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CHAPTER ONE:  
 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation of the analysis  
The last decades have seen increased economic integration world-wide, removing 
many barriers to trade and obstacles for international investment. Along with 
this globalisation process, there has been an increase in the number of regionally 
integrated areas. In some of these areas, national borders between member 
states have lost economic importance. Particularly in the European Union (EU), 
factor mobility increased with the implementation of the single market. Factor 
mobility allows both firms and workers to locate where income is highest. While 
there still exist some limitations to the mobility of labour, e.g. through language 
barriers, regulated labour markets, or migration costs, capital mobility is rather 
high. Since income is at least partially determined by tax policy, this may play 
an important role for the location decision of business within Europe. One of the 
fears often expressed in the context of this mobility is that multinational 
enterprises may put competitive pressure on governments to reduce taxation in 
order to remain attractive for the location of capital. The most pessimistic view 
is that this will lead to a “race to the bottom” with extremely low or zero 
taxation.  
 
Although this view is supported by most of the theoretical literature (e.g. 
Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986, Wilson, 1986), empirical evidence for a “race to 
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the bottom” in tax rates among EU member states is not that clear1. There are 
three necessary conditions for tax competition to take place: First, business has 
to be mobile across national borders. Second, investments have to be sensitive 
to differences in the tax burden opposed by several countries. Third, 
governments in these countries have to be able to actively use the tax policy 
instrument, and thus react to downward revisions of other countries’ tax rates 
or capital outflows.  
 
Evidently, the first condition is fulfilled: Statistics on either cross-border 
portfolio investment or on foreign direct investment (FDI) illustrate the 
mobility of capital world-wide and within the European Union and show that 
these investments have become important for at least some regions. For 
example, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, FDI flows have increased more 
than sevenfold in the European Union and do account for more than three 
percent of GDP. Moreover, empirical studies suggest the third condition to be 
fulfilled as well.  Some recent studies (Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002, Devereux 
et al., 2004) present evidence that corporate tax rates of EU member states are 
positively correlated with each other. 
 
The focus of this study is on the second condition for tax competition. The 
central question of the present analysis is how taxes influence the location 
decision of international mobile investments. Although investment decisions 
may be influenced by a number of different taxes, we will follow the majority of 
the empirical literature and concentrate our analysis on corporate taxes since 
these can be assumed to be the most important measures of the tax burden. 
                                                 
1 In an empirical study, Rodrik (1998) finds a positive rather than a negative correlation 
between the openness of a country and the size of its government suggesting that tax 
competition does not restrict government expenditures. However, evidence on tax rates is 
somewhat indirect and there are other reasons than capital mobility that lead to this result. 
More direct evidence comes from a recent study by Krogstrup (2004). She directly tests for the 
correlation between capital mobility and tax rates and finds that increased capital mobility has 
resulted in a downward pressure on corporate tax burdens among EU countries since the early 
1980s.   
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Evidence so far suggests that cross-border investments are generally deterred by 
high tax rates. For example, for investment from the United States to Europe, 
Devereux and Griffith (1998) show that a 1% higher tax rate of a country 
reduces the probability of an investment there by 0.5% to 1.3%. Concerning 
foreign direct investment within the European Union, Gorter and Parikh (2003) 
find that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate of a country decreases 
the stock of foreign investment there by approximately five percent. 
 
However, empirical evidence concerning foreign investments within the 
European Union is based on aggregated data. In fact, FDI is a very 
heterogeneous measure that can be distinguished in several ways and it can be 
assumed that different types of investment are differently affected by tax rates 
and other economic variables. Therefore, the tax elasticities reported by the 
empirical studies so far may be of only limited help for policy purposes since 
they combine data from sectors and industries with a relatively small mobility 
with data from sectors in which investment is almost perfectly mobile.          
 
A further issue that has not been discussed so far by the empirical literature on 
the activities of multinational enterprises in Europe is income shifting. The 
growing importance of foreign direct investments through multinational 
enterprises has increased the relevance of this new type of capital tax base 
mobility. By shifting income from affiliates in high tax countries to affiliates in 
low tax countries, multinational firms can minimise their overall tax payments 
rather independently from the allocation of their real activities. A visible effect 
of these tax-planning strategies can be found particularly in the tax payments of 
large German multinationals during the 1990s which had, even though their 
profitability was high, ceased to pay taxes at home (Weichenrieder, 1996). 
While income shifting benefits low tax countries in which the tax base increases, 
high tax countries are harmed from a decrease in their tax base. Consequently, 
this is an important issue for high tax countries such as Germany.  
 
The existence of income shifting opens room for new research questions which 
are particularly relevant for policy purposes.  As income shifting is considered to 
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be harmful, there exist several proposals within the EU to reform tax policy so 
as to make income shifting of multinational enterprises more difficult or even 
impossible. However, these proposals neglect the impact of income shifting on 
the optimal corporate tax rate set on the national level by EU member states. 
The theoretical literature on income shifting has just begun to analyse these 
effects. However, while income shifting typically takes place between 
asymmetric regions, the literature so far has concentrated on the case of 
symmetric regions 
 
 
1.2. Multinational enterprises and foreign direct investment 
Definitions 
Before we present some data on foreign direct investment and on the 
importance of multinational enterprises, it will be useful to define these terms at 
first. There does not exist a general definition of FDI. However, most of the 
definitions share common features. Following the definitions of the IMF (1993) 
and the OECD (1996), foreign direct investment “reflects the objective of 
obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) 
in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct 
investment enterprise). The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant 
degree of influence on the management of the enterprise”. The most important 
feature of this definition is that the lasting interest and the control of the 
foreign enterprise distinguish FDI from other components of international 
capital flows. This becomes clear when setting FDI against portfolio investment, 
since the latter are typically undertaken by pension funds or trust funds which 
involve a smaller share of ownership and, in most cases, do not involve a long-
term relationship between the investor and the foreign enterprise. According to 
the OECD definition, to control an enterprise, the foreign investor has to own 
at least ten percent of the enterprise. This threshold of equity ownership is 
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chosen to guarantee that the enterprise is at least partly controlled by 
foreigners2.  
 
Using the above definition for FDI, it is also possible to define the term 
“multinational enterprise”. Basically, a multinational enterprise is then a 
company with two or more affiliates located in different economies. 
Consequently, a purely domestic firm can become a multinational by setting up 
affiliates abroad. 
 
Figure 1.1. 
OECD flows of FDI as a percentage of GDP*, 1981 to 1999 
  
 
* GDP is the weighted average of all OECD countries. 
Source: OECD (2000a).  
 
                                                 
2 It has to be noted, however, that definitions regarding this threshold level do sometimes differ 
across countries and that some countries do not specify a threshold level for their definition of 
FDI at all. Data which is collected by supranational institutions (such as the OECD) on the 
basis of individual country statistics should therefore be interpreted with care. 
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Recent trends in foreign direct investment 
During the last twenty years, the investment climate among countries improved 
considerably. This improvement was accompanied by continued removals of 
domestic impediments though deregulation and privatisation. Moreover, 
globalisation has become an integral part of corporate strategies. This led to a 
massive increase in the volume and the importance of cross-border investment 
flows. As shown by Figure 1.1., foreign investment flows among OECD 
countries, either measured in terms of FDI received by a country or by 
investments of that country abroad, have grown much faster than GDP3. While 
investment flows only accounted for approximately 0.5 percent of GDP in the 
early 1980s, their share increased to about 3 percent at the end of the century. 
 
A closer look at the geographical distribution of FDI reveals that the majority 
of foreign direct investment takes place between developed countries. As shown 
by Table 1.1., the European Union and the United States (US) account for more 
than 70 percent of world-wide inflows and 80 percent of world-wide outflows of 
FDI in 2000. For both these regions, FDI inflows have increased sevenfold 
between 1989 and 2000 in total value and similar effects can be observed for 
outflows as well4.        
 
However, a visible effect of globalisation does not only come from statistics on 
cross-border investment flows. Parallel to the development of FDI flows, the 
number of multinational corporations has increased markedly in the last years. 
UNCTAD (2000) presents some data on the number of parent multinational 
corporations located in several European countries and the US5: while there 
existed only about 7.000 multinational enterprises at the end of the 1960s, their 
                                                 
3 Theoretically, inflows and outflows should be equal. Dissimilarities occur since definitions of 
FDI differ among reporting economies.  
4 The observed trends in investment flows are reflected in the stocks of FDI, too. Similar to 
investment flows, the European Union and the United States account for more than 50 percent 
of inward and 70 percent of outward stocks.  
5 European countries are the „EU-15“, less Finland, Greece and Ireland, plus Norway and 
Switzerland.  
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number increased to about 40.000 in the second half of the 1990s. The figures 
presented here thus illustrate the importance of foreign direct investment both 
in relative and in absolute terms. Furthermore, they show that although FDI is 
a global phenomenon, it is particular important for the EU and the US. 
 
Table 1.1. 
FDI flows by regiona, 1989 to 2000 
Region 1989-94b 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Inflows        
European Union 76.6 113.5 109.6 127.6 261.1 467.2 617.3 
United States 42.5 58.8 84.5 103.4 174.4 295.0 281.1 
Japan 1.0 0.0 0.2 3.2 3.3 12.7 8.2 
CEEc 3.4 14.3 12.7 19.2 21.0 23.2 25.4 
DCd 59.6 113.3 152.5 187.4 188.4 222.0 240.2 
World total 200.2 331.1 384.9 477.9 692.5 1075.1 1270.8 
Outflows        
European Union 105.2 159.0 183.2 220.4 454.3 720.1 773.0 
United States 49.0 92.1 84.4 95.8 131.0 142.6 139.3 
Japan 29.6 22.5 23.4 26.1 24.2 22.7 32.9 
CEEc 0.1 0.5 1.1 3.4 2.1 2.1 4.0 
DCd 24.9 49.0 57.6 65.8 37.8 58.0 99.6 
World total 228.3 355.3 391.6 466.0 711.9 1005.8 1149.9 
 
a In billion US dollar. b Annual average. c Central and Eastern Europe. d Developing Countries. 
Source: UNCTAD (2001). 
 
Distinguishing between different types of investment 
With the definitions given above, we can distinguish FDI from other cross-
border financial flows. However, the definitions of foreign direct investment are 
rather broad and there exist many types of investment that can be subsumed 
under these definitions. In some cases, FDI statistics are only provided at an 
aggregated level and do not distinguish between different types of investment. 
Generally speaking, FDI can be distinguished by its source of finance, by its 
target industry or sector, by the economic function it is intended for, and by the 
type of transaction through which it takes place.  
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With respect to its source of finance, statistics distinguish three different types 
of foreign direct investment: FDI can either be financed with new equity, with 
retained earnings, or with intra-company loans. Quite obviously, differences in 
the source of finance indicate different characteristics of the investment. 
Financing foreign investments with retained earnings or with intra-company 
loans implies that there already existed a relation between the investor and the 
investment previously. In this case, actual investments may be determined to a 
large degree by previous activities of the multinational enterprise. Moreover, 
intra-company loans may be used to cover actual losses of foreign affiliates. 
Although these flows can hardly be classified as investments, they enter FDI 
statistics as well. If the investment is financed with new equity instead, a 
previously existing relation between the investor and the investment is not 
necessary. It may either be the case that the multinational enterprise invests in 
an already existing affiliate or in an entirely new affiliate. Differences in the 
financing of FDI seem to be important therefore. This is a crucial point since 
statistics on foreign investment do sometimes not distinguish between different 
sources of finance.  
 
Another possibility is to distinguish FDI in different economic sectors or 
industries. Table 1.2. presents some statistics on foreign direct investment flows 
of EU countries that are disaggregated with respect to the economic sector and 
the industry they take place in. As can be seen, figures differ not only 
significantly between economic sectors but also between industries within 
sectors. With a share of approximately 15 percent, investments in the primary 
sector are rather small when compared to those in manufacturing and service 
which account for more than 30% and more than 50% respectively, of total 
FDI6. The differences observed here indicate that FDI is more attractive in some 
sectors and industries than in others. This may have some important 
implications on policies that aim to improve a country’s attractiveness for 
foreign investment.  
 
                                                 
6 These figures correspond to the case of FDI outflows.  
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Table 1.2. 
Sectoral distribution of FDI flows* in the EU, 1997  
 Outflows Inflows 
 total percent total percent 
     
All industries 480513 100% 295385 100% 
Primary 67942 14% 46 0% 
Manufacturing 152731 32% 76948 26% 
   Food products 5243 1% 7077 2% 
   Textiles and wood 15665 3% 9684 3% 
   Petrol, chemicals and rubber 31624 7% 20160 7% 
   Metal and mechanical 19537 4% 9615 3% 
   Office machinery and radio 10236 2% 16034 5% 
Services 257078 54% 214878 73% 
   Electricity, gas and water 9825 2% 12494 4% 
   Trade and repairs 39721 8% 20940 7% 
   Transport, communication 17509 4% 17414 6% 
   Financial intermediation 117080 24% 73808 25% 
   Real estate and business activity 62834 13% 77175 26% 
 
*Measured in million Euros. 
Source: Own computations based on UNCTAD (2000). 
 
Moreover, we can distinguish FDI with respect to its economic function. Foreign 
direct investment can be undertaken for different purposes. This can be, for 
instance, to produce final and intermediate goods abroad, to undertake research 
and development, to provide the parent or other affiliates of the multinational 
enterprise with some overhead services, or merely to sell the goods produced at 
home at the foreign market. It can be assumed that FDI undertaken for 
different purposes does vary in its size as well as in its determinants7.           
 
Finally, FDI can be disaggregated into two broad categories by the type of 
transaction through which it takes place, greenfield and brownfield investment. 
The term “greenfield” investment is used if FDI is associated with an entirely 
                                                 
7 In most cases, statistics on this type of data has to be taken from firm-level data.  
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new activity, e.g. by setting up a new plant, and the term “brownfield” 
investment is used if the investment is associated with an existing indigenous 
firm. Again, it can be argued that a distinction between these two groups is 
very important since they differ in several characteristics. For instance, while 
greenfield investment is generally associated with additional employment in the 
target country of investment, the effect of brownfield investment on 
employment is not that clear and may be negative in some cases. Moreover, 
motivations for investment may differ too. These two broad categories can be 
divided into several subcategories such as investment in a new plant, the 
expansion of an existing plant, an increase in equity, the acquisition of an 
existing firm or the merger of two firms. While some of these transactions are 
more important in determining the total amount of investment flows, others are 
less important.  As can be seen from Figure 1.2., especially mergers and 
acquisitions account for a large share of FDI.  
 
Figure 1.2. 
The share of Mergers and Acquisitions in total FDI flows 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (1998). 
 
According to this figure, almost half of the world-wide investments that have 
taken place between 1985 and 1997 came in the form of mergers and 
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acquisitions. Hence, a large portion of FDI stems from brownfield investment. 
Most of the public and academic discussion on foreign direct investment, 
however, is focused on greenfield investment, which is typically associated with 
positive economic effects for the host country of investment, instead. 
Consequently, analysing FDI at the aggregate level where greenfield and 
brownfield investment are not distinguished, may be problematic. This is the 
case since investments do not only differ with respect to its effects on the host 
economy but also in other economic characteristics.     
 
 
1.3. Contributions of the analysis 
As we have shown in section 1.2. the disaggregation of foreign direct investment 
data may be an important issue since different types of FDI have different 
characteristics and may react differently to taxation therefore. This work 
contributes in several ways to the existing empirical and theoretical literature 
on the taxation of multinational enterprises. In its empirical chapters, it makes 
use of disaggregated data on foreign direct investments to test if the tax 
sensitivity of foreign direct investment within the EU differs with its economic 
function and the sector it takes place, i.e. if some types of investment are more 
affected by taxes than others. Moreover, we distinguish between two measures 
of taxation, effective taxation and statutory taxation, and test if different types 
of investment are differently affected by these two measures.  
 
In the theoretical part of this work we try to explain the differences we found 
for the tax sensitivity of FDI when we distinguished investment by its economic 
function. Combining our theoretical results with empirical evidence, we are able 
to provide indirect evidence for the fact that German multinational enterprises 
engage in income shifting activities. With respect to this finding, we then 
analyse how the tax policy of governments that compete for taxable profits is 
affected by income shifting activities. 
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As a starting point, Chapter 2 gives a short overview on the determinants of 
foreign direct investment. In addition, we present different methodologies to 
measure the tax burden of an investment project. We then discuss properties 
and possible interpretations of these measures. In Chapter 3 we review the 
empirical literature on the tax sensitivity of multinational enterprises. We 
discuss separately the literature on real investment decisions and on income 
shifting. This chapter reports several shortcomings of empirical studies so far 
and shows their limitations: The use of aggregated data on FDI flows by studies 
concerned with the location decision inside the European Union, and the lack of 
empirical evidence for income shifting in the EU. 
 
Both, Chapter 4 and 5, make a contribution to overcome these limitations and 
to analyse the effect of taxes on multinational activities in more detail. In 
Chapter 4 we estimate the tax sensitivity of FDI among the primary, the 
manufacturing, and the service sector and find remarkable differences: While 
some investment in the primary sector is insensitive to tax rates, investment in 
the service sector is particularly sensitive to taxation. We conclude that tax 
authorities should take into account these differences when designing tax 
policies that aim to attract foreign investments.  
 
We go one step further in Chapter 5 where we investigate how different 
measures of taxation affect the investment behaviour of alternative firms. We 
develop a small theoretical model in which income shifting is a feasible strategy 
to minimise tax payments for some but not for all firms and show that 
investment of these firms is affected by different measures of taxation. This is 
tested for empirically with disaggregated data on German multinationals’ 
foreign activities. We group firms’ investment into two broad categories and 
show that their investment decision is determined by different measures of 
taxation, depending on the firms’ possibilities for income shifting.  
 
After having presented some evidence for income shifting in Chapter 5, we 
change the perspective of the analysis. While we were concerned with the firms’ 
optimal decisions in Chapter 5, we analyse the optimal policy of regional 
 13
government in Chapter 6. Our model is concerned with the question of how the 
existence of income shifting affects the optimal choice of tax rates in two 
asymmetric regions that compete for taxable profits. It is shown that income 
shifting may reduce tax competition. This is the case since the tax-base 
elasticity of the low tax region will decrease with income shifting such that it 
has an incentive to increase its tax rate.  
 
Our analysis has some clear implications for policy purposes which become clear 
in our conclusion of Chapter 7. First, sector specific tax elasticities obtained 
from the analysis in Chapter 4 suggest that different policies are needed to 
attract FDI in different economic sectors. Policies aimed to attract specific types 
of FDI should take care of this result. Second, the existence of harmful income 
shifting among German multinationals suggests that tax authorities should take 
this problem more serious. Third, tax authorities should be careful when 
designing tax policies aimed to prevent income shifting since these may reinforce 
tax competition.     
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CHAPTER TWO:  
 
Theoretical background 
 
 
2.1. The location decision of multinational enterprises 
 
2.1.1. Introduction 
As a starting point for our further analysis, this section provides a short 
overview on the motives and determinants of foreign investment and 
multinational activity as it is provided by the theoretical literature. Early 
theoretical work distinguishes two key motives for multinational activity: to 
serve a foreign market and to reduce the costs inputs8. This distinction is used 
to differentiate between “horizontal” and “vertical” investment as the two main 
types of FDI. The term “horizontal” refers to the foreign manufacturing of 
products and services which are quite similar to those the firm produces (and 
sells) at home and it is used since the multinational enterprise duplicates 
activities in different countries. Horizontal FDI arises primarily due to high 
transport costs which make it too costly to serve foreign markets via exports. In 
contrast, vertical FDI refers to those multinationals that fragment their 
production process geographically. If the production process of a firm involves 
different input factors at different production stages, the multinational firm can 
                                                 
8 Dunning (1993) provides a detailed review of the early literature on the motives for foreign 
direct investment.  
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locate each production stage in the country where factor prices are lowest. In 
practise, multinationals will be affected to some degree by both these motives, 
e.g. factor costs do affect market seeking FDI as well, and a distinction between 
the two is quite difficult if not impossible. However, we will follow the (early) 
theoretical literature which deals separately with these two different motives for 
multinational activity9. Based on this general discussion on the determinants of 
FDI, we will explore the effect of agglomeration forces and taxes in more detail.  
 
 
2.1.2. Theories of horizontal FDI 
Horizontal multinational enterprises are firms that produce the same goods or 
services in multiple plants in different countries where the local market is served 
from the production in the local plant. The central question here is for what 
reason the firm sets up a new plant abroad instead of serving the foreign market 
via exports from home. Two factors are important in determining the choice of 
a firm to become a horizontal multinational: the presence of trade or transport 
costs10 and economies of scale at the plant and at the firm level.  
 
First attempts to model the decision of a firm to become a horizontal 
multinational are the studies by Horstmann and Markusen (1987, 1992). 
Horstmann and Markusen (1992) analyse the case of imperfect competition in a 
two-country model with one homogeneous good. Initially, there is one 
monopolistic firm in each country which serves the local market only. Firms are 
assumed to have constant marginal costs in production and there exist two 
different types of fixed costs associated with the firm. One is plant-specific costs, 
i.e. fixed costs for each single production plant. The other is firm-specific costs, 
                                                 
9 More recent studies combine the two different strands of literature in one single framework 
(Markusen et. al., 1996). In doing so, they can analyse the interaction of different motives in 
more detail. However, the present work will only present the general motives for multinational 
activity. The interested reader is referred to Markusen and Maskus (2003).   
10 Note that transport costs differ from trade costs. The latter does not only include the costs to 
transport goods from one country to another, but it does also contain tariffs and the effects of 
other trade barriers.  
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which are independent from the number of production plants. Together with 
constant marginal costs of production, these fixed costs result in economies of 
scale, making it profitable for the firm to serve a larger market. That is, if the 
domestic market is already served, to expand activity to foreign markets.  
 
Of course, serving the foreign market is costly. If the goods are exported to the 
foreign country, transport costs have to be added to the production costs. An 
alternative is to set up a new plant abroad. Although this is costly as well 
(plant-specific costs are doubled in this case), this is a feasible strategy if plant-
specific costs are lower than transport costs which disappear in this case. As 
Horstmann and Markusen (1992) show, the decision to become multinational 
does crucially depend on the size of economies of scale and therefore on the 
production technology of the firm11. They find that firms are more likely to 
produce in both locations, i.e. becoming horizontal multinationals, if plant-
specific costs are low relative to firm-specific costs. 
 
In a more general model, Brainard (1993) discusses the role of scale effects at 
the firm and at the plant level in relation to transport costs. Her analysis makes 
the impact of trade costs on the firm’s decision more explicit. In a model very 
similar to those of Horstmann and Markusen (1992), it is argued again that a 
firm seeking for foreign markets will make horizontal investments abroad if the 
trade costs associated with export are larger than the costs of setting up a 
completely new production plant there. So, there is a trade-off between the 
advantage of being near to the foreign market to avoid transportation costs 
(proximity) and scale effects in case of production in one plant 
(concentration)12. The model predicts two situations in which horizontal FDI 
will dominate over exports or crowd them out completely. The first is when 
                                                 
11 In fact, since the decision of the domestic firm to become multinational has to be made in the 
context of a Curnot duopoly, it does also depend on the decision of the other firm initially 
located in the foreign country and vice-versa.  
12 With respect to the costs and benefits from locating abroad, this is called “proximity-
concentration approach”. 
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economies of scale at the firm-level are larger than at the plant-level. The 
second situation is when transport costs are higher than plant-level fixed costs.  
 
From the latter result, we can derive two assumptions regarding the 
attractiveness of a country for foreign investment: First, for given plant-level 
fixed costs and assuming transport costs to be increasing in distance, foreign 
investment becomes more attractive the larger the distance between countries. 
Second, since total transport costs will increase with the number of goods sold 
in the foreign market, production will be more attractive abroad the larger the 
foreign market. Thus, it can be expected that the size of a country has a 
positive effect on the inward FDI it receives. As FDI is a substitute for trade 
within this “proximity-concentration approach”, it can be further expected that 
investment between two countries increases with distance. However, as we will 
show below in section 2.1.3. it may also be the case that FDI follows trade 
instead.         
 
 
2.1.3. Theories of vertical FDI  
A second strand of literature we want to report here is concerned with vertical 
FDI. While horizontal FDI may occur between similar countries, the theory of 
vertical FDI assumes countries to be different. Following trade theory, Helpman 
(1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) assume that countries differ with 
respect to relative factor costs. Vertical multinationals use these differences in 
factor prices to minimise production costs.  
 
Helpman (1984) assumes that a firm produces its output with two inputs, 
unskilled labour and skilled labour (or human capital). There exist two 
countries which differ in their endowment of the two factors, one is relatively 
abundant of unskilled labour and one is relatively abundant of skilled labour, 
such that factor prices differ between them. It is further assumed that 
production factors can not move across national borders. The production 
process consists of two stages which require different input factors. The example 
given by Helpman (1984) is one in which some overhead services are provided in 
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the first stage while final production takes place in the second stage. The 
overhead services provided at the first stage require the use of skilled-labour and 
can serve many plants in different countries. Final production in the second 
stage involves the use of unskilled labour. Again, the choice to become a 
multinational can be described as a trade-off between costs and benefits. On the 
one hand, a firm can decrease its costs by splitting its production process across 
countries. Overhead services are produced in the country that is abundant of 
skilled labour and final production takes place where the costs for unskilled 
labour are lowest. On the other hand, fragmentation incurs costs such as the 
fixed costs when setting up a new plant abroad. 
 
If a firm becomes a vertical multinational enterprise it thus makes use of the 
same advantages that lead to international trade flows. Consequently, and in 
sharp contrast to the case of horizontal investment, we therefore expect that 
vertical FDI will in general follow trade flows. Moreover, the more the 
multinational enterprise fragments the production process of different stages 
geographically, vertical investment by itself may increase trade flows. Since 
investment decisions are primarily driven by differences in factor costs across 
countries, it can be expected that a multinational enterprise will locate each of 
its activities in that country which offers the lowest factor prices. Consequently, 
a country becomes more attractive for inward FDI the lower its factor prices. 
These can be, for example, prices for skilled and unskilled labour, energy prices 
or the cost of capital.                  
 
 
2.1.4. Agglomeration effects 
An issue that is closely related to the location decision of a multinational 
enterprise is the existence of agglomeration effects. Agglomeration effects can be 
best characterised as external economies of scale that occur if firms concentrate 
in a specific location. There are several reasons why these economies of scale 
may occur. First, the concentration of several firms in a single location offers a 
pooled market for workers with specific skills. Second, localised industries may 
support the production of (non-tradable) specialised inputs. Third, 
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informational spillovers may increase output of clustered firms. As Krugman 
(1991) shows in a theoretical model, the existence of such positive spillover 
effects may result in a clustering of firms which is self-reinforcing: Firms will 
concentrate in an attractive location. This will make the location even more 
attractive for other firms. 
 
Following the two motives for foreign investment presented above, 
agglomeration effects can arise for two reasons. As we have seen, a country with 
a large market will be an attractive place for market seeking (horizontal) FDI. 
In most cases, however, these firms will not only sell in this market but will also 
demand some (intermediate) goods from the market which makes it attractive 
for other firms to locate there as well. It can be therefore assumed that the 
concentration of firms in a specific location makes it more attractive for FDI. 
Vertical FDI offers another reason for agglomeration effects. Producing only 
these goods that require the low-cost input factor will lead to a specialisation of 
the country. This specialisation may reduce production costs further in a way 
that the country becomes more attractive for similar types of foreign 
investment. Having these agglomeration effects in mind, it can be supposed that 
a location becomes more attractive for a specific foreign investment, the larger 
the concentration of similar firms is.      
 
 
2.1.5. The impact of taxation 
The focus of this work is on the question how taxes affect the decisions of 
multinational enterprises. It can be assumed that taxes play an important role 
particularly in determining vertical FDI. Taxes will influence the factor prices a 
firm has to pay in a certain country and low tax rates will therefore make a 
location more attractive. Labour taxes, for example, increase the factor costs for 
labour and environmental taxes may increase energy prices. In this work, 
however, we will primarily focus on the corporation tax. Most of the theoretical 
literature in the field of taxation models the corporation tax as a unit tax on 
capital (for an extensive overview see Wilson, 1999). As shown by these models, 
a unit tax on capital will typically increase the costs of capital for a firm and 
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will therefore make investment less attractive. Although a unit tax on capital is 
rather unrealistic, results derived from these simple models carry over to the 
taxation of corporate profits. In this case, taxation does not increase the costs of 
the investment but decrease the return of the investment. We can suppose 
therefore that higher tax rates will make a country less attractive for foreign 
investment. 
 
However, the effect of taxes is more complicated than it seems at first sight. In 
fact, it is not that clear whether multinational enterprises can benefit from low 
tax rates abroad or not. This crucially depends on how the tax system employed 
by the home country of the multinational enterprise treats foreign profits. Two 
broad types of tax systems can be distinguished, tax-exemption systems and 
tax-credit systems. Under tax-exemption, taxation in the home country follows 
a source principle. In this case, only that income of the multinational is taxed in 
the home country that is generated there. Income generated abroad is exempt 
from taxation at home but is taxed by the foreign country with its 
corresponding tax rate. Hence, under a system that exempts foreign profits, 
there will be incentives to locate foreign activities in low tax countries. Under 
tax-credit, however, incentives are different. In this case taxation follows the 
principle of world-wide income and multinational income from abroad will be 
taxed at home. However, to avoid a double taxation of foreign income that is 
already taxed at its source abroad, the tax credit system allows the 
multinational enterprise to subtract taxes paid abroad from the tax liabilities at 
home. If tax liabilities abroad are lower than those at home, the multinational 
firm has to pay the difference to its home country. If, on the other hand, tax 
liabilities abroad are larger than that at home, the firm will typically get no 
refund on taxes from the home country since tax credits are limited. So under 
tax-credit, there will be no tax-specific incentives to locate foreign activity in 
low tax countries. However, since tax credits are limited there will be 
disincentives to locate in high tax countries. Moreover, taxation at home does 
only take place when the foreign income is repatriated. If the multinational firm 
delays repatriation and reinvests in the foreign country, there do exist invectives 
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to locate in low-tax countries even under tax credit. Note that these 
reinvestments do typically enter FDI statistics (see section 1.2.3). 
 
In addition to the decision where to locate real investment, taxation also affects 
the income reporting of multinational enterprises. By shifting income from one 
location to another, multinationals have the opportunity to minimise their 
overall tax burden. This can be done, e.g. by manipulating transaction prices for 
intra-company trade or by manipulating interest rates for intra-company loans. 
For instance, an affiliate located in a high tax country may sell some products 
to another affiliate of the multinational located in a low-tax country. By 
charging a price lower than actual production costs, income in the high-tax 
affiliate will decrease while those of the affiliate in the low-tax country will 
increase. Remarkably, as Mintz and Smart (2004) have only formalised recently, 
since tax liabilities will be lower in the high tax country then, the possibility to 
shift income will make the high tax country attractive for real investment, 
despite its high tax rate.  
 
Nevertheless, due to its negative effect on tax revenue, high tax countries may 
try to prevent income shifting. With respect to transfer pricing, tax authorities 
can compare intra-company trade prices with those prices observed in inter-
company trade. If the intra-company trade price differs too much from this 
“arms-length price”, tax authorities may treat the transaction as being 
irregular. However, there exist some goods which are not commonly traded on 
the market and those regular prices are difficult to observe. Examples of such 
goods are royalty payments and some special types of overhead services such as 
expenses on research and development. An alternative to prevent income 
shifting is the use of apportionment rules. Under these rules, the multinational 
enterprise has to allocate its world-wide income according to some measures of 
real economic activity such as the capital employed in a country or the number 
of employees. Yet, this again leads to incentives to reallocate real activity from 
the high tax country to the low tax country in order to increase the potential 
for income shifting. It can be argued therefore that tax-motivated income 
shifting affects multinational investment activity as well.                      
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2.2. Measuring the tax burden of multinational enterprises 
 
2.2.1. Introduction 
When evaluating the response of multinational enterprises to tax policy we need 
first a good indicator for the tax burden imposed on these firms. While 
theoretical work on corporate taxation is often only concerned with one measure 
of taxation, i.e. the statutory tax rate, empirical studies, in contrast, make use 
of a large number of methodologies that try to measure the burden of taxation. 
These methodologies differ not only significantly in the approach taken to 
measure taxes but they have different interpretations as well. It is therefore not 
clear which of these methodologies to use when comparing the tax burden 
imposed on firms across different countries. This chapter investigates the 
different methodologies to measure the burden of the tax system of a country 
and presents arguments for and against their use. We start with measures based 
on the actual tax code of a country. We then discuss the properties of tax 
measures that are based on the evaluation of past tax codes. We proceed in 
presenting a measure that combines the latter two approaches. Finally, we 
present tax rates calculated under different methodologies, compare them with 
each other, and give a conclusion. 
 
 
2.2.2. Measures based on the current tax code 
Statutory tax rates 
The most basic measure of corporate income taxation is the statutory tax rate. 
A major advantage of statutory tax rates is that data are readily available, both 
over time and across countries. However, it has to be noted that defining this 
tax rate is less straightforward than might be expected: Corporate taxes are 
often applied at more than one level of government, i.e. central and regional 
governments impose their own statutory tax rate on the same investment13. 
                                                 
13 The United States and Canada are prominent examples for such a state of affairs.  
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There may also be temporary or permanent surcharges to these taxes which 
have to be taken into account14.  
 
A high statutory tax rate does not necessarily imply high tax payments. 
Statutory tax rates include neither different depreciation allowances nor any 
other specifics of the national tax code. Effects of the tax base are typically 
omitted. Therefore, statutory tax rates not more than a first indicator for the 
tax burden of real (productive) investments. However, there might be two 
possibilities why the statutory tax rate is nevertheless important: One 
possibility is that firms do not in fact consider the more complex measures 
developed below. The second and more likely possibility is that firms undertake 
income shifting. For a given level of allowances, the statutory tax rate equals 
the marginal rate of tax applied on any additional income. It is therefore likely 
to be relevant in determining the incentives for income shifting.           
 
Effective marginal tax rates 
More encompassing tax measures are so-called effective tax rates. Broadly 
speaking, effective tax rates take into account the differences between the 
theoretical concept of pure economic profits and the taxable income, the tax 
base, which firms are actually charged under the tax code of a given country. In 
the presence of special tax breaks, accelerated depreciation schemes and similar 
tax incentives, the tax base may be substantially lower than pure economic 
profits, leading to diverging measures for statutory tax rates on the one hand 
and effective tax rates on the other. 
 
The first theoretically founded concept for effective tax rates, the effective 
marginal tax rate (EMTR) that is based on neoclassical investment theory, was 
developed by Hall and Jorgensen (1967) and later extended by King and 
Fullerton (1984)15. The EMTR measures the tax burden of an entirely new 
investment project that earns zero profits at the margin. To be realised, a 
marginal investment project has to earn a rate of return, p , that is equal to its 
                                                 
14 Surtaxes are levied, e.g. in Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. 
15 King and Fullerton extended the framework by considering debt financing and personal taxes.   
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costs, i.e. the interest rate r . With corporate taxation, however, the post-tax 
rate of return will decrease. To redeem this negative effect, the project has to 
earn a larger pre-tax rate of return, pˆ . The idea of the EMTR is to calculate 
the required pre-tax rate of return of the investment, given the tax code of the 
country. When calculating the pre-tax rate of return, the EMTR does not only 
take into account the corporate statutory tax rate, t , but also other relevant 
tax provisions such as taxation at the personal level and the net present value 
of current and future tax allowances, A  (assuming future tax laws to be 
unchanged). Beside the information about the tax code, the calculation makes 
use of assumptions regarding interest rates, the financing structure of the firm 
and so on. Therefore, EMTRs can be calculated for different asset and financing 
policies. As this calculation is not only based on the current period but is also 
based on future periods, particularly with respect to A , the EMTR can be seen 
as a forward-looking tax measure.    
 
To give an example, let us assume that a firm makes a marginal investment of 
1€ and has to pay an interest rate r  of eight percent16. In the absence of taxes, 
the required return of the investment project p  equals r . Now, suppose the 
firm has to pay a statutory tax rate of 0.5t =  but at the same time can make 
use of tax allowances A . These allowances account for two cents in tax savings, 
e.g. half of the interest payments can be deducted. The required pre-tax rate of 
return pˆ  is then 12 percent: 
 
( )ˆ 1
r Ap
t
−= −             (2.1)      
 
Given that taxation increases the required pre-tax rate of return, the difference 
between post-tax and pre-tax rate of return, the so called “tax wedge”, pˆ p− , 
can be thought of as a measure for the tax burden. As can be seen from 
equation (2.1), while a statutory tax rate will increase pˆ  and therewith the tax 
wedge, the opposite holds if depreciation allowances A  increase. The 
                                                 
16 In this simple one period example we abstract from depreciation, i.e. the only cost of the 
investment project is the interest paid.  
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proportionate difference between the pre-tax and the post-tax rate of return is 
then defined as the EMTR. Using this definition, the EMTR in our example 
becomes: 13ˆ ˆ( ) /p p p− = . The EMTR of 1/3 implies that the pre-tax rate of 
return required to achieve a zero-profitability has to be 33 percent higher than 
the rate necessary when the investment is untaxed. Hence, the higher the 
EMTR, the lower is the incentive for investment. Since the EMTR is based on 
the assumption of a marginal investment project, it is a good measure for the 
tax burden of adjustment decisions such as plant expansions. Alternatively, if a 
firm has already decided to invest in a country, this measure can determine the 
scaling of investment.  
  
Effective average tax rates 
Typically, when investing abroad, multinational firms can not split their 
investment across several countries but have to choose between two or more 
mutually exclusive locations in which the investment project gains positive 
profits. Examples for such discrete (or inframarginal) investment choices are 
alternative production locations or investments in the case of financial 
constraints, i.e. where only one investment project can be realised. By 
construction, the impact of taxes on discrete investment choices that earn a 
positive rent is not captured by the framework of the EMTR. As an example, 
think of an investment neutral cash-flow tax which is only levied on the 
economic rent. In this case, the EMTR would be zero, implying that there is no 
tax burden at all. To deal with this shortcoming, the concept of effective 
average tax rates has been developed.  
 
Devereux and Griffith (1998a, 1998b, 2003) extend the concept of effective 
marginal tax rates by allowing investments to be profitable. The main difference 
between their measure of an effective average tax rate (EATR) and the EMTR 
stems from the calculation of the required pre-tax and post-tax rate of return. 
Instead of calculating these rates of return for a marginal profitability of zero, 
they are calculated for different levels of profitability, R . For our simple 
example from above, profitability can be incorporated by introducing R  in the 
numerator of equation (2.1) which leads to: 
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( )ˆ 1
R r Ap
t
+ −= −             (2.2) 
 
As depicted by Figure 2.1., and analysed in more detail algebraically by 
Devereux and Griffith (2003), the EATR increases with the level of 
profitability. For a profitability of 0R = , it is equal to the EMTR. For larger 
levels of profitability, it converges towards the statutory tax rate17. So, as a 
result, the EATR can be simply thought of as a linear combination of the latter 
two measures.  
 
Figure 2.1. 
Effective average tax rates at different levels of profitability  
 
Source: Own representation, based on Devereux and Griffith (2003).  
     
                                                 
17 In their analysis, Devereux and Griffith (2003) do also incorporate taxation at the shareholder 
level. With this specification of the EATR, they show that it converges to an “adjusted” 
statutory tax rate if profitability increases.    
EMTR 
R=0 
Statutory 
tax rate 
R infinite 
EATR 
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To give an intuition for the connection between these measures, think again of 
our example. If increased profitability is not affecting the level of A , then any 
additional profit made will be taxed at the statutory tax rate. The overall level 
of taxation then depends on the fraction of pre-tax profits for which the 
marginal tax rate is given by the EMTR and the fraction of profits for which it 
is given by the statutory tax rate. For a profitability of four percent, equation 
(2.2) calculates a pre-tax rate of return of 20 percent for our example. While 60 
percent of the pre-tax profits of the firm (12 cents out of 20) are taxed with the 
EMTR of 33 percent, the remaining 40 percent are taxed with the statutory tax 
rate of 50 percent. This leads to an EATR of 40 percent. Hence, for any given 
level of tax allowances, the EATR will increase with the profitability of the 
investment project18.  
 
In principle, the EATR, as well as the EMTR, can be calculated for a variety of 
different investment projects by adjusting the model used. Taking into account 
the tax code of the source and the target country of an investment, it would 
even be possible to calculate the tax burden of international investments19. 
However, as the results are derived from models, the measured impact of 
taxation is only valid under the assumptions of these models. If these 
assumptions, i.e. on the profitability of the firm and the financing mix, are 
invalid, these measures will not give us a proper picture of the actual tax 
burden of an investment. 
 
 
                                                 
18 In line with empirical findings we assume here that the marginal tax rate is lower than the 
actual statutory tax rate levied on pure profits. However, it may also be possible that the 
EMTR is higher than the statutory tax rate. In this case, the EATR will decrease with the level 
of profitability. 
19 An alternative method to calculate effective average tax rates that is not further pursued here 
is to use a model firm approach (see Jacobs and Spengel, 2000). The basic approach is to 
assume an industry specific mix of assets and liabilities of a firm and to calculate future pre-tax 
profits on the basis of estimates for future cash receipts and costs. Comparing the net present 
value of the firm for the case with and without taxation gives a measure for the effective tax 
burden.      
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2.2.3. Measures based on past tax codes 
Implicit macroeconomic average tax rates 
Given the complexity of the forward-looking tax measures described in section 
2.2.2., their calculation is not an easy task. Sufficient data does only exist for a 
small number of countries and for some years. Since the alternative use of 
statutory tax rates offers only limited benefits when measuring the tax burden 
of investment, so called implicit average tax rates have been used often to 
measure tax incentives instead. 
 
The basic idea of these measures is to express total tax payments as a 
proportion of a measure of (pre-tax) profits or the tax base. A particular 
example of such a tax rate, and one which has been widely used, was developed 
by Mendoza et al. (1994) for use with aggregate data. Their approach is to 
derive tax ratios on the basis of the OECD Revenue statistics and National 
Accounts. They define the tax rate on corporate income as the fraction of tax 
revenues from taxes on income, profits, and capital gains on corporations, to the 
operating surplus of the economy minus the operating surplus of private 
incorporated enterprises. The most serious problem with this approach comes 
from the definition of the tax revenue categories used in the numerator of the 
implicit tax measure. These categories are often broadly classified and do 
contain tax payments that can hardly be assigned to only one macroeconomic 
sector. To give an example: All of the income of the self-employed represents 
capital income, although this income does partly reflect the reward to their 
labour input as well. In this respect, it is not surprising that a number of 
scholars have criticised the definition of tax ratios used by Mendoza et al. 
(1994) and proposed their own, perhaps more sophisticated, definitions20.  
                                                 
20 Volkering and de Haan (2001) provide an extensive survey of the conceptual and practical 
problems when calculating implicit tax rates. Carey and Rabesona (2004), argue that the 
definition of the corporate tax ratio neglects a number of important categories of taxation 
(namely corporate recurrent taxes on net wealth and immovable property). In a subsequent 
study, Volkering et al. (2002), propose a refined version of the implicit tax rate. It is shown, 
however, that the results of several empirical studies are robust with respect to the exact 
definition of implicit tax rates.    
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The attractiveness of this approach lies in its simplicity. Aggregate data are 
easily available from most statistical institutes, and ratios can be calculated in a 
convenient and quick way for different countries and years. Moreover, such tax 
rates implicitly consider the entire tax code and may also reflect the 
enforcement policy of a country. Nevertheless, these rates suffer from a number 
of shortcomings. In fact, the actual tax payments used to calculate the tax ratio 
do not only depend on the current tax code. To a large degree, these payments 
are determined by the history of the tax system, the history of the investment 
of a firm up to this point, and by the history of the losses of the firm21. As 
historical data plays a crucial role in determining the implicit tax rate, it can be 
best characterized as a backward-looking concept relying on past tax codes. 
Consequently, this concept can give a proper picture of the tax burden of 
already existing capital, but it can not be used to measure the incentives of the 
tax system on new investment. To give an example, think of the recent German 
capital tax reform. With this reform, several firms were allowed to deduct losses 
stemming from the early eighties from their actual tax payment. In aggregate, 
although conditions for new investment have not been affected by this 
particular provision, this led to a dramatic decrease in corporate tax revenue 
which resulted in a sharp decline in the tax ratio.  
 
Another fundamental problem of this measure is that it is a very broad one. 
With the approach taken, it is not possible to distinguish the effects of taxes on 
different investments, e.g. among sectors or industries. Moreover, this measure 
may be contaminated by the influence of foreign tax systems on the tax 
payments of local firms, e.g. by double taxation agreements under which foreign 
income of multinational enterprises is taxed/not taxed in the home country. An 
alternative approach that can cope with some of these difficulties is the concept 
of implicit microeconomic tax rates.  
 
Implicit microeconomic tax rates 
The concept of implicit microeconomic tax rates is based on firm specific data 
instead of revenue statistics. Similar to the macroeconomic case, tax rates are 
                                                 
21 That is, firms may be carrying forward losses from previous periods.    
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calculated as the tax liabilities of the firm, relative to its profits. Data can either 
be taken from individual financial statements or consolidated returns. Country 
specific tax rates can then be obtained from firm specific tax rates with several 
techniques. For example, the tax ratio of a representative firm can be taken as a 
measure for the tax burden in the country. As current tax liabilities of the firm, 
again, do largely depend on the history of the investment, this concept shares 
some of the shortcomings of the macroeconomic average tax rate when 
determining the tax burden of new investments. However, compared with the 
latter approach, microeconomic tax rates offer the advantage that they can be 
calculated for different sectors and industries. Based on firm specific data, it is 
also feasible to calculate tax rates for differently sized firms22. Moreover, with 
this approach, it is also possible to cope with another problem. Tax rates can 
either be calculated from all firms in the sample or on the basis of national firms 
which do no business abroad only. If the latter method is used, tax liabilities are 
not influenced by foreign tax systems and the national tax system can be 
isolated from any interference with these systems. It is often argued that using 
backward-looking tax measures in empirical studies entails some problems 
regarding endogeneity since it is not that clear whether tax rates determine 
investment decisions of multinational enterprises, or, the other way round, the 
investment decision of multinationals determines the tax rate of a country. 
Calculating microeconomic implicit tax rates on the basis of purely national 
firms can obviously solve this problem since these rates can be assumed to be 
largely independent from multinational activities.         
 
When comparing the macroeconomic with the microeconomic approach to 
calculate backward-looking tax rates, the advantages discussed above have to be 
related to the disadvantages of firm level based data. These disadvantages stem 
from the required efforts in data collection. Although there exist several 
databases which contain detailed information on the balance sheet of individual 
firms, e.g. the Worldscope- or the Bach-database, these efforts are relatively 
high when compared to the approach based on revenue statistics.               
                                                 
12 By carrying our regressions, the microeconomic approach makes it also possible to identify the 
items of the balance sheet that determine the effective corporate tax rate of a firm.     
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2.2.4. Combining the neoclassical approach with historical data  
In principle, forward-looking tax rates based on the current tax system may give 
a proper picture of the tax burden of new investment. However, as we have 
already noted above, this is only the case if the model used to derive these tax 
rates is specified correctly. Since tax laws are very complicated in practice, there 
is a possibility that the model used overlooks some important issues of the tax 
code. In this case, the parameter A  used to calculate the pre-tax rate of return 
(compare equations (2.1) and (2.2)) is specified incorrectly. On the other hand, 
given the shortcomings discussed in section 2.2.3., using implicit tax rates that 
do automatically account for all provisions of the tax law, may involve other 
problems. 
 
To overcome this dilemma, Gordon et al. (2004) propose an alternative measure 
that combines the two different approaches. Their basic idea is to use the 
theory based approach taken to derive effective marginal and effective average 
tax rates. However, when calculating the required pre-tax rate of return of the 
investment on the basis of equation (2.1) or (2.2), instead of assumptions 
regarding the actual tax code, their measure uses historical data to proxy the 
parameter A . Historical data on depreciation allowances can be assessed by 
comparing actual tax payments with hypothetical tax payments that would 
emerge if all profits are taxed with the statutory tax rate, either at the firm or 
at the aggregate level. This data implicitly accounts for all provisions of the tax 
code and, using firm level data, can be assessed in a very detailed form. As can 
be shown theoretically, if tax laws have not changed over time, and if the 
investment growth rate equals the nominal interest rate, this historical data can 
perfectly approximate future depreciation allowances for new investment. In this 
case, the backward-looking measure proposed by Gordon et al. (2004) is 
superior to any application of the EMTR that omits some details of the current 
tax code.       
 
In reality, however, depreciation allowances are changed quite frequently in the 
tax code and the investment growth rate does not correspond to the nominal 
interest rate. In this case, the proposed measure here is as inaccurate as other 
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backward-looking tax rates. Becker and Fuest (2004) propose a refined version 
of this measure which can deal with some of these problems. They show that 
depreciation allowances derived under the approach of Gordon et al. (2004) can 
be divided into regular allowances as measured by forward-looking data and 
special deductions which are not captured by the latter approach. Having 
additional empirical information on the change in tax codes23 and the difference 
between investment growth and nominal interest rates, it is then possible to 
correct for these inaccuracies. When applied correctly, this combined measure 
therefore offers an alternative that may solve some of the practical problems 
involved when using tax measures based on the current tax code. 
 
       
2.2.5. Comparison of different measures and conclusion  
The literature so far has already calculated tax rates based on the different 
methodologies presented here. In general, and in line with our theoretical 
assumptions of section 2.2.2., the statutory tax rate indicates a relatively large 
burden of taxation for new investment, while the burden indicated by the 
EMTR is relatively small. The tax burdens displayed by average tax rates are 
in between. However, between the three different measures for average tax rates 
presented here, the EATR, the macro- and the microeconomic implicit tax rate, 
there is large variation as well. With respect to different countries, there is 
variation as well.   
 
Based on these calculations, Table 2.1. presents a ranking of nine EU countries 
under different measures of corporate taxation. All other things equal, the 
choice where to locate a discrete investment that can be realised in only one of 
two or more alternative, but mutually exclusive, locations, will depend on a 
ranking of the tax burdens at these locations. Rank one is given to the country 
with the lowest tax rate in the sample while rank nine labels the country with 
the highest tax rate. As can be seen, tax rates differ markedly with the 
                                                 
23 Changes in the tax code over time can be assumed to be better observable than the tax code 
as a whole.     
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underlying tax measure. With focus on differences between the three average 
tax rates shown in Table 2.1., one obvious case is Germany where the average 
tax rate based on the backward-looking macroeconomic approach is about 20 
percent, whereas the effective tax burden calculated from the backward-looking 
microeconomic approach is 19 percentage points higher (39.0 percent). These 
differences are the basis for the controversial discussion of whether Germany is 
a high tax country for corporations, or not. Based on implicit macroeconomic 
tax rates, Hettich and Schmidt (2001, 2003) conclude that Germany is a low tax 
country and that there is no scope to further reduce the tax burden on 
corporate profits. With respect to the high German EATR, Gütekunst et al. 
(2003) argue that this is not the case. The reverse pattern can be found in the 
United Kingdom, where the effective average tax rate on a hypothetical 
investment is rather low when compared to other countries, but the 
macroeconomic tax rate is the highest in our sample. There are a few countries 
which are ranked consistently under each of the different tax measures such as 
Ireland and Austria (as low tax countries) or the Netherlands (as an 
intermediate country). However, for most countries in the sample the evaluation 
of its tax burden, relative to its neighbours, differs with the tax measure used. 
 
We have shown above that the evaluation of the tax system of a country 
crucially depends on the precise tax measure used. It is therefore important to 
use the “correct” measure in empirical studies. The correct measure depends on 
the relevant research question. With regard to the question where to invest, 
effective average tax rates are probably the best measure. If the research 
question is instead to determine how much to invest in a certain country, 
effective marginal tax rates are the most appropriate measure. Once all 
depreciation allowances are used by the firm, however, the statutory tax rate 
becomes relevant for the location decision. It is therefore a suitable measure for 
the incentives to engage in cross-border income shifting activities. The 
disadvantage of these measures lies in the fact that they are only available for a 
small number of countries and time periods and that the models these tax rates 
are based on might omit some important details of the tax code.  
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Table 2.1. 
Country ranking by tax rate  
 
Source: Adapted from Haufler and Stöwhase (2003).  
 
* split tax rate  
a. Macroeconomic tax rates based on a modified version of the Mendoza et al. (1994) methology. Taken from OECD (2000b, p.31). 
b. Microeconomic tax rates based on firm level data. Taken from Büttner (2002). 
c. Effective average and effective marginal tax rates – base case. Taken from Devereux et al. (2002). 
backward-looking 
(based on past tax codes) 
forward-looking 
(based on the actual tax code) 
average tax rates 
 
[1] 
Macroa 
(´91-´97) 
[2] 
Microb 
(´98) 
[3] 
EATRc 
(´01) 
 
 
EMTRc 
(´01) 
 
 
Statutory 
(2001 tax rate in 
parentheses) 
 
 
 
Minimum 
of [1] – [3] 
 
 
 
Maximum 
of [1] – [3] 
Austria 2 1 3 3 3 (34) 10.3 (Micro) 27.0  (EATR) 
Belgium 7 2 9 7 8 (40.2) 20.6 (Micro) 34.0  (EATR) 
France 5 7 5 5 6 (36.4) 23.6 (Macro) 36.1 (Micro) 
Germany 3 8 8 8 7 (38.3) 19.9 (Macro) 39.0 (Micro) 
Ireland 1 3 1 1 1 (28/10*) 8.0 (EATR) 23.5 (Micro) 
Italy 8 9 4 2 9 (40.3) 28.6 (EATR) 43.9 (Micro) 
Netherlands 6 6 6 6 4 (35) 24.7 (Macro) 30,3 (EATR) 
Spain 4 4 7 9 4 (35) 20.6 (Macro) 32.5 (EATR) 
UK 9 5 2 4 2 (30) 25.7 (EATR) 38.4 (Macro) 
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The shortcomings of forward-looking tax measures can be overcome by the use 
of empirical (historical) data on corporate tax payments. Due to their 
backward-looking nature, however, these tax rates are inaccurate when 
measuring the incentives for new investment and, especially when based on 
aggregate data, should be used with due care. Although recent measures try to 
combine the two approaches these may have their shortcomings as well. Hence, 
provided the availability of sufficient data on forward-looking tax rates these 
should be the preferred measures to be used in an econometric analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
 
Empirical evidence on the tax sensitivity of 
multinational enterprises 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to give an overview and some critique on the literature that 
has so far studied the impact of different international tax rules and tax 
burdens on the financial and real behaviour of multinational enterprises. We do 
so by presenting selected empirical work concerning the United States as well as 
Europe. Our review includes work from the early 1990s as well as more recent 
studies24. Empirical results provided by these studies, in general, indicate that 
taxation does influence the financing of multinational enterprises and their 
allocation of factors and products around the world. We reveal possible channels 
for the observed behaviour by taking a closer look at the data and the basic 
approach used by these studies. Moreover, we present results and discuss 
possible shortcomings which open room for further empirical work. Most of the 
empirical literature under review here does either investigate the question on 
how real investments are determined by taxation, or it investigates how 
                                                 
24 Hines (1997) provides an extensive overview on the early literature with a particular focus on 
the United States. A more recent review, Hines (1999), also includes studies from the late 1990s. 
De Moiij and Ederveen (2003) provide a meta-analysis of  these studies. They analyse how 
regression results are affected by the design of the study and the data used.     
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multinational activities are motivated by considerations of tax avoidance 
(namely income shifting). We follow this distinction made in the literature. In 
section 3.2. we present empirical work on the tax sensitivity of real investments. 
Section 3.3. is concerned with the question of whether cross-border activities of 
multinational enterprises are determined by strategies of income shifting or not, 
and how this is related to taxation. Section 3.4. concludes.            
 
 
3.2 The tax sensitivity of real investment 
 
3.2.1. Empirical evidence from the United States 
The early empirical literature on the effects of taxes on investment decisions 
almost exclusively uses data from the United States. A simple explanation for 
this particular focus comes from the fact that the United States collected more 
and higher-quality data, e.g. on investment flows or on foreign owned capital 
stocks, than other countries. Studies are either concerned with the worldwide 
distribution of investments from the United States (outbound FDI), or they try 
to explain the allocation of foreign investments inside them (inbound FDI). We 
will focus here on three studies which we will discuss in more detail. The first is 
on inbound FDI, the two others are concerned with outbound FDI. 
  
Studies that analyse the determinants of inbound FDI typically take the 
decision of multinational enterprises to invest in the USA as given. Conditional 
on a firm having decided to invest in the US, these studies examine in which US 
state the investment occurs. The basic idea is to estimate foreign investment as 
a function of tax rates and other specific variables that vary among the different 
target states of the investment. Tax rates between states differ since US states 
are allowed to impose their own taxes on corporate profits. Other provisions of 
the tax code such as depreciation allowances, however, do not differ across 
states. State specific variables may illustrate, for example, demand, factor costs 
and public infrastructure but also other factors that determine the 
attractiveness of a location. Some of these factors are easy to quantify, others 
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are not. In practise, controlling for these non-tax factors may be very difficult 
and there is a possibility that some important variables that determine the 
investment decision are not identified by the econometric model. An elegant 
method to deal with this problem is taken by Hines (1996).  
 
The starting point for his analysis is the observation that investors from 
countries that exempt US profits from taxation in the home country are much 
more sensitive to state tax rates than investors from countries that grant a tax 
credit for taxes paid in the United States25. Investments from seven source 
countries, five of which exempt foreign profits and two grant a (limited) tax 
credit26, act as dependent variable. Investment is measured as the value of 
property plant and equipment (PPE) used by foreign-owned firms in the year 
1987 at the aggregate level. Hence, this is a purely cross-sectional analysis. To 
measure tax incentives, the study makes use of statutory tax rates calculated at 
the state level. With respect to section 2.2.2. above, we may argue that 
statutory tax rates are an incorrect measure here since they do not account for 
depreciation allowances. However, since depreciation allowances are equal across 
states, differences in statutory tax rates can be assumed to represent differences 
in effective taxation as well.  
 
In principle, the estimation follows a two step procedure: In the first step it is 
assessed which states are attractive for investments if tax incentives play no 
role. To do so, the study makes use of investments from tax-credit countries 
only. Theoretically, these investments should be independent from tax 
incentives since foreign firms have to pay excess taxes at home. If this is the 
case, however, and states are equal in all other aspects, investment from these 
countries should be distributed uniformly among US states theoretically. Any 
deviation from this distribution then reflects the locational (dis)advantage of a 
                                                 
25 For a short theoretical discussion see section 2.1.5. In fact, as Hines (1996) shows, controlling 
only for state size, investment from tax-exemption countries in states that levy a zero corporate 
tax is approximately three times larger than that in high tax states. Investments from tax-credit 
countries, on the other hand, are equally distributed among low and high tax states. 
26 Countries that grant a tax credit are Japan and the United Kingdom. 
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state, i.e. it measures to which degree one state is more attractive than the 
other.. This information is used to capture all non-tax variables in a single 
state-specific measure. In the second step, investment from tax-exemption 
countries is then estimated as a function of these state specific variables and 
taxes alone. Hence, the approach taken by Hines (1996) makes it unnecessary to 
include multiple control variables into the regression.  
 
For a variety of different specifications, estimation results confirm those of other 
empirical studies not reported here. It is found that above average state taxes 
have significantly negative impacts on inbound foreign direct investment of US 
states: A one percent higher state tax rate reduces investment by approximately 
ten percent. However, there is one serious problem with the analysis that has 
not been discussed so far. The study implicitly assumes that investors from tax-
credit countries have no tax incentive when investing in low tax states since 
their tax burden is effectively determined by their home tax rate. As we have 
already discussed in section 2.1.5. above, this is clearly not the case if taxation 
in the United States exceeds those at the home country. Since tax credits are 
limited, a larger tax burden in the US has to be fully borne by the firm then 
and there are disincentives for investment in high tax states. Hines (1996, p. 
1080) claims that firms may use excess foreign tax credits in subsequent years 
or apply them towards earlier years’ tax obligations. This is, however, a very 
strict assumption that, if not fulfilled, may potentially bias the empirical results.             
 
The study from above was concerned with inbound FDI. We now want to turn 
attention to outbound investment. A study that is concerned with the question 
of how world-wide foreign investments of multinational enterprises with 
headquarters in the United States are affected by taxes comes from Grubert and 
Mutti (2000). Based on firm level data, their cross-sectional analysis investigates 
the determinants of investment from the United States into 60 countries for the 
year 1990. This time investment is measured as the aggregated capital stock in 
the manufacturing sector of a foreign country that is held by US-based firms. 
Foreign tax rates are calculated from the sample data by dividing income taxes 
paid by the firms in that country by total profits. Hence, these tax rates can be 
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characterised as implicit microeconomic average tax rates (see section 2.2.3). 
They use total GDP and GDP per capita to control for the size of foreign 
markets. Based on the theoretical work presented in section 2.1., it is assumed 
that investment will be more attractive, the larger the foreign market. As a 
further control variable an index for trade barriers is used. Empirical results 
suggest that the capital stock owned by US multinationals is negatively 
correlated with the average tax rate of the country and positively correlated 
with its market size. Moreover, it is shown that taxes interact with the openness 
of the country: Investments in countries with an open trade regime respond 
more elastically to tax rates than those to countries with a more restrictive 
trade regime. Presumably this reflects the fact that much of the output 
associated with the investment is intended for export. For countries with the 
most open trade regime, estimation results imply that a one percent increase in 
the average tax rate decreases investment in this country by three percent. 
However, the sample includes countries with less open trade regimes for which 
the tax-elasticity is smaller. Weighting each county’s trade-policy-influenced 
elasticity by the capital invested yields to an average elasticity of two, i.e. a one 
percent increase in the tax rate decreases investment by two percent.  
 
Grubert and Mutti (2000) are able to identify that average tax rates are 
negatively correlated to the age of the investment. So, in order to test if their 
results are driven by the age-composition of investment across countries, they 
use a modified tax rate that corrects for the age structure. Their empirical 
results do not change significantly for this as for other specifications of the 
regression. Unobserved heterogeneity between countries is accounted for by the 
use of four dummy variables that measure if investment in one global region will 
ceteris paribus be larger than those in other regions. Coefficients for these 
dummy variables suggest that regions which are geographically closer to the 
United States, i.e. North and Latin America, are more attractive for investment 
than those with a larger distance, i.e. Europe and Asia.  
 
Although results are very robust to different specifications, the study suffers 
from the limitation that countries incorporated in the analysis are very 
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heterogeneous. They include tax havens as well as OECD and developing 
countries. This raises the problem of omitted variables. In fact, with the small 
number of control variables employed in the study heterogeneity between 
countries can hardly be accounted for. Regional dummies suggest distance to be 
an important determinant but it is not included as a further control variable. 
Moreover, political stability and risk may play a role in determining investment, 
especially in less developed countries. Given that these variables are omitted 
here, one possible solution would be to use country fixed effects. However, since 
Grubert and Mutti (2000) use cross-sectional data only in their analysis, this is 
not feasible econometrically. In fact, the analysis is based on only one 
observation per country. Including fixed effects for each of these would reduce 
degrees of freedom to zero.     
 
A third study we want to describe here is Devereux and Griffith (1998b). Their 
analysis differs in many aspects from those discussed above. Instead of using 
capital stocks, they employ data on discrete investment decisions as dependent 
variable, which stem from firm level data. In contrast to capital stocks, this 
measure can be thought of as a better indicator for new investments. Their data 
comprises US outbound FDI into three European countries, Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom, for the years 1980 to 1994. Combining cross-sectional 
with time-series data their study is twofold. First, conditionally that a firm has 
decided to invest in Europe, they carry out a panel analysis on how the 
probability that this investment goes to a specific country is affected by 
taxation (lower level decision). Moreover, in extending the analyses from above, 
they examine if taxation influences the multinationals’ decision to either invest 
in Europe or to serve the European market via export from the United States 
(higher level decision).  
 
For their analysis of the lower level decision of the multinational, they employ 
three different measures of taxation: the statutory tax rate, effective marginal 
tax rates (EMTR) and effective average tax rates (EATR). As has been 
outlined above in Chapter 2, when compared to the measures used in Hines 
(1996) and Grubert and Mutti (2000), the latter two measures are more 
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appropriate to represent the tax burden of new investment. Heterogeneity 
between target countries is accounted for by the use of fixed effect and by 
labour costs. These fixed effects capture all those aspects that are difficult to 
measure. Furthermore, it is tested if agglomeration effects affect the investment 
decision. These agglomeration effects can either be demand, which simply 
reflects the size of the country, production or research agglomeration. With 
respect to our discussion from section 2.1.4. we suggest that these agglomeration 
effects have a positive impact on FDI.  
 
Empirical results show that agglomeration does positively affect the probability 
for investment in a certain country. That is, larger countries, countries which 
have attracted US investment before and countries with higher expenditures for 
research and development are more likely to become the target of investment. 
Labour costs seem to have no effects on the location decision. However, a 
possible explanation for this insignificance may stem from the non-valuation of 
labour productivity in the labour cost variable27. Results for the tax variables 
are mixed. Marginal tax rates have no effect on investment. This mirrors that 
the EMTR is not appropriate to measure the tax incentives for the discrete 
investment decision analysed here. In contrast, the effect of EATR on the 
investment decision is significant under a number of specifications. Estimates 
suggest that a one percent increase in the German tax rate will reduce the 
probability of an investment there by approximately one percent. The 
corresponding elasticities for the UK and France are –1.3 and –0.5 respectively, 
confirming that higher tax rates deter investment. In an alternative 
specification, the authors test if statutory tax rates determine the investment 
decision as well. The idea here is that apart from the decision to produce in a 
country, income shifting may play a role in determining investment. According 
to the regression results this is not the case. 
 
Concerning the higher level decision, that is to invest in Europe or to serve the 
market via exports, Devereux and Griffith (1998b) find no significant effect of 
                                                 
27 For instance, labour productivity in the UK is smaller than in Germany. This leads to a 
significant bias in the labour cost variable as employed by Devereux and Griffith (1998b).  
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taxes. Instead, results suggest that other factors that differ among investing 
firms play a crucial role. So a higher capital intensity of the production process 
reduces the probability that a firm invests in Europe. While smaller firms tend 
to export goods, larger firms are more likely to invest in Europe instead. This 
result is consistent with theoretical assumptions: When investing abroad, the 
costs for setting up a new production plant and the potential loss in economies 
of scale in the US have to be compared with the savings in transport costs. 
These costs are likely to be high for small and capital intensive firms. 
Unfortunately, however, the authors can not control for different transport costs 
across firms, so that in this respect, results have to be taken with care.  
 
 
3.2.2. Empirical evidence from Europe 
Sufficient data on multinational investment activity inside the European Union 
was not available in former years. Recently, however, data availability 
improved. The OECD as well as EUROSTAT provides data on FDI flows and 
investment stocks among EU countries. What followed was a number of 
empirical studies concerned with the question on how taxes affect investment 
flows and positions inside the EU28,29. A first attempt was made by Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2000) who try to explain bilateral FDI flows between eleven 
countries (nine of which belong to the EU) for five different years30. The 
corresponding data on aggregated FDI flows used in their analysis comes from 
OECD data bases. Due to the panel structure of their data, tax incentives are 
measured as the difference between tax rates in the source and in the target 
country of the investment. Beside the statutory tax rate, they do also employ 
implicit macroeconomic tax rates for their empirical analysis. Controlling for the 
size of the investing country, they use data on geographical distance, bilateral 
                                                 
28 A few of these studies are covered by the meta-analysis of de Mooij and Ederveen (2003). 
29 Billington (1999) studies bilateral investment flows between seven countries, including France 
and Germany. Since his study is neither focused on investment from/in the US nor on 
investment inside the EU, we do not discuss it here.        
30 Years taken into consideration are 1995, 1990 and 1992 to 1995. Countries outside the EU are 
the United States and Japan. 
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trade flows and the market potential of the target country as further 
explanatory variables. In contrast to other studies, their measure of market 
potentials does not only take into account the GDP of the target country but 
also the GDP of neighbouring countries which enter the market potential 
variable with a distance related weight.  
 
Confirming other empirical work, estimation results suggest that FDI is 
positively correlated with market potentials and negatively correlated with 
geographic distance. Moreover, FDI seems to follow trade since it is positively 
correlated with trade flows. Under a number of different specifications, 
coefficients for the tax rate differentials have a negative sign which implies that 
higher taxes deter investment. While the effect for the implicit macroeconomic 
average tax rates is highly significant, the effect of statutory tax rates is less 
significant. Taking into account the different tax regimes (exemption vs. credit) 
of source countries they do provide estimates for corrected tax differentials as 
well31. Regression results do not show any significant difference between 
coefficients of corrected tax differentials and those of their original values. Based 
on their estimates, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2000) simulate different scenarios 
concerning the harmonisation of tax rates and tax regimes inside the EU. They 
show that the harmonisation of tax rates will lead to a 1.4 percent increase in 
FDI flows between EU countries and an increase in revenue that accounts for 
0.4 percent of GDP. 
 
The most obvious shortcoming of the latter analysis is the use of implicit 
macroeconomic average tax rates to measure tax incentives. As we have already 
shown in section 2.2.3. these backward looking tax rates are an inaccurate 
measure of the incentives for new investment. In a subsequent study, Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2003), the authors have therefore extended the analysis. The study 
now comprises sixteen years instead of five, controls for further variables and 
does employ forward looking tax measures as well. In general, it confirms the 
previous result that higher tax rates decrease investment. Moreover, while 
                                                 
31 The procedure to correct tax rate differentials for different tax regimes is shown in section 
4.4.2. below.  
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quantitative results differ, qualitative results seem to be independent of the tax 
measure used. With respect to EATR, results imply that a one percent increase 
in the tax rate decreases investment by about four percent. The corresponding 
value for the EMTR is three. Investigating non-linearity as well, they show that 
the tax elasticity increases with differences in tax rates. Using dummy variables 
that interact with the tax rate, they do also find that the tax sensitivity of 
investments from tax-credit countries is similar to that of investments from tax-
exemption countries. This result is in sharp contrast to Hines (1996) who 
assumes that the sensitivity of investments from tax-credit countries should be 
(near to) zero. A possible explanation, and one that supports our critique of 
section 3.2.1., is that credit countries do on average impose lower tax rates than 
exemption countries and that investors from these countries are negatively 
affected by higher foreign tax rates. A last result worth noting concerns the 
additional control variables: While public expenditures by themselves have no 
effect on the location decision of multinational enterprises, their composition 
seems to be crucial. Estimation results show, that increasing the share of public 
investments increases the attractiveness of a country for FDI. Moreover, 
including this variable in the regression decreases the tax elasticity by about 25 
percent which highlights that a higher tax rate can be compensated for by more 
public investment expenditures. 
 
A study that is focused on the effects of public expenditure on FDI flows is 
Büttner (2002). He recognises that empirical studies so far have not taken into 
account the effects of different measures for government expenditure and 
publicly provided infrastructure in detail. To do so, the analysis makes use of 
data on public consumption and investment as well as country rankings that 
measure the competitiveness of a country concerning the efficiency of the 
government, its infrastructure, its attractiveness for research and development 
and so on. For a similar data sample than those used by Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2000, 2003)32, he presents mixed evidence concerning these variables. While 
                                                 
32 The data used comprises eight years (1991-1998) and FDI flows between 14 source and 12 
target countries, all in the EU. Data on FDI flows is this time obtained from EUROSTAT 
instead from the OECD. Controlling for the size of source and target country of the investment 
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public consumption and investment seem to have no influence on the location 
decision, more efficient government attract FDI. Quite counterintuitive, results 
imply that investment is higher if the competitiveness of the source country 
with regard to its infrastructure and its research potential is strong when 
compared to those of the target country.  
 
With regard to the tax measures used, however, it has to be noted that the 
study differs from those discussed above. Inconclusive results for the public 
expenditure variables may stem from problems related with these measures. 
Büttner (2002) makes use of three different tax variables, implicit 
microeconomic average tax rates, statutory tax rates and effective marginal tax 
rates (EMTR) which, taking into account the tax code of the source and the 
target country of the investment, have been derived for the case of international 
investments. Although the use of the latter measure offers the advantage that it 
correctly accounts for the incentives multinational firms face for a marginal 
investment decision, this measure has some disadvantages. Unfortunately, tax 
rates are only available for the years 1991 and 1999. For the intervening years, 
tax rates have been calculated by means of interpolation, assuming a gradual 
development over time. The assumption of a gradual development, however, 
ignores the possibility of discrete tax reforms in the time under consideration. 
Tax rates for the intervening years may therefore be incorrect. Moreover, the 
use of marginal tax rates may be incorrect here since it can be assumed that 
most of the investment comes in a discrete form for which average tax rates are 
important determinants. However, in line with our discussion of section 2.2.2., 
Büttner (2002) argues that since the EATR is a weighted function of the 
EMTR and the statutory tax rate, the joint estimation of EMTR with the 
statutory tax rate may capture the effect of the EATR.  
 
Regression results show that the implicit average tax rate employed here does 
not affect investment while they show a significantly negative effect for the 
                                                                                                                                               
he does also employ data on distance and trade flows in the analysis. As in Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2000, 2003), these variables are negatively receptively positively correlated with investment 
flows.  
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statutory as well as for the marginal tax rates. Results concerning tax measures 
are robust to different specification. Coefficients presented for the baseline 
regression imply that a ten percentage point increase in the bilateral EMTR 
decreases investment by approximately three percent. The corresponding 
decrease in investment for the statutory tax rate is five percent.  
 
While the studies discussed so far in this section have focused on the 
determinants of investment flows, Gorter and Parikh (2003) argue that FDI 
positions are less volatile and should therefore be the preferred measure to use 
in an econometric analysis. Accordingly, they use bilateral FDI positions from 
eight EU countries in fifteen European target countries as dependent variable. 
Instead of including multiple control variables, they follow the approach taken 
by Hines (1996) to isolate country specific effects by using investment positions 
from tax-credit countries (this time only the UK) as a benchmark to measure 
non-tax incentives. To do so, the tax coefficient of for investment from the UK 
is restricted to zero. They employ data on implicit microeconomic average tax 
rates as well as on EMTR and provide tax coefficients for all seven source 
countries that follow the exemption system. For both tax measures, these 
coefficients imply a negative correlation between tax rates and FDI positions in 
these countries, whereby coefficients vary significantly across source countries33. 
The mean elasticity calculated for the average tax rate is –5, the corresponding 
value for the EMTR is –6. So, a EU member state will typically increase its FDI 
position in a country by five to six percent if this country decreases its 
corporate tax rate by one percentage point relative to the EU mean.  
 
Clearly, the same critiques apply here as for the analysis of Hines (1996) since 
the estimation procedure used does not take into account the asymmetric 
incentives for investment from the UK. However, the authors do also present 
results for a different specification, where the coefficient for investment from the 
                                                 
33 For example, with respect to the implicit tax measure, the coefficient for Austria is 
approximately fourteen times smaller than those for investment from Portugal, implying that 
Austrian investors are much less sensitive to taxes than investors from Portugal. It has to be 
noted, however, that some coefficients are insignificant. 
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UK is not restricted to zero. Qualitative results are robust to this specification 
but the negative effect of higher tax rates is reduced this time. Another point 
for critique comes from the data used. Gorter and Parikh (2003) use FDI 
positions in the years 1995 and 1996 as dependent variable. FDI positions of 
subsequent years do largely depend on actual FDI positions. With the approach 
taken, the authors can not control for this interdependence. Therefore, it would 
be more promising to use investment flows as dependent variable instead. 
Alternatively, if it is the main intention to estimate the determinants of foreign 
capital stocks, it would be more promising to use data from more distant years.                     
 
Although data availability on foreign investment activity has improved, all 
studies on the determinants of FDI inside the EU so far suffer from one severe 
limitation: Data is only available on the aggregated level which does not allow 
accounting for heterogeneity across different firms. The last analysis we want to 
report here makes use of a new database which allows studying the investment 
decisions of German multinational firms on the microeconomic level. Büttner 
and Ruf (2004) investigate how the probability that a German parent holds one 
or more than one affiliate in a country is affected by the tax burden imposed by 
this country. The tax burden is thereby measured either by the use of EMTR, 
EATR, or the statutory tax rate. Additionally to firm and country specific fixed 
effects, their study does control for differences in target countries size and 
labour costs. The study comprises investment into twelve EU countries plus the 
United States, Canada and Japan for the years 1996 to 2001. Results for the 
baseline regression, either obtained from probit- or logit-estimations, suggest 
that a higher EATR as well as a higher statutory tax rate decrease the 
probability that a German parent holds an affiliate in that country. Coefficients 
for the EMTR are insignificant. Control variables are not significant in all cases 
and do show an unexpected sign sometimes34.  
 
                                                 
34 While country size, which has been proved to have a strong impact on FDI in other studies, is 
sometimes insignificant, labour costs show an unexpected positive sign indicating that higher 
labour costs increase the probability for investment.  
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As for the study of Gorter and Parikh (2003), one may argue that the 
dependent variable used here is problematic. In fact, the data does also 
comprise previous investment decisions which may be determined independently 
from the present valuation of the attractiveness of a country. Büttner and Ruf 
(2004) control for this possibility by focussing only on these cases where 
(dis)investments have been taken place during the time period under 
consideration. These decisions, in contrast, can be assumed to be largely 
dependent on the present valuation of a country. The tax sensitivity among this 
subsample of location decisions is much stronger than those derived for all 
decisions of German multinationals. Coefficients for the statutory tax rate 
translate into an elasticity of –2.0 while those for the EATR translate to –1.25. 
This implies that a ten percentage point increase in the tax rate reduces the 
probability that a firm holds one or more affiliates in a country by twenty, 
respectively twelve and a half percent. It has to be noted, however, that the 
empirical analysis omits a number of control variables which have, according to 
our discussions from above, proved to be significant determinants of foreign 
activities. Omitting these variables may therefore have a negative effect of the 
quality of the analysis. 
 
 
3.2.3. Industry and transaction-type specific results 
Estimation results presented above may provide a comprehensive description on 
how overall investment activities are determined by taxes. However, as we have 
shown in section 1.2.3., investment is a very heterogeneous measure that can be 
disaggregated in many ways. Firms might be affected differently by the same 
tax rules and their investment behaviour might do so, too. This issue has been 
analysed by only two studies so far. 
 
In an early study, Papke (1991) analyses on how the number of firm births 
among US states is affected by differences in state tax rates. Count data on the 
number of firm births in a specific state comes from a micro database which 
allows distinguishing between the organisational status, the number of 
employees and the industrial sector of the firm. Data is available for the period 
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from 1975 to 1982 and for investment in 22 states. With this detailed 
information, it is possible to account for several forms of heterogeneity between 
firms. The approach taken by Papke (1991) is to distinguish between firm births 
in five industries of the manufacturing sector: “Women’s Outerwear”, 
“Household Furniture”, “Book Printing”, “Radio and Communication 
Equipment”, and “Electronic Components”. Firm births in these industries are 
assumed to be a function of state specific variables such as population, public 
expenditures, energy costs, labour costs and taxes. To measure taxation at the 
state level, the study employs data on industry specific effective average tax 
rates. Under the assumption of a pre-tax profitability of 20 percent, these tax 
rates are calculated using a model firm approach. Hence, these tax rates can be 
interpreted as EATR35.  
 
For the pooled sample, estimation of the baseline regression confirms the 
negative correlation between state tax rates and new firm births. Additionally, 
it is shown that more public expenditures and a higher population increase the 
number of firm births in a state. While the labour cost variable is insignificant, 
energy costs show an unexpected positive sign. Comparing different industries, 
however, results indicate a considerable inter-industry variation. Concerning 
taxation, coefficients vary from insignificance for “Household Furniture” and 
“Radio and Communication Equipment” to –0.26 for “Women’s Outerwear”, 
implying that a one percentage point increase in the state tax rate reduces firm 
births in this very state and industry by approximately one fourth. In a 
different specification, the author allows for state fixed effects. Controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity between states has a remarkable effect on estimation 
results. The EATR is only significant in two of five industries in this case. 
Significant coefficients for this specification are much smaller than those 
obtained from the baseline regression.  
 
                                                 
35 Note that the author herself labels tax rates as “marginal effective tax rates”. Taking a closer 
look at the procedure to calculate these tax rates, however, it becomes evident that tax rates are 
“average” instead.  
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Although a general statement on the effect of taxes on new firm births is 
difficult with the sensitive results obtained from above, the study shows the 
importance to distinguish between investment decisions in different industries. 
However, with respect to the question on how multinational enterprises are 
sensitive to taxes, it has to be noted here that the data used may be insufficient 
to measure investment incentives for these multinationals. This is the case, 
simply because firm births do not measure international but to a large degree 
also national (entrepreneurial) activities. 
 
The second study we want to report here is Swenson (2001a). In contrast to 
Papke (1991), her data does only comprise multinational activities. She has 
information on discrete investment choices made by multinational enterprises 
from seven countries in different states of the US for the years 1984 to 1994. 
The data allows her to distinguish between the nationality of the investor, the 
industry the investment takes place in and the type of investment. These 
transaction types are: “New Plant”, “Plant Expansion”, “Merger & 
Acquisition”, “Joint Venture”, “Equity Increase” and “Other”. The approach 
taken in this study is to analyse how transactions of the different types are 
affected by taxation. To do so, the study uses statutory tax rates at the state 
level. Furthermore, to control for state heterogeneity, the study makes use of 
state fixed effects and two measures of agglomeration. Agglomeration is 
assumed to have a positive impact on the probability a transaction takes place 
in a state. It is either measured as the number of all firms in a specific industry 
that are located in that state, or it is measured as the number of foreign firms 
in this industry located in that state. Moreover, having information on the 
source country of the investment, Swenson (2001a) tries to distinguish between 
tax-exemption and tax-credit countries.  
 
First of all, regression results confirm the conjecture that higher agglomeration 
has a positive effect on investment. However, the distinction between different 
tax regimes in the home country of investment leads to inconclusive results. 
Contrary to theoretical assumptions, investors from tax credit countries are 
negatively affected by taxes, while the investment decision of those from tax 
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exemption countries seems to be independent. With focus on different 
transaction types, there are two specifications of the regression. One in which 
tax coefficients are estimated separately for each transaction type and one in 
which coefficients are estimated in one single regression by means of transaction 
type dummies linked to the tax rate variable. For both of these specifications, 
the study shows significant variation in tax coefficients among transaction 
types: While higher state tax rates decrease the probability of building a new or 
expanding an existing plant, it increases the probability of a merger or an 
acquisition36. Coefficients translate into elasticities that vary between -0.11 for 
“New Plant” to 0.06 for “Merger & Acquisition”37. Again, results indicate that 
various types of investment activities are differently affected by tax policy.  
 
It has to be noted however, that the latter study has some shortcomings as well. 
First of all, state heterogeneity is only accounted for by fixed effects and 
agglomeration variables. Other studies have shows that the size/population of a 
state is a quite strong determinant for investment and that other variables may 
play a role as well. Although state size may be captured by fixed effects and the 
agglomeration variables38, this may lead to some inaccuracies. Moreover, the 
study employs only one measure of taxation. It may be possible that effective 
taxation differs between the several types of transaction, e.g. since depreciation 
allowances are different. In this case, results can be explained by differences in 
taxation.    
 
 
                                                 
36 The effects for the other three transaction types under consideration are not robust to the use 
of the two specifications.    
37  Swenson (2001a) fails to give a sufficient explanation for the observed positive effect of state 
taxes on mergers and acquisitions. A possible explanation could be the fact that multinational 
firms may depreciate some of the costs associated with a merger or acquisition in the target 
state of the investment. In this case, higher statutory state taxes imply more tax savings due to 
depreciation. 
38 Note that the agglomeration variables are constructed with disregard to state size so they 
may be biased by size differences between states. Alternatively, agglomeration variables may be 
interpreted as indirect measures for the size of a state.     
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3.2.4. Summary 
We have discussed a number of studies that analyse how the investment 
decision of multinational enterprises is determined by taxes here. We have 
focused on three main areas, studies exclusively concerned with data for the US, 
more recent studies on investment decisions in Europe, and finally two studies 
that follow a more disaggregated approach in comparing the effects of taxes on 
investment in different industries and by different transaction types. Table 3.1. 
gives a short summary of each study discussed, presenting the general 
methodology and data, the tax measure used and the estimation results of the 
analysis. To sum up, empirical studies concerning investments into or from the 
US suggest that investments are significantly negative correlated with tax rates. 
It is shown, moreover, that the more general decision to invest, or to export 
instead, depends on other factors than taxes. Concerning discrete investment 
choices, it is shown that average and not marginal tax rates determine 
investment decisions. Although each of the studies discussed here suffer from 
some shortcomings, taken together, their results give a coherent picture. This 
implies that multinational enterprises are indeed very sensitive to tax 
differentials across possible target countries of investment.  
 
The recent studies presented here for the case of investment within the 
European Union confirm the results of earlier work for the United States. Taxes 
seem to have a negative impact on the investment decision of multinational 
enterprises. As has been shown, for the types of investment analysed here, 
particularly the statutory tax rate and effective average tax rates determine the 
investment decision. While we suggested a significant effect for the effective 
average tax rate, with respect to our discussion from Chapter 2, results for the 
statutory tax rate are somehow surprising. A possible explanation for the 
significant effects observed may come from income shifting activities. We will 
discuss this issue in more detail in the subsequent section. While most of the 
studies discussed here use aggregated data, the study by Büttner and Ruf 
(2004) suggests that results obtained from these studies do also carry over to 
the analysis of firm-level data. Moreover, as the studies by Papke (1991) and 
Swenson (2001a) demonstrate, using data at a more disaggregated level opens 
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possibility for new research questions. Accounting for heterogeneity between 
different forms of investment seems to be important. These studies, again, focus 
on US data only and studies so far have not proved the relevance of their 
results for investment decisions in Europe39. We will make a contribution to fill 
this particular gap in Chapter 4 where we estimate sector-specific tax-
sensitivities of FDI in the European Union. 
                                                 
39 A first study analysing the determinants of German outward FDI in more detail is Buch et al. 
(2005). Using microdata, they show that the determinants of FDI differ with the size and the 
sector of the firm. Unfortunately, however, this study does not control for the effects of taxes. 
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Table 3.1. 
Empirical studies on the tax sensitivity of investment  
 
study 
 
method and data used tax measure used estimates 
Hines (1996) Cross sectional data on the distribution of FDI 
positions among US states. Distinguishing 
between investments from tax-exemption vs. tax-
credit countries to measure state fixed effects. 
 
state statutory A 1% point higher state tax rate reduces 
investment by approximately 10%. 
Grubert and Mutti (2000) Cross sectional data on aggregated outward FDI 
in 60 countries. Controlling for the impact of 
trade openness. 
 
implicit micro A 1% increase in the tax rate reduces 
investment by 2%. 
Devereux and Griffith (1998b) Panel data on the decision of US firms whether to 
invest in Europe or not and if so, in which specific 
country to invest. 
EMTR, EATR and statutory No effect for the higher level decision. 
A 1% increase in the EATR decreases the 
probability of an investment by 0.5% to 
1.3%. 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2000) 
 
Panel data on aggregated FDI flows within the 
European Union plus the US and Japan. 5 Years. 
OECD data. 
 
implicit macro Not reported. Coefficient of -0.3 implies a 
negative impact of the tax rate. 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2003) 
 
Panel data on aggregated FDI flows within the 
European Union plus the US and Japan. 16 
Years. OECD data. 
EMTR, EATR, statutory and 
implicit macro 
A 1% increase in the EATR (EMTR) 
decreases investment by 4% (3%).     
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Table 3.1. (continued) 
 
study 
 
method and data used tax measure used estimates 
Büttner (2002) 
 
Panel data on aggregated FDI flows within the 
European Union. 8 Years. EUROSTAT data. 
Controlling for the impact of public expenditures. 
statutory, implicit micro and 
approximated bilateral EMTR 
A 10% point increase in the bilateral EMTR 
(statutory tax rate) decreases investment by 
3% (5%). 
 
Gorter and Parikh (2003) 
 
Panel data on the distribution of FDI positions 
within the European Union for the years 1995 and 
1996 at the aggregate level. EUROSTAT data. 
Distinguishing between investments from tax-
exemption vs. tax-credit countries to measure 
country fixed effects. 
 
EMTR and implicit micro A 10% point increase in the average tax rate 
(EMTR) decreases FDI positions by 5% 
(6%). 
Büttner and Ruf (2004) 
 
Panel data on the discrete decision of German 
multinationals whether to invest in a country or 
not.  
EMTR, EATR and statutory A 10% point increase in the statutory tax 
rate (EATR) reduces the probability that a 
firm holds an investment by 20% (12.5%). 
Papke (1991) Count data on new firm births among US states 
between 1975 and 1982. Differentiating between 
five distinct industries of the manufacturing 
sector. 
similar to EATR A 1% point increase in the tax rate leads to a 
9% decline in firm births. Results do vary 
significantly among industries (from 
insignificant to –26%).  
 
Swenson (2001a) 
 
Panel data on the number of discrete investments 
among US states between 1984 and 1994. Seven 
source countries. Differentiating between six 
categories of transaction types.  
 
state statutory  Overall, a 1% increase in the tax rate reduces 
the probability of an investment by 0.1%. 
Effect varies significantly among transaction 
types: Negative for “New Plants”, positive for 
“Merger and Acquisition”. 
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3.3. Incentives to engage in income shifting activities 
 
As we have noted above in section 2.5.1., additionally to locating real activity in 
low tax countries, multinational firms may avoid taxes by reallocating taxable 
income from high tax countries to low tax countries. Firms may use various 
methods including the allocation of debt and the manipulation of intra-company 
transfer prices. We will present empirical work on these activities in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
 
3.3.1. Transfer pricing strategies 
It has to be noted first, that income shifting (in general) can not be observed 
directly since this would require detailed information on intra-company 
transactions of the multinational firm40. Instead, evidence for income shifting 
comes only in an indirect form. Moreover, as for the question on how taxes 
determine multinational investment decisions, most of the empirical literature 
on income shifting is concerned with the United States. The empirical literature 
on income shifting starts with the work of Grubert and Mutti (1991). Using 
cross-sectional data on reported profits of US multinationals abroad, they show 
that these are negatively correlated to foreign tax rates, i.e. affiliates in low tax 
countries report more pre-tax profits than those located in high tax countries. 
They do, however, not identify the specific channels through which income is 
shifted41.  
 
In a subsequent study Hines and Rice (1994) extend the latter analysis. They 
observe that US multinationals report approximately thirty percent of their 
total profits in tax havens (while these do only account for three percent of 
                                                 
40 An exception is the study by Clausing (2003) - presented below - which reports direct 
evidence for income shifting activities.   
41 The rudimentary estimation of Grubert and Mutti (1991) has some obvious shortcomings. For 
example, they control for differences in the profitability of countries by means of one variable 
only.  
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world-wide GDP42) and interpret this as a sign for income shifting. In the 
following, they analyse on how the income reporting of US multinationals 
abroad is shaped by taxes. If tax induced income shifting is the motive for the 
observed pattern of income reporting, then tax rates should be negatively 
correlated with the reported income in a country. To separate between transfer 
pricing and financial channels43 for income shifting, the authors do use only non-
financial pre-tax income as dependent variable. Consequently, the focus is on 
transfer pricing strategies: Income can be shifted by under-invoicing the price of 
goods sold from an affiliate in a high tax country to an affiliate in a low tax 
country and over-invoicing vice versa (see section 2.1.5).  
 
Using data on the aggregated non-financial pre-tax income reported by US 
multinationals in 59 countries abroad (including tax havens, OECD and 
developing countries) for the year 1982 and controlling for aggregated capital 
and labour inputs44, the authors do not only show that the reported income in a 
country increases with the real activity located there, but they do also show 
that taxes have a significant effect on income reporting. For various 
specifications the tax coefficient shows the predicted negative sign, implying 
that higher taxes reduce the reported pre-tax income. The corresponding 
elasticity is –3.2 such that a one percent higher tax rate abroad is associated 
with a reported profitability that is approximately three percent lower. This is 
taken as indirect evidence for income shifting. However, results of this purely 
cross-sectional analysis should be interpreted with care. First, the study does 
only control for differences in the profitability between countries by means of 
GDP per capita, assuming that a firm has higher profits in “rich” countries. So 
results may be biased by some low (high) tax countries in which firm 
profitability is high (low). Moreover, the tax measure used is problematic. Hines 
                                                 
42 With focus on “small” tax havens, i.e. excluding countries such as Ireland and Switzerland, 
the observed discrepancy between economic size of these countries and profits reported there is 
even larger. 
43 See section 3.3.2. for empirical studies concerning the financing strategies of multinational 
enterprises.   
44 They do also control for the overall profitability of the country by means of GDP per capita. 
Results show that this variable is insignificant.  
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and Rice (1994) employ implicit microeconomic average tax rates derived from 
the actual tax payments of the firms. These may be already biased by income 
shifting activities. In some cases effective tax rates are also biased by firms with 
negative income. Hines and Rice (1994) assume effective tax rates to be 
imprecise measures for income shifting incentives in these cases and use the 
statutory tax rate instead. 
  
Following the approach above to rely on statistical relationships between 
country tax rates and affiliates’ reported profitability, there is a large literature 
that has considered indirect evidence for income shifting. The only study so far 
that finds direct evidence for tax induced transfer pricing strategies is Clausing 
(2003). The basic feature of this analysis is that it makes use of detailed 
information on US import and export prices. Data comes from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and covers monthly trade prices of 22.000 goods in the period 
between 1997 and 1999. This data does not only allow to differentiate the prices 
charged for imports/exports of the same good in different countries, but also for 
different prices charged for this good in intrafirm and non-intrafirm trade. If tax 
motivated transfer pricing takes place, then we should observe differences in the 
prices observed for intrafirm and non-intrafirm trade. While trade prices 
between non-related parties are assumed to be independent from taxes in the 
partner country of the transaction, prices for trade between related parties 
should be correlated with taxes, instead. More specifically, to be consistent with 
the incentives for income shifting, export prices should be positively correlated 
while import prices should be negatively correlated with the tax rate of the 
trading partner45.  
 
This assumption is tested by separately estimating observed import and export 
trade prices as a function of tax rates and other potential determinants such as 
                                                 
45 A study that takes a similar approach is Swenson (2001b). She analyses on how US import 
prices are affected by the tax rate of the partner country. However, since she can not distinguish 
between intrafirm and non-intrafirm trade, her results have to be interpreted with care. 
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exchange rate effects or the GDP of the partner country46. Moreover, the 
regression also controls for industry heterogeneity and the possibility that 
differences in prices for intrafirm and non-intrafirm trade are due to other 
reasons than income shifting. The study employs two alternative measures of 
taxation, an implicit microeconomic average tax rate and the statutory tax rate.  
 
To distinguish between intrafirm and non-intrafirm trade, there are two 
different specifications of the regression. A first specification estimates 
coefficients separately for both types of trade relation. A second specification 
estimates coefficients in one single regression by means of intrafirm dummy 
variables linked to the tax rate variable. As the results of both specifications 
show, there are large differences among the determinants of intrafirm and non-
intrafirm trade prices. While they get mixed results for the correlation between 
taxes and non-intrafirm export prices, regression results confirm the assumption 
that the higher the taxes in the partner country, the higher the export prices in 
intrafirm trade47. Concerning import prices, these are positively correlated to the 
foreign tax rate in the case of non-intrafirm trade, but are negatively correlated 
to the foreign tax rate in the case of intrafirm trade. These results imply that 
US firms manipulate transfer prices in a way that is consistent with tax 
minimisation strategies. With respect to the tax measure used, regression results 
are robust. However, in line with the assumption that the statutory tax rate is 
more appropriate to measure incentives for income shifting, regressions with this 
measure show more explanatory power. Coefficients presented translate into an 
elasticity of 1.8 and -2.0. A one percent higher tax rate associated with 
intrafirm export prices that are approximately two percent higher and intrafirm 
import prices that are two percent lower, relative to the trade prices for non-
intrafirm trade. In sum, using detailed data on differences in trade prices, 
                                                 
46 It can be assumed, for instance, that export and import prices are lower as the dollar is 
strong. They should be higher in the case the trading partner is a rich country. Empirical results 
confirm the latter assumption. 
47 Note that taxes enter negatively in the regression originally presented by Clausing (2003). 
Therefore, a negative coefficient implies a positive correlation between trade prices and taxes.  
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Clausing (2003) present direct evidence on tax motivated transfer pricing 
strategies of multinationals located in the United States.  
 
A final paper we want to describe here is Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003). 
Differing in many aspects from previous literature, their analysis shows indirect 
evidence for transfer pricing among OECD countries. They assume that if tax 
motivated transfer pricing takes place, this will affect the reported nominal 
value-added by firms, i.e. sales revenue less intermediate purchases, in a 
country48. The value added reported in a country should be negatively 
correlated with its tax rate in this case. In contrast to data on profits, data for 
reported value-added is available for a number of countries and sectors. The 
approach taken by Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) is to estimate this 
observable as a function of tax rates and the actual value-added of the country. 
Data comprises information on 22 OECD countries for the years between 1979 
and 1997. However, what makes their analysis difficult is the fact that the 
actual value-added of a country is not observable and has to be estimated first 
from other observable variables. 
 
The authors employ data on the long term interest rate of a country, its real 
wage rate and on total labour compensation to estimate the actual value-added 
from a CES production function simultaneously to the effect of tax rates. 
Incentives for transfer pricing are measured as the difference between the 
statutory tax rate of the country reporting value-added and the weighted 
average of the statutory tax rates of all other countries included in the study. 
Controlling for country and sector effects, coefficients reported for different 
econometric specifications do all show a significant negative sign implying that a 
higher tax rate of a country will lead to a decrease in its value-added reported. 
With some reasonable assumptions on the estimated production function and on 
statutory tax rates, estimation results suggest that 65 percent of additional 
revenue from a one percentage point increase in the statutory tax rate is lost 
because of income shifting.  
                                                 
48 Intermediate purchases in particular will be over-invoiced in high tax countries and under-
invoiced in low tax countries. 
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However, this indirect evidence for income shifting should be interpreted with 
care. The procedure to estimate the effect of taxes simultaneously to the current 
value-added of a country is very difficult and relies on specific assumptions 
regarding the production function. Moreover, it is questionable whether 
multinational enterprises alone can manipulate the reported value-added of a 
country or sector to such a significant extent given that there may be a number 
of national firms which can not make use of transfer pricing strategies. From 
this perspective, the reported effects of transfer pricing on marginal tax revenue 
seem to be very high. 
 
 
3.3.2. Financing strategies 
Apart from transfer pricing, other strategies may be used for the purpose of 
income shifting. These do include, for example, the allocation of R&D expenses, 
the size and scope of intra-firm dividend payments, or other specific incentives49. 
More recent studies focus on the effect of taxes on the financing strategies of 
multinational firms. Mills and Newberry (2004) use confidential tax return data 
of foreign controlled firms in the United States to analyse how their debt policy 
is determined by differences in tax rates50. Their data does not only comprise 
detailed information on the firm itself but also provides information on various 
aspects of the parent company, e.g. the home country of the parent, the world-
wide use of debt of the multinational and its profitability. The analysis covers a 
ten year period between 1987 and 1996. Typically, national tax laws allow 
deducting interest payments of a firm from taxable profits. A possible strategy 
for income shifting would then be to locate these costs in high tax countries 
where the tax savings of the deduction are highest. Having information on the 
debt ratio of the foreign controlled US firm, this can be tested for.  
 
                                                 
49 See the review by Hines (1997). 
50 Another recent study that is not covered by the reviews of Hines (1997, 1999) is Jog and 
Tang (2001). They analyse on how debt allocation among Canadian multinationals is affected 
by tax rates. 
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To do so, the study employs two different measures for taxation. The first 
measure is the difference between the US statutory tax rate and the statutory 
tax rate of the parent company. The second and more complex measure is the 
difference between the US statutory tax rate and the world-wide average 
effective tax rate of the multinational enterprise. The latter measure is directly 
calculated from firm data51 and is used to account for the possibility that 
income is not only shifted between the US affiliate and the parent but also 
between the US affiliate and any other affiliate of the multinational enterprise. 
If the world-wide allocation of debt is subject to income shifting strategies, then 
the debt reported by the multinational in the US should be higher, the higher 
the US tax rate when compared to the tax rate the multinational faces in other 
countries. Controlling for firm heterogeneity in the debt policy, the authors 
show that this is indeed the case. According to their estimation results, the 
lower the taxes a multinational faces outside the US, the higher is the debt ratio 
of its US affiliate. The coefficients found imply that a ten percentage point 
lower tax differential reduces the debt ratio of US affiliates by about 1.2 
percentage points. So, the results of Mills and Newberry (2004) suggest that 
foreign multinationals follow tax-motivated US income reporting strategies and 
that these strategies are particularly reflected by their US debt policy. 
 
With respect to financial strategies, it can be assumed that it is especially the 
banking sector that can take advantage of these in order to minimise their 
world-wide tax liabilities. In contrast to non-financial firms, profits in the 
banking sector are less determined by real economic activity and there exist 
ample possibilities to shift income between countries. The study by Demirgüc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2001) is concerned with this issue. Their data set comprises 
firm-level information on individual banks in 80 countries for the years 1988 to 
1995 and allows to distinguish between home-owned (national) and foreign-
owned (multinational) banks52. They observe quite significant differences in the 
                                                 
51 In this respect, the tax rate is best characterised as an implicit microeconomic average tax 
rate.   
52 The data set used is very comprehensive. For most countries it covers about 90 percent of 
bank assets.  
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pre-tax profitability as well as in the tax payments of national and 
multinational banks across countries. In their study, they analyse if there is a 
systematic relationship between the observed differences in profitability and tax 
rates across countries, and if this is the case, if this is consistent with income 
shifting. To do so, they estimate the pre-tax profitability of a bank in a specific 
country as a function of bank and country specific characteristics. While 
country characteristics control for heterogeneity across countries concerning the 
overall profitability of business, bank characteristics control for heterogeneity 
across banks and include information on whether the bank is national or 
multinational.  
 
Estimation results indicate that bank and country characteristics are important 
in determining profitability53. To account for taxes, the study employs statutory 
tax rates as well as a measure on the banks’ average tax rate implicitly 
calculated from the balance sheet of the bank. For both these measures, 
estimation results show significantly positive coefficients implying that banking 
in high tax countries is more profitable than banking in low tax countries. The 
authors interpret this as evidence that the tax burden of banks is to some 
extend passed on to bank customers. However, when distinguishing between 
national and multinational banks, estimation results do change: Interacting the 
tax rate variable with a dummy indicating whether the bank is national or 
multinational, we get the result that the pre-tax profitability of multinational 
banks instead is negatively correlated with the tax rate. This negative 
correlation is consistent with income shifting. 
 
Having information on the tax payments of banks, the authors do also provide 
estimates on how these are affected by tax rates. It is found that increasing the 
statutory tax rate enlarges tax revenue collected from national banks54. In the 
                                                 
53 Banks that use relatively more equity are found to be more profitable while those who achieve 
more non-interest earnings are found to be less profitable. The real interest rates of a country or 
its per capita GDP does also determine reported pre-tax profitability of a bank. 
54 This implies a position left to the maximum of the Laffer-curve. It has to be noted, however, 
that the corresponding coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
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case of multinational banks, however, although in general these pay higher taxes 
than national banks, increasing statutory taxation will unambiguously reduce 
tax revenue collected. Of course, the strong effects found here for the banking 
sector can not be carried over to other sectors, such as manufacturing, where 
possibilities for income shifting are limited. However, it demonstrates that 
income shifting may have a significant effect on tax revenue collected and may 
explain why several countries have created special tax incentives tailored to 
multinational banks. 
 
Having shown evidence for income shifting in the United States and other 
OECD countries, we will now turn to Germany. As Germany had the highest 
statutory tax rate on retained corporate profits among OECD countries during 
the 1990s it is likely that the country is particularly prone to income shifting. 
Ramb and Weichenrieder (2004) use microdata on the financial structure of 
foreign owned affiliates in Germany to analyse this issue in more detail. Their 
data comprises information on the debt (including intra-company loans), and on 
the profits of foreign owned affiliates as well as on the total balance sheet and 
on the location of their parent company. Their panel analysis covers the years 
from 1996 to 2001. As in the study by Mills and Newberry (2004), it is tested if 
the German affiliate uses more debt if its parent company is located in a low 
tax country. Additionally, it is tested whether there is a similar relationship for 
intra-company loans received. To control for firm heterogeneity, the authors 
employ several variables that may explain differences in the financing structure 
of the firm, e.g. firm size and borrowing costs. Tax incentives are measured by 
the statutory tax rate. However, since these incentives are only available for 
firms with positive profits55, the study does also control for the profitability of 
the German affiliate, i.e. if it has positive or negative profits.  
 
With respect to intra-company loans granted by the parent, estimation results 
are inconclusive. While more profitable firms receive fewer loans from its parent, 
                                                 
55 Since firms with non-positive profits will typically pay no taxes in Germany, cost deduction is 
not possible. Hence, there is no incentive to use debt for purposes of income shifting.    
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a significant correlation with taxes is only found for some affiliates56. Regression 
results suggest that a ten percentage point increase in the German tax rate 
enlarges intra-company loans received by directly held affiliates by 
approximately 1.4 percent and decreases those received by indirectly held 
affiliates by some 0.1 percent. With respect to (third-party) debt, results are 
mixed as well. The suggested positive relationship between tax incentives and 
debt is only significant in two of four specifications of the empirical model. 
Moreover, the coefficients reported for these regressions are very small. So, while 
the analysis of Ramb and Weichenrieder (2004) provides some weak evidence on 
the use of financial instruments to undertake income shifting, the results 
presented here for the German case are less clear-cut than those of other studies 
concerned with US data. Among others, one possible reason for (partly) 
inconclusive results may stem from inaccuracies in measuring tax incentives. 
The authors themselves note that they can only account for tax differences 
between Germany and the location of the parent company. If, instead, the 
average tax rate the multination firm faces on its world-wide operations plays a 
role, then the used measure is incorrect.         
 
 
3.3.3. Joint decisions on investment and income shifting activities  
So far, the empirical literature reviewed in this chapter has analysed two 
questions separately: To what extend do taxes determine real investment of 
multinational enterprises and to what extent do taxes affect multinationals to 
engage in income shifting. However, in practise, these two aspects can be 
assumed to be interrelated. On the one hand, opportunities for income shifting 
will decrease the effective tax rate a firm has to pay in a certain country. On 
the other hand, to make use of income shifting strategies, a multinational 
enterprise needs an affiliate in a low tax country to which income can be 
shifted. Until now, there exist only two studies which deal explicitly with this 
                                                 
56 As the authors argue, a possible explanation for insignificant results may stem from the fact 
that foreign multinationals cover losses of their German affiliates in large parts with intra-
company loans. 
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issue. One is by Grubert and Slemrod (1998). Their general idea is that a tax 
haven will be a more attractive location for real investment if a multinational 
firm can make use of ample income shifting possibilities. Moreover, they assume 
that income shifting may be limited by national tax laws in the high tax 
country, i.e. by formula apportionment. Under formula apportionment, world-
wide income of multinational enterprises has to be allocated according to some 
measure of real activity (see section 2.1.5). Increasing real activity in the low 
tax country will then allow firms to increase income shifting into this country as 
well. Consequently, income shifting will not only increase the number of 
affiliates in a tax haven (i.e. small mailbox companies) but also the total capital 
stock in this country. 
 
Using firm level data on approximately 4000 US multinationals for the year 
1987, Grubert and Slemrod (1998) analyse how real investment in Puerto Rico 
is affected by differences in the opportunities for income shifting among these 
firms57. Profits can be assumed to be a function of variables that determine real 
economic profitability and of variables that determine the amount of tax savings 
that stem from income shifting. The study employs data on firm characteristics 
to measure how these determine profitability and the investment decision. It is 
assumed that firms which are more profitable in the US are profitable in Puerto 
Rico as well and that firms with high trade costs will be less profitable there. 
Incentives for income shifting are measured by the parents’ expenses on research 
and development and on advertisement. Firms with large expenses in these 
categories are assumed to engage more in income shifting than other firms since 
this offers ample opportunities for income shifting. Under the realistic 
assumption that Puerto Rico does not offer any real locational advantage that 
makes it relatively more attractive for research and development or advertising 
than the US, any positive correlation between the expenses of the parent in 
these categories and the probability it locates in Puerto Rico has then to be 
interpreted as indicating income shifting.  
 
                                                 
57 Puerto Rico is chosen since there exist some specific US tax laws that make income shifting in 
this tax haven extremely beneficial.  
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Regression results show a significantly positive correlation with the firms’ 
profitability at home and a negative correlation with trade costs. Moreover, 
estimation results suggest that the probability to locate in Puerto Rico increases 
with the firms’ opportunities for income shifting. In a different specification, the 
authors do also test if the variables used do have an impact on the size of real 
investment as well. Estimation results are similar to those obtained for location 
probabilities and confirm that income shifting is a potential reason for real 
investment. Based on these estimates, Grubert and Slemrod (1998) calculate the 
effects of income shifting on the location decision. They show that in the 
absence of any gains from income shifting, the number of affiliates of US 
multinationals in Puerto Rico would almost halve and the capital employed 
would be about 70 percent lower. So, the authors are able to identify income 
shifting as a predominant reason for real investment of US multinationals in 
Puerto Rico.               
 
Naturally, income shifting to Puerto Rico is a very special case that may be 
governed by the specific rules that apply to US multinationals. Hence, 
generalising results for the case of other countries may be difficult. A second 
study that deals jointly with the effect of taxes on income shifting and real 
investment is provided by Mintz and Smart (2004). They analyse income 
shifting among Canadian provinces. The general idea is to separate firms into 
subsets that differ with respect to the firms’ possibilities for income shifting and 
mobility of real economic activity, and to estimate for each of these categories 
how taxable income of firms in a certain province is affected by statutory tax 
rates. Three broad categories are distinguished: Large firms, which may engage 
in income shifting since they are subsidiaries of other Canadian corporations, 
other large firms for which income shifting is not possible and small firms which 
can not make use of income shifting strategies at all. Their dataset comprises 
aggregated information on taxable income reported in Canadian provinces by 
firms in each of these categories for the years 1986 to 1999 which acts as 
dependent variable. The tax measure used is the provincial total statutory tax 
rate which consists of the statutory tax rate levied by the central government 
and the statutory tax rate levied by the province.  
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Controlling for differences in the size and the overall profitability among 
provinces, empirical results suggest that taxable income reported in high tax 
provinces is generally lower than those reported in low tax provinces. This 
qualitative result is independent from firm categories. With respect to the 
quantitative results of the analysis, however, they find significant differences. 
While the effect of taxes is insignificant for small firms, the effect for large firms 
that may engage in income shifting is about two times larger than for those 
firms which are not able to shift income. Results are robust to different 
specifications of the model as well as to alternative classifications of firms into 
the shifting and non-shifting categories and imply that increasing the tax rate 
by one percentage point will decrease taxable income reported by shifting firms 
by about 8.5 percent. Observed dissimilarities among categories can be assumed 
to represent differences in real mobility as well as in mobility of income: While 
small firms are immobile across provinces, the observed effect for large non-
shifting firms represents their opportunity to locate real economic activity in 
low tax provinces. The somewhat larger effect for shifting firms represents both, 
their opportunity to locate real activity in low tax provinces and their 
opportunities to shift income. So, the result that these firms which are able to 
shift income do reply more heavily to tax rates is taken as evidence for income 
shifting.  
 
However, this result has to be interpreted with care. Mintz and Smart (2004), 
use information on provincial sales and real assets of the firms to account for 
their real economic activity across provinces. Using data on real assets as 
dependent variable instead of taxable income should give some indication of 
how taxes affect real investment of firms, in contrast to their tax planing 
decision. Estimation results show that while the location of real economic 
activity by non-shifting firms is independent from tax rates, shifting firms do 
also locate their real activity in low tax provinces. This is somehow inconsistent 
with the assumptions made. Concerning real activity, one would suggest that 
firms in the two categories are similarly affected by provincial taxes. Moreover, 
if we interpret the correlation between tax rates and taxable income of non-
shifting firms as indicating mobility of real activity, then we would suggest 
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finding a similar correlation between a direct measure of real activity and tax 
rates as well.           
 
 
3.3.4. Summary 
We have discussed a number of studies that analyse how tax motivated income 
shifting affects the behaviour of multinational enterprises here. In particular, we 
focused on the effect of cross country differences in tax rates on intra-company 
transfer prices and on the world-wide allocation of debt. Table 3.2. gives a 
summary of each study discussed, presenting the general methodology and data, 
the tax measure used and the estimation results of the analysis. Most of the 
studies are concerned with US data, either on US based multinationals or on the 
US affiliates of foreign multinationals. They provide indirect evidence that 
income shifting determines multinational behaviour. Using data on differences in 
trade prices among related and non-related parties, however, Clausing (2003) is 
able to present direct evidence on transfer pricing. With respect to countries 
other than the US, empirical evidence is rather scarce. There exist only two 
studies on income shifting between OECD countries. These either use a very 
complex approach to gain results (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003) or they are 
limited to a particular sector in which income shifting is assumed to be a 
common strategy (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). The only study so far 
concerning Germany (Ramb and Weichenrieder, 2004) presents only limited 
evidence for the possibility that debt allocation by multinational firms is used to 
shift income.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  71
Table 3.2. 
Empirical studies on tax motivated income shifting  
 
study 
 
method and data used tax measure used estimates 
Hines and Rice (1994) Cross sectional data on reported non-financial 
income of US multinationals in 59 countries for 
the year 1982. Analysing the impact of taxes on 
income reporting. 
 
measure constructed from 
implicit micro and statutory 
tax rates 
A 1% point higher tax rate in the foreign 
country reduces income reported there by 3.2%. 
Clausing (2003) Detailed information on the import and export 
prices of US based firms between 1997 and 
1999. Distinguishing between prices charged for 
intrafirm and non-intrafirm transactions. 
 
statutory and implicit micro A 1% point higher tax rate in the foreign 
country increases (decreases) export (import) 
prices in intrafirm trade by 2%.    
Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) Measuring the difference between value–added 
reported in an economy and the non observable 
real value-added in the absence of income 
shifting. Panel data on 22 OECD countries and 
19 years. Jointly estimating real value-added 
and the impact of taxes. 
statutory 65% of additional revenue from a 1% point 
increase in the local tax rate is lost due to 
transfer pricing. 
Mills and Newberry (2004) Firm level data on the debt allocation of foreign 
held affiliates in the US between 1987 and 1996. 
Analysing the impact of taxes on the use of 
debt. 
statutory and implicit micro A 10% point increase in the US tax rate 
increases in use of debt among foreign held 
affiliates by 1.2%. 
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Table 3.2. (continued) 
 
study 
 
method and data used tax measure used estimates 
Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2001) 
 
Firm level data on reported income in the 
banking sector. 80 countries for the years 1988 
to 1995. Distinguishing between reported pre-
tax profitability and tax payments of national 
and multinational banks.  
 
statutory and implicit micro Elasticity not reported. 
Higher tax rates increase tax revenue collected 
from national banks and decrease revenue 
collected from multinational banks.   
Ramb and Weichenrieder (2004) Firm level data on foreign held affiliates in 
Germany for the years 1995 to 2001. Analysing 
on how intra-company loans received (debt 
used) by the affiliate is affected by taxes. 
statutory A 10% point increase in the German tax rate 
increases intra-company loans received by the 
affiliate by 1.4 %. It increases the use of debt of 
affiliates by 0.4%. 
 
Grubert and Slemrod (1998) Firm level data on the incentives for US 
multinationals to invest in Puerto Rico. 
Analysing the joint effect on real activity and 
shifting income. 
  
no measure used Firms that have more opportunities for income 
shifting, i.e. that are research intensive and 
have high expenses on advertising, are more 
likely to locate in Puerto Rico. Without 
possibility for income shifting, investment in 
Puerto Rico would be 50% to 70% lower.  
 
Mintz and Smart (2004) 
 
Aggregated data on taxable income of Canadian 
firms among provinces. Distinguishing between 
firms that are able to shift income and those 
who are not.  
 
provincial statutory  Effect of taxes on income shifting firms is twice 
as large as the effect for non-shifting firms. A 
1% point increase in the provincial tax rate 
reduces taxable income of shifting firms by 
8.5%. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
 
The empirical evidence reviewed here shows that investment, financing and 
other activities of multinational enterprises are quite sensitive to their tax 
treatment. This finding provides numerous implications for tax policy. 
Concerning real investment, the sensitivity found opens the possibility for 
governments to compete with each other to offer multinationals ever lower tax 
rates. However, results also show that non-tax incentives, in particular market 
size and agglomeration effects, are important determinants of multinationals 
investment decisions as well. Consequently, although tax competition can be 
assumed to decrease equilibrium tax rates, fears concerning a “race to the 
bottom” may go too far.  
 
With respect to income shifting, the same problems may apply. By decreasing 
their tax rate governments can attract substantial amounts of taxable income 
and thereby increase their total tax revenue. Given the large effects reported by 
some studies, this may indeed result in a race to the bottom in statutory tax 
rates. To prevent multinational firms from income shifting, high tax countries 
have therefore to develop appropriate instruments. However, as has been shown 
in particular by the study of Grubert and Slemrod (1998), the use of these 
instruments may increase incentives for multinational enterprises to locate their 
real activity in low tax countries as well. 
 
Although there does exist quite a large literature on these issues, some questions 
are still open for future research. Especially with focus on the European Union, 
empirical evidence is only very general or weak. While US studies have 
emphasized the importance to distinguish several types of investment, the same 
has not been done so far by studies concerned with the EU. More importantly, 
evidence for income shifting is rather scarce or indirect, and most the empirical 
literature has analysed investment decisions and incentives for income shifting 
separately by now. We make a contribution to fill these gaps in the next two 
chapters where we analyse incentives for investment and income shifting in 
more detail. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
 
The tax-elasticity of FDI between different economic 
sectors 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Globalization of economies and growing factor mobility has led to a substantial 
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) during the last decades (see Chapter 
1). Such investment is in general associated with benefits for the host country, 
e.g. more employment, economic growth and tax revenues. Consequently it is 
not surprising that some countries try to induce foreign direct investment by 
the use of tax instruments, particularly the corporate tax rate, that reduce the 
effective tax burden of the investment. As argued by the Ruding Report (1992) 
and the Commission of the European Communities (2001), uncoordinated fiscal 
policy of EU members could then lead to an undertaxation of the mobile factor, 
namely capital, at the expense of the immobile factor, namely labour. Compared 
with the case of tax harmonisation, this will lead to losses of aggregate welfare 
in the union. Any proposal for the “optimal” tax policy within the union, 
however, requires sufficient knowledge about the tax-sensitivity of foreign direct 
investment. As we have already shown in section 3.2. there exists a large 
literature concerning the United States and recently there emerged a few 
empirical studies analysing the tax-sensitivity of foreign investment inside the 
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European Union as well. With respect to the EU, although the econometric 
models in these studies are specified differently, they all find a significantly 
negative correlation between tax rates and foreign direct investment on the 
basis of bilateral country-to-country data.  
 
The motivation of this paper comes from the fact that most studies, 
independent of their geographical focus, rely on aggregate data describing 
overall investment activities. Papke (1991) and Swenson (2001a) have already 
shown that results may differ with respect to investment in different industries 
and among different types of investment58. Having these empirical findings in 
mind, it is reasonable to assume that the response of FDI to differences in tax 
rates may also differ between economic sectors. A welfare maximizing 
government then has two different options: A first-best solution would be to set 
different tax rates in each sector, according to the investment elasticity in this 
specific sector. In practice, this means to charge a high tax rate for investment 
in sectors with a relatively low mobility of capital, while taxing investment in 
sectors with a relatively high mobility of capital with a low rate59. 
Weichenrieder (1996) gives two prominent examples of such preferential 
taxation within the European Union: In Ireland, until recently, FDI in the 
secondary and tertiary sector was taxed with a lower corporate tax rate than 
investment in the primary sector. In the Belgium-Luxembourg economic union 
and in the Netherlands, such tax incentives are limited to those multinational 
firms that provide intra-company financial services or act as financial holdings. 
This preferential taxation of the secondary and tertiary sector is then a visible 
response to differences in capital mobility throughout the sectors. 
 
                                                 
58 For a more detailed discussion of these studies see section 3.2.3. 
59 This mobility can be related to the location rents that the firm earns in the taxing country. In 
a theoretical model, Haufler and Wooton (2004) show that EU countries may be able to raise 
tax rates and increase tax revenue without losing attractiveness for FDI. This is the case when 
the firm’s location rent in the EU is large. On the other hand, if the firm is indifferent between 
locating within the EU and a third country, then EU countries may attract additional (welfare 
enhancing) investments by a co-ordinated decrease in tax rates for these firms. 
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When setting their tax rates, governments have to take into account the effects 
of FDI on the local economy. Empirically, the existence of spillovers is 
documented (see Görg and Ströbel, 2001)60. Even though empirical work on the 
possible transmission channels for these spillovers has only just begun, most 
observers argue that investments in the primary sector have fewer positive 
spillovers onto the rest of the economy than FDI in the other sectors, and that 
technological spillovers are particulary high and growth enhancing in the service 
sector (see e.g. Elfring, 1989, Fagerberg, 1994). If, however, preferential taxation 
is not possible or allowed, e.g. for reasons of equity61, a welfare maximizing 
government has to choose a tax rate which accounts for the importance of 
sector specific investment on the aggregate level of (inter-temporal) welfare. 
This strategy implies to set the tax rate such that the FDI attracted maximizes 
national welfare and economic growth. Following this argument, it seems that 
the aggregated tax-elasticities reported by most empirical studies62 are of only 
limited help for policy purposes, since they combine data from sectors and 
industries with a relatively small mobility of capital, e.g. the agricultural sector, 
with data from sectors in which capital is almost perfectly mobile, e.g. transport 
and communication. If it is particularly the tertiary sector that determines the 
economic performance, then aggregate tax-elasticities may underestimate the 
economic effects of tax incentives. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate tax elasticities for outward foreign 
direct investment of three major members of the European Union (Germany, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands63) differentiating between the three 
                                                 
60 Most often, these spillover effects are positive. However, for less developed countries, some 
studies, as for example Gazioglou and McCausland (2002), report negative effects of FDI.    
61 Although the attention lies on the discrimination of non-residents versus residents, one can 
argue that such sector specific tax incentives are in conflict with the EU Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation  as it is proposed by the Commission of the European Union (1997). 
62 De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) make the outcomes of several empirical studies comparable 
and compute a mean tax-elasticity around -3.3, i.e., a one percentage point increase in the host 
countries tax rate leads to a 3.3% reduction of foreign direct investment.     
63 Although the Netherlands are small in (economic) size, they are an important source and 
destination of foreign direct investment. 
  77
main industrial sectors. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2. 
presents the econometric model used to estimate the tax-elasticities of the three 
sectors. Section 4.3. gives a description of the data used in the empirical 
analysis. Results are shown in Section 4.4. Section 4.5. concludes. 
 
 
4.2. Investigation approach 
A firm that can decide between investments in alternative countries abroad will 
typically choose to locate where expected profits are highest. Thus, the profits 
each firm derives from locating in a country j are a function of the 
characteristics of that location  ( )j j jπ = π φ  where jφ  is a vector of the 
characteristics in country j. Generally speaking, this vector comprises measures 
of the costs and accessibility of production factors, public policies such as basic 
infrastructure and tax rates, the size and characteristics of nearby markets, and 
so on64. 
 
Inspecting investment flows, it becomes obvious that a firm originally located in 
country i will only invest in the foreign country j if this foreign country offers 
better characteristics than the home country does. Therefore, we can define 
foreign direct investment from country i to country j as a function of differences 
in country characteristics. Denoting by nφ , { }1,n N∈ , the n-th element of the 
vector jφ  and iφ ,  this function can be written as:   
 
1 2 1 1 1
, , , , , , , ,( , ,..., , , ,..., , )
n n n N N
i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i jFDI f
− + −= ∆φ ∆φ ∆φ ∆φ ∆φ ∆φ ∆φ         (4.1) 
 
where ,
n
i j∆φ  is equal to n nj iφ − φ . 
 
                                                 
64 Apart from the above-listed variables, location characteristics may include, for example, 
barriers to trade, domestic inflation, the political system and language. Some of these variables 
are negligible for FDI inside the European Union. Other variables, such as language, can be 
captured with fixed effects.     
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Among the main factors determining FDI in Dunning´s OLI-Framework, we 
focus on locational advantages, in our case measured as the difference between 
n
jφ and niφ . Of course, this approach can not capture all determinants of FDI in 
detail. Dunning (1977, 1981) explores not only locational but also ownership 
and internalization advantages as sources for multinational activity. The reason 
why we concentrate on locational advantages is that our data, which is in 
general on a macroeconomic basis and therefore not firm specific, does not allow 
us to account for advantages that are due to ownership and internalization. As 
we are merely trying to explain the general determinants of aggregated FDI 
among sectors, a detailed analysis at the firm level is beyond the scope of this 
analysis. 
      
Equation (4.1), does not take into account the economic and geographic 
distance between the two countries. It is frequently observed that FDI between 
two countries decreases with the distance, such as trade does65. This can be due 
to the fact that a longer distance makes a foreign operation more difficult and 
expensive to supervise, which might therefore deter investment. Assuming 
linearity, a possible specification for the relation between country characteristics 
and FDI could therefore be: 
   
,
1
,
N
n
i j
ni jFDI =
∆φ
= δ
∑
           (4.2) 
 
where the parameter δ  measures the distance between the two countries. At 
first sight, it is suggestive to use geographical distance here, but this measure is 
of course not always a reliable indicator of the mutual openness of two 
countries. Instead, it may be preferable to use a more simple to measure proxy 
                                                 
65 According to our discussion from section 2.1.2.and 2.1.3, the effect of distance is ambiguous 
since it is not clear whether FDI is a complement or a substitute for trade. The empirical 
studies discussed in section 3.2., however, present some first evidence that FDI is deterred by 
distance. A detailed discussion on the theoretical and empirical work concerning the relationship 
between FDI and trade goes beyond the scope of this work. The interested reader is therefore 
referred to Markusen (1995). 
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for distance. Good indicators for distance are trade flows such as country-to-
country exports. Theory as well as empirics predicts that exports (Exp.) will 
decrease with distance. Assuming an inverse relationship between distance and 
exports, we can then rewrite equation (4.2) as: 
 
,
,
, 1
Ni j n
i j
i j n
FDI
Exp =
= ∆φ∑                (4.3) 
  
Note that the approach taken by equation (4.3) is very similar to a standard 
gravity equation approach. Thereby, we assume a positive correlation between 
FDI and trade. Available empirical evidence supports this assumption66. This 
could be due to the fact that the problems of information and monitoring in 
multinational corporations investing abroad can be reduced by maintaining 
trade relations67. The volume of trade is also a good indicator for the openness 
of a country. One would expect that footloose manufacturing, that is, 
production of intermediate and final goods that are mainly intended for export, 
takes place only in countries with the most open trade regime and therefore 
trade and investment activities are complementary. Grubert and Mutti (2000) 
present empirical evidence which shows a strong positive correlation between 
openness and foreign investment stocks68,69. However, as our sensitivity analysis 
will show, relaxing the assumption of a positive correlation between FDI and 
trade will not change the general results of our empirical analysis. 
 
                                                 
66 See for example Deutsche Bundesbank (1997). According to this study, there is a positive 
correlation between German exports and German outward FDI.  
67 Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) see asymmetric information across countries as one possible 
explanation for observed capital immobility. With (long-term) trade relations this information 
gap can be narrowed and hence capital mobility increases.    
68 This study is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.1. 
69 Obviously this contradicts the argument that FDI is a substitute for trade because of 
increasing transport costs which make it more profitable to produce abroad than to produce at 
home and export to the foreign market. As we have discussed in section 2.1.3., however, it can 
be alternatively assumed that FDI follows trade. In our sample data and exports are positively 
correlated.  
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As mentioned above, it is crucial to make a distinction between foreign direct 
investments in different economic sectors, since the mobility of capital may 
differ between them. Therefore we run separate regressions for the sectors of the 
economy under consideration. Building on equation (4.3), we estimate the 
following baseline regression for all three sectors:   
 
, ,
, 1 , , 2 , , 3 , , 4 , , ,
, ,
i j t l e
i j t i j t i j t i j t j t i j t
i j t
FDI
q q y
Exp
= α +α +β ⋅ τ +β ⋅ +β ⋅ +β ⋅ + ε? ? ?     (4.4) 
 
with 
 
, , , ,i j t j t i t−∆τ = τ τ    ;   , , , ,l l li j t j t i tq q q−∆ =    and   , , , ,e e ei j t j t i tq q q−∆ =        
 
According to equation (4.4), the ratio of FDI to exports in each time period t 
primarily depends on the difference in factor costs and tax rates. While , ,i j t∆τ  
characterizes the tax rate differential, , ,
l
i j tq∆  and , ,ei j tq∆  are the labour cost, 
respectively energy price, differential between the two countries70. Since any 
increase in these differentials make country j less attractive, we would assume 
the coefficients 1β , 2β  and 3β  to be negative. Note that tax rates may either be 
statutory or effective. In subsequent chapters we will distinguish between the 
statutory tax rate t 71 and a measure of effective taxation T . However, as long 
as we do not explicitly refer to one of these concepts we label tax rates by τ .    
 
The additional variable ,j ty  was introduced into this pooled cross-section and 
time-series regression to control for differences in the size of the target country. 
As mentioned above, the size of foreign markets may play a role in the location 
decision of a firm since a larger market offers more market potentials. Therefore, 
we expect that investment into a small economy like Greece is lower than 
                                                 
70 We do not use cost of capital as an alternative factor price variable. We assume that a 
multinational corporation faces only the world interest rate r. 
71 For the econometric parts of this work we will sometimes refer to t  as an index for time. 
However, when t  is not used as a subscript, it will always correspond to the statutory tax rate.   
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investment into France or Italy72. So the expected sign of 4β  should be positive. 
To further control for other common effects among source and target country of 
investment, we introduced the bilateral constant ,i jα . Particularly, it captures 
the specific economical, political and cultural relations of the two countries73. In 
addition, tα  is a time dummy that controls for common shocks to all countries 
influencing the quantity of investment. The residual term is given by , ,i j tε .  
 
The parameter of interest, 1β , captures the relationship between tax incentives 
and foreign direct investment. Linearizing the correlation between tax 
differentials and FDI, the partial derivative of (4.4) can be written as:     
 
1
,
1 1
( )i j j i
FDI FDId d
Exp Exp d
β = ⋅ = ⋅∆τ τ − τ           (4.5) 
 
The parameter 1β  measures the response of foreign direct investment flows from 
country i to country j (scaled by exports) in absolute terms. Rearranging 
equation (4.5), this is easy to see: 
 
1 ( )j idFDI d Exp⋅= β τ − τ ⋅           (4.6) 
 
Absolute changes in FDI are given by the changes in tax rate differentials 
between the two countries multiplied with 1β  times the exports. Bear in mind 
that this is not the elasticity of FDI with respect to the tax differential since it 
says nothing about the percentage change of investment flows. Other studies use 
log-linear regressions to estimate the impact of taxes on international 
investment. The advantage of log-linear regressions is that β is equal to the 
semi-elasticity of the explanatory variable since all variables are independent of 
their size. We use a non-logarithmic regression here since some of our variables, 
e.g. investment flows, tax rate and factor cost differentials are negative in 
                                                 
72 See also our discussion in section 2.1. 
73 Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) argue that in a gravity model, the use of bilateral constants is 
preferable to the more common method where there are fixed effects for each home and/or host 
country.  
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several cases. A logarithmic regression is therefore not possible. Nonetheless, 
elasticities can be easily computed when evaluating the result of equation (4.6) 
with the mean values of FDI, exports and tax rates. 
 
 
4.3. Data sources and description 
 
4.3.1 Data on foreign direct investment 
Data on foreign direct investment flows comes from EUROSTAT, the statistical 
office of the European Commission. According to the OECD benchmark 
definition FDI occurs when an investor owns more than 10% of a foreign firm 
(compare section 1.2.1.). The advantage of EUROSTAT data, compared with 
that of the OECD, lies in the fact that it accounts for differences in national 
statistics and is therefore harmonized for the purpose of international 
comparisons74. Note that the OECD definition allows only to distinguish 
between direct and portfolio investment, but not, for example, between setting 
up an entirely new plant (greenfield investment) and acquiring an existing 
indigenous firm (brownfield investment). 
  
Another possibility is to differentiate foreign direct investment flows concerning 
the three economic sectors. EUROSTAT provides us with sector specific data 
on foreign direct investment on a bilateral basis. FDI in the primary sector 
consists of agriculture, fishing, mining and quarrying. Investment in the 
secondary sector covers all manufacturing industries. And finally, FDI in the 
tertiary sector refers to all investment in transport, communication and 
financial intermediation. The dependent variable used in this analysis is the 
value of bilateral FDI flows as provided by EUROSTAT. These flows are 
expressed with current market prices and current exchange rates and do 
comprise investment that is financed with equity as well as investment financed 
with retained earnings. Due to limited availability of data there are only three 
                                                 
74 Note that, although the data is harmonised, there can still occur substantial measurement 
errors.   
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reporting economies; Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
These countries report annual exports of FDI into several European partner 
countries, namely Austria, the Belgium-Luxembourg economic union (BLEU), 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. This 
leaves us with 3*(9-1)=24 observations for each year and sector. As the UK and 
the Netherlands report annual foreign direct investment only since 1995, the 
analysis covers the years 1995 to 1999.  
 
Table 4.1.  
Aggregated outflows of FDI to eight EU countries by source country and sector*  
 Germany Netherlands UK 
 1995 1999 1995 1999 1995 1999 
Primary Sector 
(Agriculture/Mining) 
100 -907** 139 97 1175 -461** 
Secondary Sector 
(Manufacturing) 
5088 6044 -787** 12132 1427 12167 
Tertiary Sector 
(Transport/Telecommunication/
Financial Intermediation) 
4759 20381 3795 9118 2402 682 
 
Source: EUROSTAT New Cronos Database, own computations. 
* All values in mill. Euros. 
** A negative sign means that disinvestments are higher than investments. 
 
Table 4.1. gives a short summary of the observed FDI flows. As we can see, the 
level of FDI depends not only on the reporting economy but is typically 
different between the three sectors, e.g. FDI into the primary sector is typically 
ten or more times smaller than FDI into the other sectors. It is also interesting 
to see that the remarkable increase in the absolute level of FDI mainly occurs in 
the secondary and tertiary sector while foreign direct investment in the primary 
sector is decreasing over time and even turns negative in 1999. These facts can 
best be demonstrated from Figure 4.1.75: Except for the year 1997, where large 
                                                 
75 Here we simply aggregated the data for 1995 to 1999 over the three countries and smoothed 
the corresponding graphs. 
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disinvestments in the tertiary sector from the United Kingdom took place, there 
is a high and increasing level of FDI in the manufacturing as well as in the 
service sector while investment into agriculture and mining fluctuates in a range 
between 2.000 and –1.000 Million Euro with a slight downward trend. The 
exceptional effects we observe for the year 1997 can hardly be explained by our 
econometric model presented in the previous section. Only one observation is 
responsible for the relatively low sum of investments for the tertiary sector in 
1997 – in fact there was a large sum of disinvestments (around 7.300 Million 
Euro) from the UK in the Netherlands. Data for our explanatory variables, 
however, has not changed that significantly for this year and bilateral relation. 
Since we can neither control for this outlier with country-to-country nor with 
time dummies, we excluded this year from our data sample. Using the years 
1995 to 1996 and 1998 to 1999 we have 4*24=96 observations for each sector.    
  
Figure 4.1. 
Development of sector specific FDI flows in time 
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4.3.2. Data on tax rates 
In the theoretical as well as in the empirical literature there exist a large 
number of tax measures. As we have already argued in Chapter 2, there is 
general agreement that the statutory tax rate may be a misleading indicator for 
tax incentives and that it is more promising to use effective tax rates instead. 
This raises the question on which effective tax rate to use. As one may expect 
that most of the cross-border investment observed by our dependent variable 
comes in a discrete form, effective average tax rates are more likely than 
marginal tax rates to give a proper picture of the actual tax burden levied on 
these investments. Consequently, we use effective average tax rates to measure 
tax incentives. 
 
Our discussion in Chapter 2 has revealed that even among the measures of 
effective taxation there exist important differences. Having in mind these 
differences, we use two different tax measures. First, our analysis makes use of 
the EATR as proposed by Devereux and Griffith. While it is often argued that 
this measure is the most preferable, we also consider a backward looking 
microeconomic tax rate, from now on referred to as average tax rate (ATR). 
The advantage of the latter measure is that it incorporates all elements of the 
tax code, including special tax rebates/incentives. ATRs are taken from Büttner 
(2002) and were also used in the analysis of Gorter and Parikh (2003). Using a 
sample of approximately six thousand companies, this measure is developed in a 
first step by dividing the corporate income tax paid by each firm through the 
pre-tax corporate income. Multinational companies are excluded from the 
sample76. In a second step the effective average tax rate for each country is set 
equal to the median tax rate paid by its corporations. Table 4.2. gives a short 
overview for the tax rate differentials calculated for EATRs and ATRs. In same 
cases these differentials are significantly different from each other. For example, 
the first column reveals that in 1995 the EATR for German corporations was 10 
                                                 
76 There are at least two reasons to exclude multinational corporations. First, it is difficult to 
divide the aggregate income of the corporation into income from several source countries. 
Secondly, these corporations can easily shift income from one country to another and 
consequently bias our results. For further discussion see section 2.2.3. 
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percentage points higher than that of Italian corporations. The third column 
shows us a different result: Using ATRs, the tax burden of German corporations 
was 6.4 percentage points lower than that of Italian corporations in this year. 
 
Table 4.2. 
Tax rate differentials between source and target countries* 
 EATR ATR 
Source Country: Germany 1995 1999 1995 1999 
Austria -18 -12 -28,5 -16,7 
Belgium/Luxembourg -15 -9 -15,5 -22,6 
France -20 -11 -4,6 -3,5 
Greece -13 -7 -8,7 -13,2 
Italy -10 -2 6,4 0,3 
Netherlands -19 -13 -8,8 -9,2 
Spain -18 -11 -15,3 -9,8 
United Kingdom -21 -17 -8,3 -10,8 
Source Country: Netherlands 1995 1999 1995 1999 
Austria 1 1 -19,7 -7,5 
Belgium/Luxembourg 4 4 -6,7 -13,4 
France -1 2 4,2 5,7 
Germany 19 13 8,8 9,2 
Greece 6 6 0,1 -4 
Italy 17 1 15,2 9,5 
Spain 1 2 -6,5 -0,6 
United Kingdom -2 -4 0,5 -1,6 
Source Country: UK 1995 1999 1995 1999 
Austria 3 5 -20,2 -5,9 
Belgium/Luxembourg 6 8 -7,2 -11,8 
France 1 6 3,7 7,3 
Germany 21 17 8,3 10,8 
Greece 8 10 -0,4 -2,4 
Italy 19 5 16,7 11,1 
Netherlands 2 4 -0,5 1,6 
Spain 3 6 -7 1 
 
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies, London; Büttner (2002); own computations. 
* Positive values indicate that taxes in the target country are higher than taxes in the source 
country. Negative values indicate that taxes in the target country are lower than taxes in the 
source country. 
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4.3.3. Data on other explanatory variables 
In order to measure the investment potential of the different target countries, 
,j ty , we employ data on their economic size as approximated by GDP. This 
data is taken from OECD databases and measures GDP at 1995 prices and 
exchange rates quoted in billion dollars. Data on bilateral trade relations 
between source and target country of the investment are from the OECD as 
well. Here we use the exports from country i to country j, quoted in billion 
dollars, to measure the volume of trade, and therewith the distance between the 
two countries. To account for the possibility that the approximation of distance 
with exports gives us incorrect results, we will employ a direct measure for 
distance in our sensitivity analysis, as well. We measure geographic distance 
between countries, δ , as the distance between their capital cities.    
 
Even though most empirical studies report mixed or insignificant results for the 
effect of labour costs on foreign direct investment, we include this data as a 
measure for differences in factor prices, ,i jq∆ . Information is taken from the US 
Bureau of Labour Statistics that collects data from national surveys of 
employment, hours and earnings in the manufacturing sector and harmonizes 
them. Table 4.3. shows an index of hourly direct pay in manufacturing77, where 
labour costs in Germany act as a benchmark. Note, that the data used here is 
different from unit labour costs since it reveals nothing about labour-
productivity. Indices for unit labour costs, again, were not available for all 
countries and years investigated. Analogous to the tax rate differential we 
constructed a labour cost differential, , , , ,
l l l
i j t j t i tq q q−∆ = , showing the divergence in 
factor prices of the two countries. 
 
                                                 
77 Under the definition of the U.S. Department of Labour, hourly direct pay includes pay for 
time worked (basic time and piece rates plus overtime premiums, shift differentials, other 
premiums and bonuses paid regularly each pay period, and cost-of-living adjustments) and other 
direct pay (pay for time not worked (vacations, holidays, and other leave, except sick leave), 
seasonal or irregular bonuses and other special payments, selected social allowances, and the 
cost of payments in kind), before payroll deductions of any kind.  
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Table 4.3. 
Indexes of hourly direct pay in manufacturing; Germany=100 
 1995 1996 1998 1999 
Austria 84 75 85 85 
Belgium/Luxemburg 91 92 93 93 
France 66 67 70 70 
Germany 100 100 100 100 
Greece 30 32 34 36 
Italy 53 60 65 65 
Netherlands 80 78 82 84 
Spain 43 45 46 47 
United Kingdom 46 48 62 64 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labour, Bureau of Labour Statistics, own computations. 
    
Given the problem associated with the labour cost variable in most studies, we 
use energy prices as an additional measure for factor prices. For example, 
differences in energy prices between countries may stem from monopolistic 
competition in local markets or green taxes imposed by the government. The 
use of energy as a factor of production is at least well-founded in the secondary 
sector where a high share of production output stems from the use of heavy 
machinery. If we bear in mind that FDI in the tertiary sector contains 
investment in transport, then it is appropriate to use energy prices as a 
determinant of investment in this sector as well. To quantify the effect of energy 
prices on the firm’s location decision, we use industry electricity prices per 
Kilowatt-hour as a further variable in our regression. Data stems from the 
International Energy Agency78 and reports prices measured in dollars for all the 
countries in our sample. From this data we constructed an energy price 
differential , , , ,
e e e
i j t j t i tq q q−∆ = , illustrating differences in energy prices between the 
source and the target countries of the investment. 
                                                 
78 The data can be found in the volume: Energy Prices & Taxes – Quarterly Statistics, 
International Energy Agency, 2001, Paris. Data for the year 1999 was in some cases missing. 
Using the trend for the years 1994 to 1998, missing values where approximated. 
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4.4. Empirical Results 
 
4.4.1. Baseline regression 
The econometric approach chosen is Weighted Least Squares (WLS) instead of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Using a cross-section weighted regression we are 
able to eliminate cross-section heteroskedasticity in a two stage process. In a 
first step the cross section weights are computed. They are proportional to the 
reciprocals of the standard deviation of the disturbances observed in an OLS 
regression. In a second step, the regression is performed using these weighting 
factors79. All regressions are performed using dummy variables for time and 
country-to-country fixed effects.     
 
Results using a baseline regression of equation (4.4) are shown in Table 4.4. 
Columns (1) and (2) present results for the primary sector. In this sector, 
investment seems to be independent of both tax rates used. Neither the 
coefficient of the EATR in column (1) nor the coefficient of the ATR in column 
(2) is significantly different from zero. The same holds for energy prices. This 
result is plausible when we think of location rents arising from specific resources. 
In the primary sector, investment is mostly resource driven, and it is thus 
plausible that it is unrelated to the explanatory variables used in the analysis. 
For instance, think about the petroleum and natural gas industry in the 
European Union. FDI in this industry is bound for locations where the 
corresponding resources are available80. But as investment is limited to a 
particular location, tax rates and other economic parameters become non-
relevant81. Contrary to this argumentation, not only the size of the target country 
                                                 
79 In our main analysis, we do not estimate country specific tax-coefficients. Using seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SURE), it would be possible to estimate coefficients that are country 
specific. We do not follow the latter approach since country specific coefficients would only rest 
on very few observations. However, in section 4.4.2. we perform a robustness test using SURE to 
account for the tax credit status of investment from the UK. 
80 In the sample under consideration this is primarily the United Kingdom. 
81 In a recent study, Dahl (2002) comes to the result that foreign direct investment during the 
1990´s into southern African (which is dominated by the primary sector) was independent of 
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but also labour costs show the expected positive, respectively negative, effect on 
foreign investment. Different results appear when we look at columns (3) to (6). 
For both the secondary and the tertiary sector tax rate differentials have a 
significantly negative impact on foreign direct investment. The coefficient for 
the secondary sector is somewhat lower than that for investment in the tertiary 
sector and the latter one also shows a higher level of significance. The 
interpretation of these findings is that with a given tax rate in the source 
country, iτ , a rise in the target country’s tax rate, jτ , increases the tax 
differential ,i j∆τ  and reduces the incentives to invest in country j. Results are 
robust with respect to the tax measure used.  
 
The sign of jy  is significantly positive in all cases, indicating that FDI is 
positively correlated to the GDP of the target country. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the capacity for investment is higher for a large country 
than for a small one. Concerning labour costs and energy prices we get mixed 
results. Both coefficients are insignificant when we use the EATR to measure 
tax rate differentials. When the ATR measures are used instead, coefficients are 
significant, but some of them have an unexpected sign. While we can not offer 
an ad hoc explanation for the unexpected sign concerning energy prices there 
may be several reasons for the unexpected sign of the labour cost variable. First 
of all, this could be due to the fact that we can not account for the productivity 
of labour with the measure used here. Moreover, we may face a considerable 
measurement error when using average labour costs of the manufacturing sector 
to explain FDI in the tertiary sector. Likewise, higher labour costs may indicate 
a better availability of skilled labour. As investment in the tertiary sector is 
often associated with skilled labour, e.g. in the financial service sector, this may 
then explain the observed positive correlation.  
                                                                                                                                               
the economical and political performance of the host country. Moreover, Angola, a country with 
plenty of economical and political problems, was the largest beneficiary from FDI due to its 
large mineral resources. 
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Table 4.4. 
Regressions by sector: Base case  
  
primary sector 
 
 
secondary sector 
 
tertiary sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Forward looking 
tax rate (EATR) 
 
0.555 
(1.45) 
 
 
-8.854* 
(1.98) 
 
 
-13.254*** 
(5.27) 
 
 
Backward looking 
tax rate (ATR)  
 
 
-0.537 
(0.827) 
 
 
-17.614*** 
(4.46) 
 
 
-27.364*** 
(16.25) 
 
Target countries 
economic size 
 
0.876*** 
(5.43) 
 
0.827*** 
(5.00) 
 
3.646*** 
(3.22) 
 
5.007*** 
(5.41) 
 
1.613*** 
(3.19) 
 
3.813*** 
(7.83) 
 
Labour costs 
 
-1.515*** 
(6.03) 
 
-1.167*** 
(4.32) 
 
0.360 
(0.10) 
 
-7.077*** 
(5.29) 
 
0.383 
(0.31) 
 
9.935*** 
(9.17) 
 
Energy prices 
 
0.176 
(0.44) 
-0.0378 
(0.10) 
-5.87 
(1.37) 
 
4.480*** 
(2.77) 
-2.445 
(1.51) 
-13.030*** 
(6.98) 
 
R-Squared 0.45 0.39 0.43 0.78 0.58 0.67 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.20 0.11 0.17 0.68 0.38 0.52 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 
  
Regressions include time and country-to-country specific fixed effects.  
Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are given in brackets; *, ** and *** indicates significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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To make the outcome of this baseline regression comparable with other studies, 
elasticities have to be calculated. Sector specific relative changes in FDI can 
easily be computed when dividing the outcome of equation (4.6) by the total 
amount of FDI in each sector. Using EATRs, β1 transforms into an elasticity of 
-0.3 for the secondary sector and -0.43 for the tertiary sector. For the ATRs, 
coefficients transform into a tax-elasticity of -1.4 in the secondary sector and -
2.3 in the tertiary sector. In this scenario, the difference between the tax-
elasticities is thus notable and the use of aggregated data underestimates the 
tax-elasticity for the tertiary sector by about 20 to 30 percent82. Moreover, we 
will see below that this difference even intensifies when we extend our model. 
 
 
4.4.2. Model extension: Controlling for home countries’ tax system 
Up to this point of our analysis we have not considered the different tax 
systems of the three source countries of investment. As we have already shown 
in section 2.1.5., there exist two alternative methods to avoid double taxation of 
foreign corporate income which have different effects on the incentives to invest 
abroad. One is to exempt foreign income from taxation in the source country. If 
the method of tax exemption is applied in the source country, the tax rate 
differentials used in the analysis give a proper picture of tax incentives. Another 
way to avoid double taxation of foreign income is to grant a tax credit. In this 
case, if profits are instantly repatriated, any taxes paid abroad are deducted 
from overall liabilities in the source country and the difference between the 
source and target countries’ tax rates may become irrelevant for investment 
decisions. While Germany and the Netherlands follow the exemption method, 
the UK grants tax credits.  
 
Accordingly, some authors argue that investors from tax credit countries 
generally have no tax incentive when investing abroad because target countries’ 
                                                 
82 Weighting each sector specific elasticity with the volume of FDI (under the simplified 
assumption that FDI in the primary sector is close to zero and FDI in the secondary and 
tertiary sector is approximately the same) leads to: β1mean = β1primary * 0  + 0.5 * β1secondary + 0.5 * 
β1tertiary. The resulting coefficient is -0.365 in case of the EATR and -1.85 in case of the ATR.   
  93
tax rates do not matter. For example, Hines (1996) uses investment from the 
United Kingdom into the United States as a benchmark to capture state fixed 
effects83. We take the difference between credit and exemption systems into 
account in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equation (SURE) where the tax 
elasticity of investment from the UK is constrained to zero. Results are reported 
in columns (1) to (6) of Table 4.5. As can be seen, the effects on FDI point in 
the same direction as before84. Notably however, using constraints on the tax 
incentives, the coefficients for the tax rate differential increase significantly. We 
can interpret these results as follows: A fraction of foreign direct investment 
that can not be explained with tax rate differentials (in the situation where the 
source country’s tax system is not considered) turns out to be dependent on tax 
rates when we take tax credits into account. So, the elasticity of FDI with 
respect to tax rates is generally underestimated when not accounting for the 
different tax systems85.  
 
Moreover, the tax coefficient for the tertiary sector is still much higher than 
that of the secondary sector, indicating that investment into telecommunication, 
transport and financial intermediation is more sensitive to tax rate differentials 
than investment in the manufacturing sector. A comparison with Table 4.5. 
shows one more result that is remarkable: The difference between the estimators 
for the secondary and the tertiary sector even increased in our extended model. 
While the coefficients regarding the EATR, as shown in column (3) and (5), 
now transform into tax-elasticities  of -0.6 and -1.4, those for the ATR are given 
by -0.7 and -3.3.  Again, there is a notable difference of 40 to about 200 percent 
between the overall elasticity based on aggregated data and the sector specific 
                                                 
83 For a detailed discussion of this study see section 3.2.1.  
84 The only exception is the coefficient for the ATRs which just become insignificant for 
investment in the secondary sector.   
85 The effect is quite intuitive. In our baseline regression we face a situation where our data 
suggests a positive tax rate differential between the United Kingdom and some other countries. 
Actual FDI flows, however, are not influenced by this tax rate differential since tax credits 
apply. Hence, our baseline regression undervalues the correlation between tax rate differentials 
and foreign direct investment that exists in the remaining observations.  
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tax-elasticity for the tertiary sector86. This difference even exceeds the difference 
we observed in our baseline regression. The procedure above, however, does not 
take into account that there may be situations in which the tax rate differential 
matters even with tax credits. Although minimum taxes are limited by the 
source country’s tax rate, taxes can indeed be higher. This is the case whenever 
the target country levies higher taxes than the source country does. Since the 
tax credit is limited, any tax payment that is above the tax liability in the 
home country has to be fully borne by the firm (see section 2.5.1.).  
 
Accordingly, to account for these differences, we set the tax rate differential 
,i j∆τ  equal to zero whenever ,i j∆τ  is negative and investment comes from the 
UK. This procedure is in line with the asymmetric incentives investors from the 
tax credit country face. Using EATRs, the UK has the lowest tax rates of all 
countries under consideration. Tax rate differentials for the UK are always 
positive in this case and, accordingly, there will be no changes to our baseline 
regressions presented in columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 4. Using ATRs, 
however, regression results will change. Columns (7) to (9) report regression 
results that account for limited tax credits. Again, coefficients show the 
expected negative sign for investment in the secondary and tertiary sector. 
When compared to our previous results, coefficients (at least in the tertiary 
sector where a comparison is valid) are in between to what was reported in 
Table 4 and 5. Hence, one can argue that the elasticity of FDI with respect to 
tax rates is generally overestimated when the coefficients for tax credit countries 
are unconditionally constrained to zero. 
                                                 
86 For the ATRs, the rather large difference between elasticities should not be overvalued since 
the corresponding coefficient for the secondary sector is not significantly different from zero.    
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Table 4.5. 
Controlling for home countries’ tax system  
 SURE – tax coefficient for investment from the UK is zero Accounting for limited tax credit in the UK 
 primary sector 
  
secondary sector tertiary sector primary sector 
 
secondary 
sector 
tertiary sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Forward looking 
tax rate (EATR) 
 
-0.014 
(0.06) 
 
 
-18.517*** 
(4.17)  
-39.49*** 
(6.51)     
Backward looking 
tax rate (ATR)  
-0.131 
(0.21) 
 -9.171 
(1.25)  
-38.895*** 
(15.64) 
-0.106 
(0.19) 
-25.606*** 
(4.87) 
-35.247*** 
(21.06) 
 
Target countries 
economic size 
 
0.876*** 
(5.46) 
 
0.888*** 
(5.52) 
4.251*** 
(4.92) 
4.831*** 
(4.43) 
2.787*** 
(6.00) 
3.551*** 
(7.37) 
0.953*** 
(5.85) 
5.058*** 
(3.33) 
2.342*** 
(5.45) 
 
Labour costs 
 
 
-1.59*** 
(6.39) 
 
-1.41*** 
(5.78) 
-5.014** 
(2.33) 
-6.432*** 
(3.81) 
6.846*** 
(5.70) 
8.427*** 
(7.38) 
-1.923*** 
(8.17) 
-5.966* 
(1.76) 
2.482** 
(2.23) 
 
Energy prices 
 
0.130 
(0.33) 
-0.842 
(0.22) 
2.972 
(1.37) 
4.789*** 
(3.09) 
-14.098*** 
(6.82) 
-11.980*** 
(6.99) 
0.180 
(0.43) 
0.167 
(0.00) 
-3.047** 
(2.21) 
R-Squared 0.46 0.44 0.71 0.88 0.62 0.72 0.57 0.42 0.72 
Adj. R-Squared 0.21 0.19 0.58 0.83 0.44 0.65 0.37 0.15 0.59 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
 
Regressions include time and country-to-country specific fixed effects.  
Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are given in brackets; *, ** and *** indicates significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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4.4.3. Specification Test 
To test whether the results obtained above are robust to changes in our 
econometric specification, we make use of two additional variables. One of them 
is public inputs. As a proxy for public inputs we use data on annual public 
investment expenditures as provided by the OECD National Accounts. Public 
investment expenditures are expected to have a strong impact on the level of 
public infrastructure and therefore on the production costs of a multinational 
firm. These expenditures, expressed in terms of national currency and at 1995 
prices, are normalized by GDP in order to make countries comparable. The 
second variable tries to measure agglomeration effects. As has been shown in the 
previous literature, agglomeration effects, i.e. the proximity to other firms, may 
have a strong positive impact on FDI. As a measure for agglomeration effects, 
we use the capital stock from country i in country j in each time period. Data 
comes again from EUROSTAT. This approach is in line with the empirical 
findings. For investment into the US, Head et al. (1999) show that the location 
decision of Japanese firms is strongly determined by the number of already 
existing Japanese firms at a certain location. For investment into France, 
Crozet et al. (2004) show that proximity to other firms from the same source 
country makes a location more attractive. 
 
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4.6. report coefficients when public infrastructure 
and agglomeration effects are considered in our regression analysis. As tax 
coefficients for the primary sector are insignificant in the regressions above, we 
will concentrate our analysis on the secondary and tertiary sector. As expected, 
agglomeration effects, approximated by the stock of FDI from country i in 
country j, promote further investment flows. While the coefficient is 
insignificant for the secondary sector, it is significant for the tertiary sector. 
This result holds irrespective of whether we control for the tax system of the 
home country, or not. For public inputs, we get ambiguous results. As Table 
4.6. shows, only investment in the tertiary sector is positively correlated with 
public investment expenditures. Although the introduction of these additional 
variables has some weak influence on the size of tax coefficients, our qualitative 
result, that tax rate coefficients differ significantly between sectors, is confirmed.   
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Table 4.6. 
Regressions by sector: Sensitivity analysis  
 Dependent Variable: FDI/EXP Dependent Variable: FDI*Distance 
  
Not Controlled 
 
Controlled Controlled 
secondary sector tertiary sector 
 
secondary sector 
 
(1) 
tertiary sector 
 
(2) 
secondary sector 
 
(3) 
tertiary sector 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Forward looking 
tax rate (EATR) 
-10.984* 
(1.87) 
-19.636*** 
(6.334) 
-16.42*** 
(2.80) 
-49.789*** 
(11.35) 
1.419 
(0.28) 
 
-7.216*** 
(3.98) 
 
Backward looking 
tax rate (ATR) 
  
 
  
-8.727*** 
(5.82) 
 
-36.226*** 
(29.89) 
Target countries 
economic size 
3.201 
(1.47) 
1.252* 
(1.65) 
3.920*** 
(2.88) 
2.413** 
(2.45) 
6.996*** 
(7.13) 
6.182*** 
(6.32) 
2.867*** 
(3.84) 
2.929*** 
(4.08) 
Labour costs -4.008 
(0.89) 
4.199*** 
(2.52) 
-5.870*** 
(2.69) 
7.203*** 
(6.62) 
-0.251 
(0.21) 
-1.251 
(1.21) 
3.71*** 
(4.03) 
4.911*** 
(5.53) 
Energy prices -1.299 
(0.24) 
-6.503*** 
(2.77) 
3.723 
(1.22) 
-14.863*** 
(7.49) 
-23.73** 
(2.33) 
0.461 
(0.36) 
-9.193*** 
(6.35) 
-5.044*** 
(3.40) 
Public inputs -15.501 
(1.46) 
31.650*** 
(19.37) 
-0.865 
(0.27) 
35.075*** 
(23.21) 
    
Agglomeration 
effects 
0.070 
(0.32) 
0.045*** 
(2.77) 
0.046 
(0.27) 
0.050*** 
(2.75) 
    
R-Squared 0.39 0.80 0.71 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.72 0.85 
Adj. R-Squared 0.07 0.69 0.56 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.59 0.78 
 
Number of observations: 96; regressions include time and country-to-country specific fixed effects.  
Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are given in brackets; *, ** and *** indicates significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Finally, it may be questioned whether the approximation of distance with 
exports is correct. Multiplying equation (4.2) with distance, distance weighted 
FDI can be expressed as a function of our explanatory variables. Columns (5) to 
(8) of Table 4.6. report regression results for a corresponding specification of 
equation (4.4) where distance weighted FDI acts as dependent variable87. As can 
be seen, our general results do not change significantly when we use geographic 
distance instead of exports. Coefficients for both tax variables are still negative 
and significant88. Moreover, our general result of larger tax-elasticities in the 
tertiary sector carries over to this specification. Given these results, it seems 
appropriate to use bilateral exports as an approximation for distance.  
 
     
4.5. Conclusion 
At the most basic level, the results derived in this chapter confirm previous 
empirical work showing that bilateral foreign direct investment in the European 
Union is deterred by high taxes. The analysis goes further however, in 
demonstrating that the tax-sensitivity of foreign direct investment flows 
crucially depends on the economic sector in which the investment takes place. 
Differentiating FDI flows from Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands by the three main economic sectors, we find that investment in 
agriculture and mining is not driven by tax incentives. Taxes matter, however, 
when we analyse FDI flows into the manufacturing and the service sector. 
Especially investment in the tertiary sector, which is thought to be associated 
with large spillover effects concerning employment and economic growth, reacts 
very sensitively to tax rate changes. As our regressions show, these result hold 
for the case of forward as well as for backward-looking tax measures. For both 
measures, the tax elasticity of the tertiary sector is 20% to 40% above the 
aggregate elasticity. Therefore, if one is primarily concerned about FDI in the 
                                                 
87 We also tested for a linear specification where FDI is the dependent variable and distance 
enters the right hand side of equation (4). Since results are analogous to those shown in Table 6, 
but have less explanatory power, they are not presented here.   
88 The coefficient for EATRs in the secondary sector is the only exception.   
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tertiary sector, then using aggregate elasticities underestimates the effect of 
taxes on foreign investment. 
 
Clearly, these results have to be interpreted with care, especially because the 
analysis is based on a relatively small sample size. As in the related studies 
discussed in section 3.2.2., our data does not allow us to distinguish between 
greenfield and brownfield investment. Moreover, as FDI seems to be determined 
by characteristics of individual firms, the available data set does not allow us to 
explore the determinants of FDI in all details. However, our results indicate 
important differences in the mobility of FDI for different sector aggregates. We 
believe that further empirical work at a disaggregated level is needed in order to 
help governments devise tax policies that do not deter FDI while at the same 
time ensuring that countries get a fair share of the locational rents a 
multinational firm earns.  
 
The analysis of the following chapter will make use of the results derived here. 
If the sensitivity of FDI with respect to one measure of taxation (i.e. the 
effective average tax rate) is different among sectors, this raises the question 
whether different types of investment are sensitive to different measures of 
taxation (e.g. the statutory tax rate) as well. Variation in the tax-sensitivity 
among investment would imply that these investments are motivated for 
different reasons. We will use this approach to show that the location decision 
of German multinational enterprises may be partly determined by income 
shifting strategies. 
  100
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE:  
 
Distinguishing tax incentives for real investment and 
income shifting  
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The implementation of a single European Market and increasing tax 
competition has created a number of problems for fiscal authorities in the 
European Union during the last years. When we think of corporate taxation 
there are two issues which are particularly interesting. One issue concerns the 
possibility to attract foreign direct investment in the form of physical capital, 
creating positive spillover effects to the local economy such as increased demand 
for labour. The other issue is profit shifting, mostly affecting tax revenues. The 
latter issue is of major concern for tax authorities in typical high tax countries 
such as Germany: while corporate tax revenues grew in most countries of the 
EU and stayed constant in the OECD average in the first half of the 1990s (see 
Table 5.1.), they declined from 0.96 percent of GDP to 0.57 percent of GDP in 
Germany, which equals a decrease of 40 percent89. A considerable proportion of 
                                                 
89 Given this short period of time, there is the possibility that the revenue figures presented in 
Table 5.1. are simply influenced by changes in the tax code or by the business cycle. German 
revenue may also be influenced by the process of unification. However, the figures presented 
here are part of a long time trend that holds for more than twenty five years. We took the 
figures for 1990 and 1996 since they best cover the period of our econometric analysis. 
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this decline stems from the behaviour of large multinational firms, which have, 
even though they work very profitable, ceased to pay corporate taxes at home. 
Several examples of such behaviour can be found: from 1994 to 1995 
Commerzbank doubled its profits and simultaneously halved its tax load. At the 
same time Siemens made 1.3 Billion Euro profits which where fully exempted 
from taxation in Germany (Weichenrieder, 1996).  
 
Table 5.1. 
Corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP 
 1990 1996 Percentage change 
Belgium 2.53 2.63 + 3.97 
France 2.33 2.09a - 10.18 
Germany 0.96 0.57 - 39.93 
Ireland 1.88 2.98b + 58.56 
Netherlands 3.36 4.16 + 23.72 
United Kingdom 4.02 4.27a + 6.27 
United States 1.63 2.25 + 37.71 
OECD average 2.57 2.49 - 3.14 
 
a Values for France and the United Kingdom belong to the year 1997. 
b The value for Ireland comes from the year 1995. 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, own computations. 
 
This problem is certainly not confined to German corporations, but the German 
case is perhaps more obvious than that of any other country. A recent global 
survey performed by the consulting firm Ernst&Young (2001) supports this 
hypothesis. According to this study, transfer pricing which is a traditional 
instrument for income shifting from one country to another, is the most 
important future international tax issue for multinational corporations (61%), 
followed by double taxation relief and foreign tax credits (10% and 13%). While 
transfer pricing is presently part of the corporate strategic planning process for 
approximately one third of all responding corporations, it is important for more 
than half of the German firms. More detailed insights in multinationals tax 
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planning come from the Ruding Committee (Ruding Report, 1992, Devereux, 
1992). Already in 1992, the committee asked businesses within the European 
Union, to which degree their location decisions are tax driven. The general 
result was that taxes play an important role in the decision making process of 
firms. Moreover, this survey revealed that while taxes appear to be a key factor 
in decisions where to locate real productive activity, they appear to be even 
more important in the decision where to locate financial service centres; an 
indicator for income shifting. 
 
While the results of these business surveys indicate that transfer pricing and 
income shifting actually take place in the European Union, empirical evidence is 
rather scarce. As has been shown in section 3.3., most studies concern the 
United States and there exist only two studies so far concerned with the EU.  
 
As the studies by Grubert and Slemrod (1998) and Mintz and Smart (2004) 
have shown, incentives for real investment and income shifting may be 
interrelated. A location that otherwise would be unattractive for real investment 
may become attractive if locating there enables the multinational enterprise to 
engage in income shifting activities. Other studies, primarily focusing on the 
determinants of multinationals’ location of production, rather than on income 
shifting, find a significant correlation between effective tax rates and location 
decisions (see section 3.2.). Like others, Devereux and Griffith (1998b) further 
control for the possibility of income shifting by using the statutory tax rate as 
an additional variable in their model, but they do not find any significant 
correlation between investment and statutory tax rates. This result may stem 
from the fact that for some of the firms in the dataset profit shifting is less 
relevant while it is more relevant for other firms. To obtain more clear-cut 
results, it therefore seems promising to divide the data set used in the 
econometric analysis in several subsets of firms which differ from each other in 
important structural characteristics.                      
 
This is the approach taken in the present chapter. In the theoretical part of this 
chapter we argue that investment of firms that face lower transaction costs 
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when shifting income is relatively more sensitive to statutory tax rates than to 
effective tax rates. On the other hand, if firms face high costs when shifting 
income, they are relatively insensitive to the statutory tax rate. We test this 
theory in the econometric part of the paper with data on German 
multinationals’ FDI. Therefore we divide the data on FDI into two subsets. The 
criterion for allocation to the groups is the economic function of FDI such as 
production, finance or research and development which we associate with 
different opportunities (and hence costs) for income shifting. As Wildasin (1986) 
and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) have pointed out in their theoretical work, 
public inputs may also play a crucial role in tax competition. To account for 
their important role in determining the location decision of a multinational firm, 
we included public inputs as a further variable in both our theoretical and 
econometric model. Our econometric results show that FDI associated with little 
opportunities for income shifting (production) is correlated to effective tax rates 
while FDI that we associated with more opportunities for income shifting 
(service, finance, R&D) is correlated with the statutory tax rate instead. 
 
A simple and intuitive model of income shifting and location decisions is 
provided in section 5.2. of this chapter. In section 5.3., we take a closer look at 
the sources and definitions of the variables used in the econometric analysis. 
Section 5.4. gives an overview of the econometric approach and presents the 
empirical results. Section 5.5. concludes. 
 
 
5.2. Theoretical background 
 
5.2.1. Optimal behaviour of multinationals without income shifting 
Let us consider a multinational firm operating in two countries H and F where 
H is the home country and F is a foreign location90. We further assume that the 
home country is a high tax country and the foreign location is a low tax 
country. Capital, ik , is the only variable factor of production and output is 
                                                 
90 The theoretical analysis is adapted from Haufler and Schjelderup (1999, 2000). 
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given by the production function ( )if k , which is identical across countries and 
has the usual properties ( ) 0if k′ > , ( ) 0if k′′ < . Both countries provide the 
multinational enterprise with a given level of public inputs ig . As a public 
input, we can simply think of infrastructure which the multinational uses 
proportional to the capital employed and which reduces production costs91. By 
setting output prices to unity, gross profits in country i can then be written as 
( ) ( )i i i if k c g krπ = − , where r equals the world interest rate and ( )ic g  is a function 
describing the cost reducing effect of public inputs. Since an increase in ig  will 
reduce costs, we have ( ) 0ic g′ < . Moreover, assuming decreasing returns to scale 
in the public input, we have ( ) 0ic g′′ > . 
 
The gross profits defined above are subject to corporate taxation. Here we have 
to take into account that taxable profits are not the same as gross profits. 
Dependent on the tax code of a country some, firms can claim special tax 
breaks, accelerated deduction, and so on. The tax base the corporate tax rate ti, 
is applied on is therefore different from gross profits. Net profits are given by 
  
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]i i i i i i i i if k c g kr t f k c g krπ ε= − − −         (5.1) 
 
where εi is a positive parameter describing the deductibility of investment costs. 
For 1iε <  the corporate tax system permits only an incomplete deduction of 
investment costs while we have accelerated deduction for 1iε > . Throughout the 
rest of the chapter, we will refer to εi as a tax-base parameter.   
 
We further assume that taxation follows the source principle. Then all foreign 
profits are exempted from taxation in the home country, such that total profits 
of the multinational are given by 
                                                 
91 Note that the cost decreasing effect of public inputs modelled here is equivalent to the 
positive output effect of public inputs modelled in other studies. This equivalence follows from 
the “dual approach of production theory” as proposed by Fuss and McFadden (1978). 
Proportionality between capital and infrastructure used is introduced for simplicity only. 
Indeed, our theoretical results hold for any positive relationship between capital and 
infrastructure used.    
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( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
F H
F F F F F F F F
H H H H H H H H
f k c g k r t f k c g k r
f k c g k r t f k c g k r
π π
ε
ε
Π = +
= − − −
+ − − −
       (5.2) 
 
Maximizing equation (5.2) with respect to the optimal level of capital in each 
country, we are left with the following first-order conditions: 
 
(1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) 0F F F F Ft f k t c g rε′− + − =                 (5.3a) 
 
(1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) 0H H H H Ht f k t c g rε′− + − =                (5.3b) 
 
Rearranging (5.3a) and (5.3b) to [(1 ) ( )] /[(1 ) ( )]i i i i it f k t c g rε′− − = , the first-order 
conditions can be easily interpreted: Capital in country F is invested up to the 
point where the marginal after tax profit generated by of one unit of capital is 
the same in both countries, which is equal to the gross cost of capital.  
 
 
5.2.2. Optimal behaviour of multinationals with income shifting 
We now introduce the possibility to shift income from the parent company 
located in the high tax country H to a subsidiary located in the low tax country 
F. We denote by Q the level of income that is transferred between the two 
establishments of the multinational by manipulating internal trade prices for 
final and intermediate goods, interest rates and royalties. As in the related 
literature (Kant, 1988, Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000), we assume that this 
strategy generates (non deductible) costs since there are additional efforts that 
need to be taken in order to conceal the transfer pricing activity from tax 
authorities. For this purpose we define concealment costs of the following form: 
 
2
( )
j
F
Q
f k
θω ⋅=  
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The convexity assumed generates an interior solution in which a positive but 
finite level of income is shifted. We use a quadratic form here for simplicity 
only. Including production output ( )Ff k  in the denominator of the cost function 
takes into account the fact that concealment is less costly the higher the volume 
of sales in a country92 and makes the decisions of real investment and income 
shifting interdependent. The last parameter determining ω is θj. θj is a firm 
specific positive parameter which can vary between a minimum value minjθ  and 
infinity93. If, for instance, income is shifted from one location to the other by 
manipulating internal transfer prices, shifting costs can differ with respect to the 
goods traded. A firm that provides its parent with overhead services which are 
not commonly traded on the free market will face lower concealment costs than 
a firm that trades intermediate or final goods and is more restricted by the 
arms-length principle of transfer pricing. So, θj is expected to be lower for the 
former type of firms, while it is expected to be higher for the latter ones, e.g. 
firms that produce more tradable goods. 
 
With the possibility of income shifting, total after tax profits of the 
multinational are given by 
   
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
F F F F F F F F
H H H H H H H H
f k c g k r Q t f k c g k r Q
f k c g k r Q t f k c g k r Q
ε
ε ω
Π = − + − − +
+ − − − − − −  
 
     
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
( )
F F F F F F F F
H H H H H H H H
H F
f k c g k r t f k c g k r
f k c g k r t f k c g k r
t t Q
ε
ε
ω
= − − −
+ − − −
+ − −
                    (5.4) 
 
In this case the multinational can not only decide about kF and kH but also 
about the amount of income shifted from H to F. Differentiating equation (5.4) 
with respect to Q gives us the optimal level of profit shifting: 
                                                 
92 Grubert and Slemrod (1998) argue in a similar way. They assume that the presence of 
intangible assets decreases the cost of profit shifting. Since our study often refers to transfer 
pricing, however, the size of output produced abroad seems to be a more convincing measure 
affecting concealment costs. See section 3.3.3. for a detailed discussion on their analysis. 
93 The minimum value of θj ensures that profit shifting is limited in any case.  
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 ( ) ( )
2
H F F
j
t t f kQ θ
−=?            (5.5) 
 
From equation (5.5) it is straightforward to see that, with a lower corporate tax 
rate tF, incentives for income shifting increase. The maximum level of Q? , 
however, is limited by the gross profits obtained in country H94. Substituting 
(5.5) in (5.4) and differentiating with respect to kF and kH, we get the first-order 
conditions under a strategy including income shifting:  
 
2( )(1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) 0
4
H F
F F F F F
j
t tt f k t c g rεθ
− ′− + + − =                (5.6a) 
 
(1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) 0H H H H Ht f k t c g rε′− + − =                (5.6b) 
 
Comparing (5.3) with (5.6), it becomes obvious that investment is distorted by 
the term 2( ) ( ) / 4H F F jt t f k θ′−  towards the low tax country F if income shifting 
into this country is possible. This distortion becomes larger as the difference in 
corporate tax rates between the two countries grows and decreases with higher 
concealment costs θj. 
  
Using equation (5.6a), we can derive the minimum level of concealment costs 
min
jθ  which ensures that investment in the foreign country is finite. This is the 
case as long as the marginal cost of capital ( 1) ( )F F Ft c g rε −  is higher than the 
marginal gain from income shifting 2( ) ( ) / 4H F F jt t f k θ′− . Solving this condition for 
min
jθ , we get the minimum specific concealment costs 
min 2[( ) ( )] /[(4( 1) ( ) )]H F F F Fj Ft t f k t c g rθ ε′= − −  that assures an interior solution. 
 
 
                                                 
94 In the following we will assume that Q?  is always lower than profits in the high tax country 
H. First of all, profit shifting is limited by the concealment costs. Additionally, due to a home 
bias, we can assume investment in the home country to be relatively high as compared to 
investment in the foreign country. Finally, we can argue that F is only a small tax haven 
whereas H is the rest of the world. In this case, gross profits in H are rather high and should 
therefore exceed Q? .  
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5.2.3. Concealment costs and the importance of alternative tax measures 
In a next step, we want to show that either the statutory tax rate or the 
effective tax rate, which is a function of the tax-base parameter and the 
statutory tax rate, is the predominant variable determining investment in 
country F. Furthermore, we want to show that it is the concealment cost θj that 
determines which of the two tax measures mentioned above is predominant for 
the multinationals investment decision. Therefore we have to define an effective 
tax rate TF, which measures marginal taxes paid by the firm as a fraction of 
marginal pre-tax profits:  
 
2( ( ) / 4 ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
F H F j F F F F
F
F F
t t t f k t c g rT
f k c g r
θ ε′− − −= ′ −         (5.7) 
 
Note that the second term in the numerator depicts the tax savings that stem 
from cost deductions and is therefore comparable to the parameter A  employed 
in section 2.2. Hence, equation (5.7) is comparable to the EMTR of section 
2.2.2. Using equation (5.7), we can rewrite equation (5.6a) as 
 
(1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ] 0F F FT f k c g r′− ⋅ − =           (5.8) 
 
Concentrating our analysis on the foreign country we take all other variables as 
given, but note that we assume positive income in country H that can be shifted 
to country F. As we can see from (5.7) and (5.8), investment in country F is a 
function of three different country specific variables: the foreign statutory tax 
rate, the level of public inputs offered by the foreign country, and the foreign 
tax-base parameter εF. Note that, all other things equal, the effective tax rate is 
negatively correlated with the tax-base parameter εF; a decrease in εF which 
reduces the deductibility in investment costs will in any case result in a higher 
effective tax rate. We now implicitly differentiate equation (5.8) with respect to 
the effective tax rate, public inputs and the statutory tax rate. We get the 
following elasticities: 
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, .
( ) ( ) 0F F Fk T const
F
F
F
dk T f k c g r
dT k S
η Π= ′∂ −= = − = <∂               (5.9a) 
 
, .
(1 ) ( ) 0F F F Fk g const
F
F
F
dk g t c g r
dg k S
εη Π= ′∂ −= = − = >∂               (5.9b) 
 
, .
( )1 ( ) ( )
2 0
F H
F F F
F j
k t const
F
F
F
t t f k c g r
dk t
dt k S
εθη Π=
−  ′− − ∂  = = − =∂ ??            (5.9c) 
 
where S equals the second order condition for optimal investment in country F: 
 
2( )1 ( ) 0
4
F H
F F
j
t tS t f kθ
 − ′′= − + <  
 
 
The negative sign of equation (5.9a) reveals that the investment elasticity with 
respect to the effective tax rate is negative. Hence, any decrease in effective 
taxation will encourage investment. Since / 0F FT ε∂ ∂ <  from equation (5.7), 
equation (5.9a) then implies that more generous deductibility of investment 
costs that decreases effective taxation will lead to more investment. From 
equation (5.9b) we can observe that an increase in public inputs will promote 
investment. The sign of equation (5.9c) is ambiguous. As long as the firm pays 
positive taxes, [ ]1 ( ) 2 ( ) ( )F H j F F Ft t f k c g rθ ε′− − > , a higher statutory tax rate will 
reduce investments95.    
 
It is straightforward to see from equations (5.9a) to (5.9c) that concealment 
costs have a different impact on the size of the investment elasticity with 
respect to the effective tax rate and public inputs on the one hand and the 
statutory tax rate on the other. Differentiating elasticities with respect to 
concealment costs we get: 
                                                 
95 Our last results turn around if the tax base parameter Fε  is rather large. In this case, it is 
possible that the firm has negative tax payments such that investment is subsidised. In this 
case, any increase in the statutory tax rate will further increase the subsidy and hence promote 
investment. 
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Both equations, (5.10a) and (5.10b), are obviously positive since we have 
negative numerators and denominators. Consequently, higher concealment costs 
will increase the elasticity with which investment reacts to changes in 
depreciation allowances and the supply of public inputs. The derivation of 
equation (5.10c) is shown in the Appendix 5.A.1. This equation has a negative 
sign since the positive numerator is divided by a negative denominator. The 
negative sign of (5.10c) implies that the higher are concealment costs, the lower 
is the elasticity with which investment reacts to changes in the statutory tax 
rate. In fact, equation (5.9c) describes a negatively sloped function in θj, such 
that , ( )k t jη θ  converges to ( ) / ( )F Ff k f k′ ′′−  for θj → minjθ  and to 
[ ]( ) ( ) /(1 ) ( )F F F F Ff k c g r t f kε′ ′′− −  for θj → ∞.  
 
As Appendix 5.A.2. shows, there exists a point of intersection between , ( )k t jη θ  
and either , ( )k T jη θ  or , ( )k g jη θ  at jθ~ for any εF above one.  Note that a value for  
εF above one implies that the effective tax rate the firm has to pay is lower than 
the statutory tax rate. Hence, there always exists a point of intersection if the 
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effective tax rate is lower than the statutory tax rate. We can summarize these 
results in: 
 
Proposition 5.1.: As long as it holds that F Ft T> , there exists a point of 
intersection jθ~ . For j jθ θ<?  investment decisions react more sensitively to 
changes in the effective tax rate. For j jθ θ>?  investment decisions react more 
sensitively to changes in the statutory tax rate. 
 
Proposition 5.1. can be best illustrated graphically with Figure 5.1. where the 
sensitivity of investment with respect to statutory and effective taxation is 
plotted as a function of the firm specific transaction cost parameter jθ . One can 
argue that while the statutory tax rate is predominant for investment decisions 
as long as the firm specific transaction costs are lower than jθ~ , the tax-base 
parameter (respectively public inputs) is predominant if θj is higher than jθ~ .  
 
This result is quite intuitive, since net profits in country F come from two 
different sources. One of them is real economic activity, affected by 
(1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( )F F F F Ft f k t c g rε′− + − , the other source is tax savings through income 
shifting, affected by 2( ) ( ) / 4H F F jt t f k θ′− . For low transaction costs, the 
proportion of tax savings that stem from profits generated in country H rises 
and hence the statutory tax rate becomes more important in determining the 
optimal level of investment. Consequently, income shifting is the driving force 
inducing investments in country F for θj < jθ~  and real economic activity is the 
main determinant of investment as long as θj > jθ~ . In the extreme case where θj 
is equal to infinity, such that income shifting is prohibited and real activity is 
the only source of income, investment depends on the effective tax rate, which 
incorporates the statutory tax rate, the tax-base parameter, and the level of 
public inputs. On the other extreme, if transaction costs are low and most 
profits stem from tax savings in country H, investment primarily depends on 
the statutory tax rate.    
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Figure 5.1. 
Firm specific concealment costs and dominating economic activity 
 
 
What we have shown above is that the determinants of multinationals’ location 
decisions are influenced by the opportunities (or costs) of income shifting. 
Without income shifting, location decisions are influenced by the effective tax 
rate and local inputs, e.g. public inputs. On the other extreme, if there are no 
costs for income shifting and the only reason for establishing a firm is tax 
arbitrage rather than real economic activity, the parameter determining 
investment decisions is the statutory tax rate ti. Between these two extremes, all 
three parameters influence investment decisions but with higher values of θj, 
  113
and hence less income shifting, the influence of effective taxes and local inputs 
grows, while the influence of statutory taxes declines. 
 
In the econometric part of this paper we test the theoretical results derived 
here. If we can find support for a positive relationship between corporate tax 
rates and investment decisions rather than between the effective tax rates or 
public inputs and investment, we have (indirect) evidence for income shifting. 
 
 
5.3. Data Sources and description 
            
5.3.1 Data on German multinationals’ foreign investment decisions 
We now want to test empirically the results of our model with a sample 
describing the foreign activities of German multinationals. Data on the foreign 
activities of German multinational corporations are taken from the RWI-
Database “Globalisation” and act as dependent variable in our econometric 
analysis. The RWI-Database on the globalisation of German companies is based 
on annual reports the enterprises provide for the public and is in some cases 
supplemented by other sources such as newspapers, internet pages and so on. 
The panel covers activities of approximately one hundred firms which are 
responsible for approximately 15% of German outward FDI96.       
 
Built on these annual reports a panel-like dataset of time series for individual 
companies is constructed97. Among other statistics, this panel provides us with 
data about foreign activities of the companies investigated. Examples of such 
activities are the acquisition of a foreign company, the foundation of a new 
company abroad or the start of a joint venture. Additionally, for all these 
                                                 
96 The database indirectly covers almost one seventh of FDI stocks under review by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank for the balance of payments statistics. When we consider employees 
working abroad, the representativity is even higher: more than 40% of employees at affiliates of 
German companies abroad are working in firms included in the database. 
97 A detailed description of the database is given by Döhrn (2001) or Döhrn and Radmacher-
Nottelmann (2000). The interested reader is referred to these papers.  
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activities the economic function of the foreign affiliate is provided, e.g. whether 
it is intended to produce final or intermediate goods or whether it is intended to 
provide its parent company with overhead services, such as finance or research 
and development.   
 
From these data we can get count numbers of German multinationals’ foreign 
activities, separated by year, host country and economic function. Note that the 
definition of a “foreign activity” here is far less specific than that laid down in 
section 1.2.1.: A “foreign activity” is defined as any kind of investment of a 
German multinational abroad. There is no threshold applied neither on the 
share of equity nor on the total sum of the investment. Moreover, foreign 
activities do not only comprise investments but also co-operations with foreign 
enterprises. Count data on the economic function of the activity acts as 
dependent variable in our econometric analysis. Sufficient data is available for 
the years 1991 to 1998 and eight European host countries, Austria, Belgium, 
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, leaving 
us with 64 different counts.  
 
Figure 5.2. 
Share of German multinationals’  foreign activities, 1991 to 1998 
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Source: RWI-Database Globalization, own calculations. 
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As shown in Figure 5.2., almost half of these activities took place in France and 
the UK, while the share of activities in the small countries Belgium and Ireland 
is rather small. We separate count data by the economic function of the 
activity. Due to the specific methods involved in the process of data collection, 
however, detailed data about the economic function of an affiliate has to be 
interpreted with caution. Therefore, we concentrate our analysis on a distinction 
between two broad categories of economic activities, “service” and 
“production”. 
 
Figure 5.3. 
Composition of FDI subsets 
 
 
Figure 5.3. provides an overview of the selection process: on the one hand we 
have a group including activities within the functional area of management and 
finance, research and development and services. We associate all these activities 
with the provision of some kind of overhead services to the parent company. On 
the other hand we have a group consisting of engagements which are only 
undertaken in purpose of production. Activities which can not be clearly 
assigned to one of these two categories were excluded from the database. 
 
The number of activities in each group is roughly the same. 189 of 322 activities 
observed between 1991 and 1998 were acquisitions of a foreign company, the 
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foundation of a new company or the start of a joint venture with the intention 
to produce abroad. However, the relative size of the two groups varies in the 
course of time. Figure 5.4. gives us a picture of this development: although 
investments in the two groups seem to behave similar at first glance, there are 
some differences. For example, while the number of activities in the first group 
(finance, service and R&D) decreased in the years from 1991 to 1993 and 
increased from 1996 to 1997, the development for the second group (production) 
was the opposite during this time periods. 
 
Figure 5.4. 
German multinationals’ foreign activities by economic function, 1991 to 1998 
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Source: RWI-Database Globalization, own calculations. 
 
The fundamental idea of this chapter is that these two groups differ from each 
other in the degree profits can be shifted between countries98 and that the 
determinants of FDI decisions between the two groups therefore differ, too. In 
the following we test whether we can find significant differences in the 
determinants of FDI decisions between the two groups. 
                                                 
98 Genschel (2002) expects the costs for profit shifting into firms located in the second group 
(production) to be much higher than that for the first group. 
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5.3.2. Data on tax rates 
There are two different measures of corporate taxation used in the analysis. One 
is the effective average tax rate Ti, which is a function of the corporate tax rate 
and the tax base. Clearly, following our theoretical model presented in section 
4.2., the use of marginal effective tax rates seems to be appropriate. However, as 
our dependent variable consists of count data on the number of activities of 
German multinationals abroad, which are of a discrete nature, an effective 
average tax rate should be the preferred measure for our empirical analysis. We 
use here the implicit microeconomic measure (ATR) which we have already 
employed in Chapter 4. Since multinational enterprises are excluded from the 
calculation of tax rates, these measures can be assumed to be independent from 
income shifting activities99. 
 
Moreover, as pointed out in the theoretical part of this paper, the statutory tax 
rate may have to be taken into account if substantial intercompany transfers 
open possibilities for reducing the overall tax burden. Table 5.2. presents figures 
for effective and statutory tax rates. Note that we do not incorporate tax rates 
for Germany in our analysis. Differences in the German tax rate over time will 
be captured by time fixed effects100. While the statutory tax rate is very stable 
over time (most of the variance comes from the implementation or abolishment 
                                                 
99 Nevertheless, tax rates can be biased by other forms of income shifting such as shifting 
between corporate and personal income. This possibility is recently under discussed by Lindhe 
et al. (2002) in the context of the Nordic Dual income tax. Empirical evidence for income 
shifting between corporate and personal income comes from Gordon and Slemrod (2000). They 
found that a substantial amount of income was shifted from corporate to personal income in the 
United States since 1965 by changing the form of compensation for executives and other 
workers. We will abstract from this problem and assume that the effective tax rates are not 
significantly distorted by income shifting activities. 
100 Theoretically, to make use of cost depreciations in high tax countries, German multinationals 
may locate there as well. In this case, tax incentives have to be measured as the absolute value 
of the difference between the foreign and the German statutory tax rate so the latter has to be 
considered as well. However, for the time period analysed here, the German tax rate is the 
highest in our sample. Such “symmetric” incentives for income shifting do therefore not exist 
and the German tax rate is not required.          
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of several surtaxes), there is a relatively high variance in the effective tax rates. 
Also, effective tax rates are often lower than statutory tax rates. Italy and 
Ireland are exceptions; in these countries the effective tax rate is higher than 
the nominal tax rate. While there is no simple explanation for Italy, the case of 
Ireland is very clear: effective tax rates are computed from local firms which 
face the regular Irish corporate tax rate which is around 35%. However, for our 
empirical analysis, we need a measure of the effective tax rate of multinational 
firms which face only the reduced statutory tax rate of 10%. We take account of 
this problem in the robustness check in section 5.4.3. 
 
Table 5.2. 
Statutory and effective rates of corporate taxation* 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
statutory 30.00 30.00 30.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 
Austria 
effective 22.90 13.90 14.90 10.60 10.90 16.80 25.50 10.30 
statutory 39.00 39.00 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 
Belgium 
effective 15.70 17.70 22.70 22.30 23.90 23.40 22.00 20.60 
statutory 34.00 34.00 33.33 33.33 36.66 36.66 36.66 41.66 
France 
effective 32.40 32.50 32.10 32.40 34.80 33.90 37.10 36.10 
statutory 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Ireland** 
effective 16.40 13.60 13.60 14.30 14.40 16.80 20.20 23.50 
statutory 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 37.00 37.00 37.00 
Italy 
effective 41.10 47.00 50.70 44.40 45.80 45.30 44.10 43.90 
statutory 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 
Netherlands 
effective 32.10 32.50 31.40 31.10 30.60 31.70 30.10 31.00 
statutory 35.50 35.50 35.50 35.50 35.34 35.31 35.27 35.26 
Spain 
effective 27.90 28.80 26.80 24.60 24.20 26.40 26.00 27.70 
statutory 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 
UK 
effective 31.70 31.40 30.70 31.40 31.10 30.10 29.70 28.90 
 
Source: Büttner (2002). 
* Statutory tax rates include additional surtaxes. 
** Ireland has a reduced rate of 10% for international investments. The tax rate for local firms 
was 40% in 1991 and decreased to 36% in 1998.    
  119
5.3.3 Data on other explanatory variables 
Beside the two measures of taxation, we are most interested in a measure of 
public inputs gi. As a proxy for public inputs we use data on annual public 
investment expenditures as provided by the OECD National Accounts. Public 
investment expenditures are expected to have a strong impact on the level of 
public infrastructure and therefore on the production costs of a multinational 
firm. These expenditures, expressed in terms of national currency and at 1995 
prices, are normalized by GDP in order to make countries comparable. 
  
Despite the importance of taxation and public inputs, these variables alone can 
hardly explain the distribution of foreign direct investment. Additional variables 
used in the econometric analysis are GDP and labour costs. GDP, which also 
comes from the OECD National accounts, serves as a proxy for market size101. 
Finally, labour costs as measured by hourly direct pay in the manufacturing 
sector are included to control for country differences in factor costs102.       
 
 
5.4 Econometric approach and empirical results 
 
5.4.1. Econometric approach 
For count data, like the number of engagements used in our analysis, the 
Poisson distribution is the standard reference since it describes phenomena with 
                                                 
101 Market size itself is associated with lower transport costs and hence is an important source of 
locational advantages. Markusen (1995) points out that locational advantages appear when 
transport costs are high, the foreign market is sizeable and factor prices are low relative to other 
locations. A close link between German exports and FDI was observed in an empirical study of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank (1997). It would be promising, therefore, to include German exports 
in the econometric analysis, but GDP and exports are in fact strongly correlated with each 
other. A simultaneous use of both these variables in the econometric analysis would therefore 
cause a problem of multicollinearity. However, using German exports instead of host countries 
GDP as independent variable in the regression does not change the results reported below.  
102 A detailed description on the source and properties of the labour costs variable is given in 
section 4.3.3.  
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non-negative integer outcomes where zero is a frequent observation. The Poisson 
model, however, relies on some very restrictive assumptions and is especially 
invalid in the case of overdispersion, i.e. if the variance exceeds the mean of the 
random variable. An alternative distribution that accounts for the possibility of 
overdispersion is the negative Binomial distribution. So, the number of 
engagements n is modelled as a negative binomially distributed random 
variable103. The likelihood of observing a count n of engagements in country i in 
year t is: 
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Γ + Ψ   =    Γ Γ + + Ψ                   (5.11) 
 
where ( )Γ ⋅ denotes the gamma function. The two parameters a and κ  determine 
the mean and the variance of the random variable: , ,( )i t i tE n a λ= ⋅Ψ =  and 
, ,( ) (1 )i t i tVar n λ= +Ψ . 
 
The corresponding link-function is the log-link )log( ,tiλ , which ensures that the 
dependent variable in our model can not become negative. Now, the expectation 
λi,t can be written as the product of a linear equation 
 
, ,exp( )i t i tXλ β=                   (5.12) 
 
where Xi,t is a vector of observable country and time specific exogenous 
variables that determine the number of engagements and β is a parameter 
vector to be estimated using generalised least squares104. With tax rates, public 
inputs, GDP and labour costs as exogenous variables, our baseline regression 
can be written as:  
     
1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ,, ,exp( )t i t i t i t i t i ti t i i t t g ß y w eλ α α β β β β= + + Τ + + + + +             (5.13) 
                                                 
103 We did perform regressions based on the Poisson distribution as well. Although the choice of 
the underlying distribution affects our quantitative results to some degree, qualitative results are 
similar for the Poisson distribution and are therefore not reported here.   
104 It follows from 
, ,log( )i t i tXλ β= ⋅  that , ,exp( )i t i tXλ β= ⋅ . 
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where αi is a dummy that covers country specific effects, αt is a dummy that 
controls for exogenous shocks in time, yi,t represents host countries GDP in year 
t, wi,t denotes labour costs and ei,t is the error term. 
 
The parameter βi estimated from regression (5.13) then gives us the ceteris 
paribus change in the expected number of engagements in a country, if the 
related parameter variable alters. Note that this is just a mean value. What we 
do in our regression is the following: first, we estimate the expected (mean) 
number of engagements in each country for the given economic conditions. In a 
second step, we estimate the change of this expected number.  
 
 
5.4.2. Results for the baseline regression 
Table 5.3. shows the econometric results based on regression (5.13). Column (1) 
presents the results for the activities undertaken in order to produce abroad: 
While the statutory tax rate seems to have no significant influence on the 
dependent variable, the opposite holds for the effective tax rate. The parameter 
for Ti has the expected negative sign and is significant at the five percent level. 
The other variable of interest is public infrastructure investment. Empirical 
results do not support our theoretical finding that public inputs have a positive 
impact on the location decision of German multinationals. The coefficient has a 
positive sign, indicating that an increase in infrastructure investment attracts 
multinational activities, but it is not significantly different from zero (shown by 
the small z-value). As indicated by the positive parameter for GDP, market 
potentials may also play an important role in determining investment decisions. 
This result is plausible since locational advantages appear when production 
takes place in a large country and transport costs almost disappear. 
 
Completely different results appear when we look at activities in the context of 
overhead services, financing and R&D, shown in column (4). In contrast to the 
first group, it is the statutory tax rate and not the effective tax rate which 
significantly influences the location decision. Variation in the dependent variable 
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can not be explained by the effective tax rate, public inputs and GDP. Labour 
costs are insignificant in all cases and for both groups. 
 
When we compare the outcome of the baseline regression with our theoretical 
results, it becomes obvious that the determinants of multinational activities in 
the two groups are close to the extreme cases described in section 5.2. where 
either the statutory tax rate or the effective tax rate and public inputs 
determine the investment decision. The only exception here is public 
infrastructure investment which acts as a proxy for public inputs. However, 
measuring public inputs is a very difficult task and public infrastructure 
investments are obviously a very rough approximation for public provided goods 
and services that reduce firms’ production costs. The results for the first group, 
consisting of activities undertaken in purpose of production, fit very well to the 
case where the transaction cost parameter θj is relatively high and income 
shifting is almost prohibitive so that locational advantages such as the effective 
tax rate and market size are important determinants of profits. On the other 
hand, empirical results for the latter group are consistent with the assumption 
that firms in this group face relatively low costs when shifting income and hence 
real activity plays only a small role in determining investment decisions. As real 
activity plays only a small role, it is not surprising that parameters relating to 
locational advantages are insignificant since these parameters do not directly 
influence the decision on income shifting. These results imply that most of the 
firms providing overhead services, financial intermediation or undertaking 
research and development for its German parent company are located 
strategically in order to reduce the overhead tax burden of the multinational by 
shifting income. Our results therefore give us indirect evidence for income 
shifting. Furthermore, the analysis shows us that shifting is limited to the kind 
of firms that face low transaction costs for this activity and are more 
independent from location specific factors of production.  
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Table 5.3. 
Regressions by economic function: Base case 
 Production Service, Finance, R&D Pooled Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Effective tax rate, Ti -1.945** 
(-2.021) 
-2.015** 
(-1.893) 
 
0.065 
(0.090) 
-0.007 
(-0.010) 
 
-0.515 
(-0.973) 
Statutory tax rate, ti 2.663 
(1.156) 
 
1.755 
(0.787) 
-6.544** 
(-2.406) 
 
-6.540** 
(-2.403) 
-1.645 
(-0.948) 
Public inputs, gi 0.673 
(0.845) 
0.723 
(0.924) 
0.483 
(0.612) 
0.764 
(0.843) 
0.588 
(0.676) 
0.782 
(0.885) 
0.522 
(0.899) 
GDP, yi 5.796* 
(1.844) 
5.567* 
(1.823) 
5.777* 
(1.816) 
-4.614 
(-1.568) 
-2.122 
(-0.788) 
-4.624 
(-1.570) 
0.117 
(0.055) 
Labour costs, wi 
 
-0.420 
(-0.398) 
-0.368 
(-0.353) 
-0.798 
(-0.729) 
0.807 
(0.951) 
0.128 
(0.158) 
0.796 
(0.947) 
0.113 
(0.175) 
Pseudo-R-Squared 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.75 0.65 0.75 0.87 
Adj. R-Squared 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.63 0.50 0.64 0.80 
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
 
z-statistics are given in brackets; * and ** indicates significance at the level of 10%, and 5%. 
All variables expressed in logarithmic values. Coefficients for time and country dummies not shown.  
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Note, however, that this interpretation of the qualitative effects is only valid 
under the assumption that firms in both groups face the same effective tax rate. 
Suppose, for example, that firms in the service group can not make use of the 
generous depreciation allowances of a host country, simply because there is 
“nothing to deduct”. The effective tax rate of these firms would be equal to the 
statutory tax rate. Therefore, we can not argue unambiguously that the 
observed qualitative differences between the two groups stem from income 
shifting in this case105. Testing for this possibility is very difficult in practise 
since our data does not allow us to distinguish tax rates across groups. One may 
argue, however, that there is anecdotal evidence that at least firms with large 
R&D activities make use of generous cost deductions. Moreover, Clark (2004) 
presents implicit microeconomic effective average tax rates for different 
industries in Belgium for the year 1998. Although there is variation in the tax 
rate among industries, his figures do not show that the effective tax rate faced 
by industries we may assign to our service group, i.e. financial services, are 
closer to the statutory rate than those of manufacturing industries.               
 
However, despite this remaining ambiguity there are remarkable quantitative 
differences in the response of investments to changes in the tax parameters. 
Since we have expressed all our variables in logarithmic terms, the observed 
regression parameters shown in Table 5.2. can be interpreted as elasticities. 
Thus, a one percent decrease in the effective tax rate of a country is expected to 
stimulate the number of engagements undertaken in purpose of production in 
this country by about two percent. This confirms previous empirical work where 
the elasticity of FDI with respect to the effective tax rate typically fluctuates in 
a range between -2 and -4. On the other hand, a one percentage increase in the 
statutory tax rate diminishes engagements in firms providing its parent with 
overhead services or undertaking research by more than six percent. A 
comparison of the two elasticities reveals that the response to changes of the tax 
parameters in the service group is approximately 300 percent higher than the 
response in the production group.  
 
                                                 
105 I thank Clemens Fuest for pointing this out. 
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In Chapter 4 we investigated the effect of changes in effective taxation of 
capital across economic sectors. Not distinguishing between firms with low and 
high opportunities for income shifting, our findings suggest that the tax-
elasticity of firms in the service and transportation sector is only 50 percent 
higher than that in the manufacturing sector. The difference between the 50 
percent obtained in Chapter 4 and the 300 percent obtained here are a further 
sign for income shifting. 
 
Column (7) presents empirical results for a pooled sample where we do not 
distinguish between the two different groups. Here, the effects observed using 
disaggregated data completely disappear. Although they have the expected sign, 
all tax related variables are insignificant. It is not surprising that we get such 
insignificant results when pooling the data, since investments are underdone for 
different purposes, and therefore have completely different determinants. As a 
consequence, the econometric model can not carve out clear results106.  
 
In the remaining columns of Table 5.3. we tested whether the simultaneous use 
of the two tax measures in one regression biases our results. Since the effective 
tax rate is a function of the statutory tax rate there is a high possibility that it 
is not exogenous, but endogenously given by the statutory tax rate. Using the 
effective and statutory tax rate in one regression may result in multicollinearity. 
Although observed correlation between the two variables is almost negligible in 
our sample107, we tested for this possibility. Therefore we ran two additional 
                                                 
106 Note that investments in the first group (production) often employ more capital than 
investments in the second group (investments in R&D facilities are sometimes an exception). 
The total sum of capital invested in the first group is therefore much higher than that invested 
in the second group. Using the amount of capital rather than count numbers in our regression, 
it can be assumed that the results for the pooled sample would be more similar to that of the 
first group since the weight of this group measured in terms of capital is relatively high. We 
would get results very similar to that of Devereux and Griffith (1998b): the effective tax rate 
would be significant; the statutory tax rate would be insignificant in determining investment 
decisions. This demonstrates the importance of using data disaggregated by the type of FDI for 
econometric analysis on the effect of taxes. 
107 Cov[log(Ti),log(ti)]=0.09. 
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regressions for each group, excluding one measure of taxation in each. As we 
can see from columns (2) to (3) and (5) to (6) respectively, results do not 
change much, neither in the size of the regression parameters nor in its level of 
significance: while the effective tax rate is significant for the production group, 
the statutory tax rate is significant for the service group. 
 
 
5.4.3. Specification test 
We have mentioned above that effective taxation in Ireland and Italy is higher 
than the statutory tax rate and that the results derived from the baseline 
regression could be biased by the use of the reduced tax rate for multinational 
corporations in Ireland. Hence, we excluded Ireland and Italy from the sample. 
Results of this regression are presented in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5.4. Even 
after exclusion of the two countries the results appear to be quite robust. When 
we take a closer look at our findings, however, we get one striking result: while 
the importance of the effective tax rate grows after exclusion in the first group 
(the coefficient changes by approximately 30 percent and becomes more 
significant), the importance of the statutory tax rate for activities in the second 
group declines (in this case the coefficient decreases by approximately 25 
percent and loses significance) 
 
One explanation for observed changes in the first group could be the fact that 
the effective tax rates of Ireland and Italy used in the econometric analysis are 
too “high”. Tax induced investments in these countries are not treated as tax 
induced and are hence underestimated by the model. To give an example: a 
multinational enterprise locating a subsidiary in Ireland de facto faces an 
effective tax rate lower than 10 percent108. Because of this low tax rate the 
multinational decides to locate in Ireland. Our econometric model, however, 
                                                 
108 Assuming equal treatment of multinational and local firms concerning depreciation 
allowances we get an effective tax rate of approximately 5 percent (dividing the effective tax 
rate of 15 to 20 percent by the regular statutory tax rate of 35 to 40 percent we get a ratio of 
approximately 0.5. Multiplying this ratio with the statutory tax rate for multinational firms we 
get an effective tax rate of about 5 percent). 
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suggest that this location decision is based on an effective tax rate that is 
around 15 or 20 percent and hence is not tax induced. Consequently, the 
observed tax sensitivity of investment grows after exclusion of the two 
countries.  
 
When we think of Ireland as a tax haven, changes in the second group can also 
be explained. With its preferential corporate tax rate of 10 percent, Ireland can 
be considered as an outlier in our sample as the next lowest tax rate is 30 
percent (Austria from 1991 to 1993). Our results in the baseline regression are 
then to some degree influenced by the existing preferential taxation offered by 
the Irish government and primarily applied to multinationals’ subsidiaries 
engaged in financial investments109. As expected, the tax sensitivity of 
investment in the second group declines after adjusting our sample. 
 
Furthermore, we tested if the composition of the service category, which is an 
aggregate of activities underdone for three different purposes, influences our 
results. Therefore we changed the composition of the service category by 
excluding either Finance or Research and Development from the service 
category. As we can see from the two regressions reported in columns (4) and 
(5) of Table 5.4., results for service based activities are robust to changes in the 
composition of the category. 
 
Certainly, the counts of activities used in the analysis differ substantially in 
many dimensions. One of them is the type of transaction, i.e. if the activity is a 
merger, the start-up of a new company, et cetera. Taking a closer look at the 
data, we are able to identify some heterogeneity between the production and the 
service category:  the relative share of mergers is substantially higher in the 
production category than in the service category. As Swenson (2001a) finds for 
the United States, the tax-sensitivity of FDI crucially depends on the type of 
FDI. Her results indicate that new plants and plant expansions appear to be 
                                                 
109 As most of these subsidiaries, which are part of the second group in our regression, are 
located in a small area near the docks in Dublin, they are often referred to as the Dublin docks 
companies. 
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deterred by high state taxes, while mergers and acquisitions are instead 
positively correlated with tax rates (compare section 3.2.3.). Consequently, 
results for our two categories could be determined by differences in transaction 
types rather than by differences in the functional form of the activity. Using 
dummy variables for the different shares of mergers in the two groups, we 
controlled for this possibility. With trans_p we measure the share of mergers 
and acquisitions in the production group while trans_s measures the same share 
in the service group. We test for two possible relations between these shares and 
the exogenous variables. In column (6) and (8) of Table 5.4. we included the 
dummy as a further explanatory variable to test if the type of transaction has 
an effect on all variables that determine the count of activities. In column (7) 
and (9) we linked the transaction type dummy to the significant tax variable 
assuming that differences with respect to the type of transaction are limited to 
taxation only. Results to not change significantly (there is only a 10 percent 
increase in the observed elasticity of the service group) if we include the dummy 
variables which are themselves insignificant. Thus, it must indeed be the 
distinction between production and service that drives the different results for 
the two categories. Other variations of our model, such as the exclusion of the 
labour cost variable, which is insignificant in all cases, or the limitation to 
specific time periods, do not lead to major changes for our findings reported 
above. This suggests that the qualitative results derived from our database are 
robust with respect to the exact specification of the model. 
  129
Table 5.4. 
Regressions by economic function: Sensitivity analysis 
 Exclusion of Ireland and Italy 
Changes in the composition of the 
service category 
Including transaction type dummies 
 
Production 
(1) 
Service, Finance, R&D 
 (2)                 (3) 
R&D excluded 
(4) 
Finance excluded 
(5) 
Production 
  (6)               (7) 
Service, Finance, R&D 
(8)                (9) 
Effective tax rate 
-2.667** 
(-2.222) 
0.924 
(1.067) 
 -0.540 
(-0.692) 
0.239 
(0.312) 
-1.922** 
(-1.988) 
-1.945** 
(-2.011) 
-0.070 
(-0.094) 
-0.067 
(-0.089) 
Effective tax rate * trans_p 
 
 
 
    0.001 
(0.203) 
  
Statutory tax rate 
3.433 
(1.241) 
-5.244* 
(-1.816) 
-5.080* 
(-1.744) 
-6.604** 
(-2.254) 
-6.408** 
(-2.287) 
2.591 
(1.127) 
2.645 
(1.149) 
-7.224** 
(-2.555) 
-7.274** 
(-2.573) 
Statutory tax rate * trans_s 
 
 
 
      0.038 
(0.782) 
Public inputs 
0.971 
(0.664) 
-0.256 
(-0.243) 
-0.068 
(-0.066) 
1.237 
(1.266) 
0.760 
(0.807) 
0.672 
(0.842) 
0.675 
(0.832) 
0.945 
(0.907) 
0.953 
(0.914) 
GDP 
7.323** 
(2.031) 
-3.972 
(-0.941) 
-4.859 
(-1.165) 
-4.747 
(-1.534) 
-4.181 
(-1.329) 
5.537* 
(1.748) 
5.796* 
(1.840) 
-4.727 
(-1.614) 
-4.706 
(-1.604) 
Labour costs  
-0.657 
(-0.633) 
1.376 
(1.512) 
1.221 
(1.358) 
0.654 
(0.753) 
0.879 
(0.952) 
-0.429 
(-0.405) 
-0.420 
(-0.398) 
0.882 
(1.064) 
0.882 
(1.065) 
trans_p 
 
 
    0.085 
(0.541) 
   
trans_s 
 
 
 
 
 
     0.130 
(0.771) 
 
Pseudo-R-Squared 0.87 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.75 0.84 0.84 0.75 0.74 
Adj. R-Squared 0.79 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.64 0.76 0.76 0.61 0.61 
Observations 48 48 48 64 64 64 64 64 64 
z-statistics are given in brackets; * and ** indicates significance at the level of 10%, and 5%. 
All variables expressed in logarithmic values. Coefficients for time and country dummies not shown. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have analysed count data on foreign engagements of German 
multinationals differentiated by their economic function. This is done in order 
to investigate if there is substantial variation in the determinants of FDI 
between functional groups. Results indicate that foreign engagements in real 
activity depend on variables that refer to locational advantages, e.g. GDP or 
the effective tax rate, measuring the actual rather than the statutory burden of 
taxation. Completely different outcomes appear when we focus on engagements 
in the functional area of management and finance, research and development or 
overhead services which we associate with high potentials for (respectively low 
costs of) income shifting. Instead of locational advantages, investments in these 
groups only follow the statutory tax rate. Under the assumption that firms in 
both groups face the same effective tax rate this gives us indirect evidence for 
income shifting activities. The effect of the statutory tax rate is thereby 
approximately three times higher than that of the effective tax rate on 
investments in real activity.  
 
The main result of our analysis is that the separation of different types of FDI 
leads to very sharp results on the effects that different elements of the corporate 
tax system have on different types of FDI. Using aggregated data instead, as 
has been done by most empirical studies of the subject, gives a less clear-cut 
picture of the correlation between tax parameters and investment, since it 
“averages” over different, and sometimes even opposite, effects. Provided the 
availability of suitable data, further research should therefore concentrate on 
the effects of taxation on specific types of FDI.  
   
As we have seen in the analysis, a larger statutory tax rate for investments 
undertaken in purpose of real activity (production) can be balanced by other 
location factors such as GDP which acts as a proxy for market potentials. 
Consequently, from this point of view, there is only limited scope for a “race to 
the bottom” in effective corporate tax rates across Europe, as is feared by many 
scholars. On the other hand, income shifting can indeed result in a “race to the 
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bottom” since a country can easily gain corporate tax revenues by lowering the 
statutory tax rate, leaving the effective level of taxation constant. This confirms 
previous results already presented in Chapter 3. In particular high tax countries, 
which are harmed from decreasing tax revenue, may react to income shifting 
with the use of strategies that limit these activities. However, as we will see in 
our theoretical analysis of Chapter 6 below, the use of such strategies may 
reinforce the decrease in tax revenue.  
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5.A. Appendix to Chapter 5 
5.A.1. Deriving of the sign of equation (5.10c) 
Rearranging equation (5.10c) we get: 
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The denominator of equation (A.5.1), (II), is clearly negative. While the first 
term (I) of the numerator shows a positive sign, this is the case for the terms 
(III) and (IV) as well. So, the numerator will be positive as long as it holds that 
( ) ( )III IV> .  
 
Substitution of S in (III) and dividing by ( )Ff k′ , ( )Ff k′′  and jθ  gives:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 3 22
2
( ) ( )( )
2 2 8 4 8 4 ( )
F H F H F H F H F H FF H
F
F
F
j j j j
t t t t t t t t t t c g rt tt
f k
ε
θ θ θ θ
   − − − − −−− + > − + +   ′      
         (A.5.2) 
 
Rearranging yields: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
2
1 ( ) 1
2 2 2 ( )
F F H F H F
F H F
F
j j j
t t t t t c g r
t t f k
ε
θ θ θ
− − −+ −+ > −′−              (A.5.3) 
 
Since it follows from a positive effective marginal tax rate that ( ) ( )F FFf k c g rε′ > , 
the right hand side of equation (A.5.3) has to be negative. Hence, to have 
( ) ( )III IV>  it is sufficient that the left hand side of (A.5.3) is positive. 
Multiplying the left hand side with ( )2 F Hj t tθ − , we get: 
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( ) ( )2 21 0F F H F Hjt t t t tθ − − − + − >                (A.5.4) 
 
Since ( )2 0F Ht t− > , equation (A.5.4) will hold as long as ( )21 0F F Ht t t − − − >  . 
Since tax rates can only vary between zero and one and we know that Ht  is an 
upper bound for Ft , this is the case for any possible combination of statutory 
tax rates. Hence, the numerator of (5.10c) will be positive. Given the negative 
sign of the denominator, equation (5.10c) shows a negative sign. 
 
 
5.A.2. The existence of jθ~  
Inserting θj → minjθ in equations (5.9a) and (5.9b), the investment sensitivity 
with respect to effective taxation and public inputs gets zero since the 
numerator is divided by an infinite value for S. Since we know from equations 
(5.10a) to (5.10c) that the sensitivity with respect to effective taxation and 
public inputs increases in jθ  while those with respect to the statutory tax rate 
decreases, we only have to show that the former two sensitivities are higher in 
absolute value for the case of θj → ∞ . Inserting jθ = ∞  in equations (5.9a) to 
(5.9c) and multiplying with S we get: 
 
, ( ) ( )k T F Ff k c g rη ′= −                        (A.5.5) 
 
, (1 ) ( )k g F F Ft c g rη ε ′= −                        (A.5.6) 
 
, ( ) ( )k t F F Ff k c g rη ε′= −                        (A.5.7) 
 
To have a point of intersection for the comparison between statutory and 
effective taxes, it has to hold from (A.5.5) and (A.5.7) that ( ) ( )F F Fc g r c g rε >  and 
hence that 1Fε > .  
 
Analogically, we can derive a value for εF which ensures the existence of the intersection 
between , ( )k t jη θ  and , ( )k g jη θ . We get 1 ( ) / ( )F F Fc g c gε ′= − .  
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CHAPTER SIX:  
 
Asymmetric capital tax competition in the presence 
of income shifting  
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
As our empirical results from Chapter 5 suggest, income shifting is indeed a 
relevant issue for multinational enterprises. By shifting income from one 
jurisdiction to the other, multinational enterprises have the opportunity to 
minimise their overall tax payments. Although some minimum investment in 
the low tax country may be needed, in principle this can be done without 
affecting any decision on real investment. The multinational firm can thus 
benefit from location advantages in one jurisdiction while transferring the 
economic rent of the investment to the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate. 
Clearly, from the point of view of tax authorities in high tax countries, this 
strategy will lead to substantial losses in revenue.  
 
Against this background, the Commission of the European Communities (2001) 
presents a strategy that would allow multinational firms to create a 
consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities. This proposed 
change from the current system of separate accounting to either a “Common 
Consolidated Base Taxation” or a “Home State Taxation” would make income 
shifting more difficult or even impossible. These two policy alternatives do, 
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however, have a number of shortcomings and their implementation faces several 
difficulties110. It therefore seems to be important to evaluate the effects of 
income shifting on inter-jurisdictional tax competition in more detail before 
concluding whether this proposal can improve upon the current method of 
separate accounting.  
 
In the theoretical literature on tax competition with income shifting, several 
authors stressed that the strategic choice of income shifting regulations may 
lead to a double taxation of corporate income and hence higher effective tax 
rates (Mansori and Weichenrieder, 2001, Raimondos-Møller and Scharf, 2002). 
In opposition, others suggest that income shifting may spur tax competition 
between governments and exert further downward pressure on statutory tax 
rates (Gordon and McKie-Mason, 1995, Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000). All 
these papers model competition between regions of similar size. Clearly, the 
assumption of symmetric regions is not that realistic: Since tax rates will be 
equal among regions, there will be no income shifting in the symmetric 
equilibrium. To have a more realistic case, as that in Chapter 5 in which income 
shifting takes place, we have to introduce some asymmetries that lead to 
differences in corporate taxation between regions.  
 
The literature on asymmetric tax competition goes back to the work of 
Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). They show that tax competition between 
small and large jurisdictions with identical relative endowments of capital and 
labour leads to a Nash equilibrium in which tax rates, capital-labour ratios and 
revenue differ among jurisdictions. Their findings lead to an interesting 
conclusion about “smallness” in tax competition. Since there are capital exports 
from the large to the small jurisdiction in equilibrium, residents of the small 
jurisdiction are better off than residents of the large jurisdiction. Although tax 
competition is harmful for world welfare as a whole, Wilson (1991) shows that 
the small jurisdiction may benefit from tax competition if differences between 
                                                 
110 Mintz and Weiner (2003) discuss this issue in more detail. They conclude that allocation rules 
may introduce distortions concerning the real activity of multinational firms.   
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jurisdictions are sufficiently large. Therefore, the small jurisdiction is unwilling 
to harmonize tax rates. 
 
There exist a number of contributions that extend the basic model of 
asymmetric tax competition111. Other papers, like Kanbur and Keen (1993), 
readdress the issue of asymmetries to other fields of taxation. However, none of 
the literature on asymmetric tax competition has considered income shifting so 
far. This is the aim of the present chapter where we incorporate competition for 
taxable income into a framework of asymmetric capital tax competition. Even 
with income shifting, equilibrium tax rates for the small jurisdiction will be 
lower than that for the large jurisdiction. Our main result is that continuing 
economic integration, modelled as a reduction in the costs of income shifting, 
may lead the low-tax (small) jurisdiction to increase its tax rate. This implies 
that tax competition may become less severe if the competition for physical 
capital and paper profits are simultaneously allowed for.  
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2. lays out a theoretical model of 
income shifting between asymmetric jurisdictions. In section 6.3. we compare 
our results with that of the basic model where there is no possibility for income 
shifting. Based on this comparison we conclude how equilibrium tax rates will 
change with the introduction of income shifting. Possible extensions and 
shortcomings of the model are discussed in section 6.4. Section 6.5. concludes.          
 
 
6.2. The Model 
 
6.2.1. General Framework 
The model used here starts from the work of Bucovetsky (1991). The world 
consists of two jurisdictions labelled A and B which are identical in all respects 
except for population size. Each jurisdiction has a fixed population which is 
                                                 
111 It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss this literature in more detail. An extensive 
review is provided by Wilson (1999). 
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immobile internationally. A representative individual in each jurisdiction 
inelastically supplies one unit of labour and owns k  units of capital. Thus, k  is 
also the average capital-labour ratio in the world if we assume that capital is 
fully employed112. Since capital is perfectly mobile among jurisdictions, it is 
possible that the capital-labour ratio employed in each country ik  differs from 
the world average capital-labour ratio. Denoting by is  the exogenous share of 
country i  on the world’s population such that 
 
1A Bs s+ =             (6.1) 
 
 the world average capital-labour ratio is given by 
 
A A B Bk s k s k= +            (6.2) 
 
Both jurisdictions produce a single, homogenous output whose price is 
normalized to unity. The production function is identical for the two 
jurisdictions and given by ( )if k . Furthermore, it is concave in its input, twice 
differentiable and exhibits constant returns to scale such that ( ) 0if k′ >  and 
( ) 0if k′′ < . Following Bucovetsky (1991), we assume a quadratic specification of 
the production function, which permits us to introduce several convenient 
simplifications113. Output and factor markets are perfectly competitive. 
 
Output in both jurisdictions is produced by one single representative 
multinational firm which operates a subsidiary in each jurisdiction. Both 
jurisdictions levy a source tax at rate it  on each unit of capital employed within 
its boundaries. With identical per capita endowments of capital, identical 
production technologies and identical preferences across jurisdictions, differences 
in tax rates are the only possible reason for capital flows in equilibrium. For the 
rest of this chapter, and without loss of generality, we assume that A Bt t≥ . As a 
result, there will be capital exports from the high tax jurisdiction A to the low 
tax jurisdiction B.  
                                                 
112 Of course, this is the case as long as the interest rate on capital r is positive. 
113 Relaxing this assumption does not affect our qualitative results in a substantial way. 
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6.2.2. Firm behaviour 
The representative firm tries to maximize its overall net profits by choosing the 
optimal levels of Ak  and Bk  taking into account the different tax rates and the 
interest rate r, which is endogenously determined and equal across jurisdictions. 
In addition, the firm has an opportunity for income shifting activities.  
 
To achieve comparable results to the standard model of Bucovetsky (1991), we 
model income shifting in a way that appears to be very simple: in order to avoid 
capital taxes in the high tax jurisdiction, the firm may underreport the amount 
of capital employed in jurisdiction A to the tax authorities. However, tax 
authorities in both jurisdictions can observe the total amount of capital (which 
is, by assumption, equal to the world population). Consequently, if information 
on tax payments is revealed in the public, e.g. through the balance sheet, a firm 
that underreports capital in jurisdiction A by a certain amount, has to 
overreport its use of capital in the low tax jurisdiction B by the same amount. 
Otherwise, tax authorities would observe tax evasion114. This view of income 
shifting captures one central strategy of multinational firms when minimising 
their overall tax burden - the allocation of debt (compare section 3.3.2). If, for 
example, the multinational firm can (partially) deduct its interest payments 
from the tax base, then it will allocate the largest possible share of its debt in 
the high tax jurisdiction. As a consequence, when compared to that of a 
national firm of equal size, the tax base of the multinational will be relatively 
low in the high tax jurisdiction and it will be relatively high in the low tax 
jurisdiction. Our model captures this situation by using the amount of capital 
declared in each country as a proxy for the tax base115.  
                                                 
114 If information on firm’s tax payments in the foreign jurisdiction is not accessible, one may 
alternatively assume that tax authorities voluntary exchange this information in order to fight 
tax evasion.   
115 Therefore, this work is in line with other recent papers that use a similar approach (see e.g. 
the study by Mintz and Smart, 2004, discussed in section 3.3.3.). Moreover, it is in line with 
empirical findings, too. As Grubert (2003) points out, almost one half of income shifting is done 
with financing strategies including debt allocation. According to his results, transfer pricing 
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To limit the extent of income shifting in our model, from now on also referred 
to as “misreporting”, we assume that these activities involve resource costs to 
the firm. We assume that the total costs of misreporting increase linearly with 
the tax base116 and are given by: 
 
( , )θ α β Ak  
 
where the function ( , )θ α β  is defined as: 
 
2( , )
2
βθ α β α=            (6.3) 
 
The parameter [ ]0,β ∈ ∝  is exogenously given and describes the general costs 
for misreporting activities. This parameter can be related to the degree of 
globalisation or to the tax code of the high tax jurisdiction. As can be seen from 
(6.3), costs increase with β . Accordingly, low values of β  may either depict a 
situation in which increased globalisation creates generous opportunities for the 
firm to undertake misreporting activities or a situation where there exist a 
number of loopholes in the national tax code that make it rather easy to shift 
income. The parameter [0,1]α ∈  is defined as the fraction of the tax base that is 
misreported. We assume that resource costs are a convex function of this 
parameter. This assumption is standard in the literature on both tax evasion 
and income shifting (compare Chapter 5) and is justified by additional efforts 
that need to be taken in order to conceal the misreporting activity from tax 
authorities.  
                                                                                                                                               
techniques, which are often used in the related literature and which require to model a tax on 
profits, are not that commonly used in practise. 
116 Assuming that the costs of misreporting increase linear in the tax base considerably simplifies 
our analysis. As will be shown below in equation (6.5), the firm’s choice of α  then will be 
independent of the capital allocation between the two jurisdictions. Alternatively, one could 
consider the case where concealment costs are independent from the amount of capital invested 
in jurisdiction A. Then, the optimal level of misreporting would also depend on Ak . In this case, 
more capital would be allocated in the high tax jurisdiction in order to decrease concealment 
costs. As will be discussed in section 6.4 below, using this alternative function does not affect 
our qualitative results in a substantial way. 
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With these specifications, the overall net profits of the multinational firm are 
given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )A B A A B B A B A B A Af k f k t k t k k k r t t k kα θ α β∏ = + − − − + + − −     (6.4) 
 
The firm maximises equation (6.4) by choosing Ak , Bk  and α . In a first step, 
we derive the optimal fraction of Ak  to be misreported by differentiating (6.4) 
with respect to α 117:  
 
( ) ( , ) 0 ( , )A B A A A Bt t k k t tα αθ α β θ α β− − = = − −          (6.5) 
 
Solving for ( , )αθ α β  and rearranging, we get: 
 
A Bt tα β
−=             
 
As can bee seen from (6.5), misreporting only depends on the difference in tax 
rates between jurisdictions and on the exogenous parameter β . While an 
increase in At  will ceteris paribus increase the misreporting activities, an 
increase in Bt  will decrease misreporting. Implicitly differentiating (6.5), we get: 
 
 1
( , )A
d
dt αα
α
θ α β=  , 
1
( , )B A
d d
dt dtαα
α α
θ α β= − = −          (6.6) 
 
In a second step, we derive the allocation of capital between the two 
jurisdictions by differentiating equation (4) with respect to Ak  and Bk . Since the 
net return to capital r  must be equal among jurisdictions, we get: 
 
( ) (1 ) ( , ) ( )A A B B Bf k t t r f k tα α θ α β′ ′− − − − = = −   
 
which simplifies to: 
                                                 
117 Subscripts denote the partial derivative of the concealment cost function with respect to the 
corresponding parameter.  
  141
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( , ) 0A B B Af k f k t t α θ α β′ ′− + − − − =        (6.7) 
 
For a given tax pair ( At , Bt ), equation (6.5) and (6.7) completely determine the 
allocation of capital to the two jurisdictions, and its net return r . Note that, for 
the case where α  is zero, such that there is no misreporting, equation (6.7) 
reduces to ( ) ( )A A B Bf k t r f k t′ ′− = = − . In this case, we are back in the model of 
asymmetric tax competition by Bucovetsky (1991). Introducing misreporting 
activities now has the effect that the differences in the capital-labour ratio 
between the two jurisdictions are smaller. This effect is intuitive as misreporting 
decreases the effective tax rate the firm has to pay in the high tax jurisdiction 
and makes investment there more attractive. This is because the fraction α  of 
capital invested in A is effectively taxed at the lower tax rate of jurisdiction B. 
Since it is not the nominal tax rate it  but the effective tax rate that determines 
the degree of capital flows, this decrease in effective taxation reduces capital 
outflows from the high tax to the low tax jurisdiction. So, with misreporting, 
real capital mobility is partly substituted by “paper” mobility. That is, capital 
that would be reallocated from one jurisdiction to the other in the absence of 
misreporting opportunities now stays at its origin while the firm still reports an 
export/import of capital to the local tax authorities118.  
     
The next step is to determine the effect of changes in the tax rates on the 
allocation of capital: Solving equation (6.2) for Ak  and Bk , substituting in (6.7), 
implicitly differentiating and using (6.5) gives the change in each jurisdiction’s 
capital-labour ratio in response to a domestic and a foreign tax increase.   
 
(1 )
0
( ) ( )
ji
i i j j i
sdk
dt s f k s f k
α−= <′′ ′′+    }{, ,i j A B∈ ; i j≠             (6.8a) 
 
(1 )
0
( ) ( )
ji i
j i j j i i
sdk dk
dt s f k s f k dt
α−= − = − >′′ ′′+             (6.8b) 
                                                 
118 In the extreme case where the costs for misreporting are zero and hence all capital is reported 
in the low tax country, there would be no capital flows at all. In this case, however, the 
equilibrium tax rates for both jurisdictions would be the same. 
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As can be seen, while an increase in the domestic tax rate will drive away 
capital, an increase in the foreign tax rate will attract capital and hence increase 
the capital-labour ratio. Similar to the basic asymmetric tax competition model, 
the degree to which capital reacts to a change in tax rates crucially depends on 
the relative size of the jurisdiction. While the denominator of equation (6.8a) 
and (6.8b) is a constant that is equal for both jurisdictions in the case of a 
quadratic production function119, the numerator is larger for the small country. 
Consequently, an increase in the tax rate of the small jurisdiction will result in 
a higher outflow of capital. Our results deviate from those in the standard 
model since the reaction of capital with respect to a tax change also depends on 
the parameter α . For positive values of α , the effect of a tax change is lower 
than in the standard model. In relative terms /i idk dt  will be lower for both 
jurisdictions. In absolute terms, the decrease will be stronger for the smaller 
jurisdiction. This result resembles the findings of Mintz and Smart (2004) that 
income shifting tends to make the location of real investment less responsive to 
tax rate differentials (compare section 2.1.5) and can be summarised in: 
 
Proposition 6.1.: The tax-sensitivity of real investment will decrease with the 
fraction of income that is shifted from the high tax jurisdiction to the low tax 
jurisdiction.       
 
 
6.2.3. The government’s problem 
Governments in each jurisdiction set their capital tax rate so to maximize per-
capita tax revenue. This is consistent with the assumption of a “Leviathan” 
type government or of a welfare maximizing government when the marginal 
benefit of a public good is constant and exceeds marginal welfare from private 
consumption. We assume that jurisdictions behave non-cooperatively in setting 
tax rates and that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which A Bt t> 120. 
                                                 
119 Using equation (6.1), the denominator in equation (6.8a) and (6.8b) simplifies to ′′f .      
120 An asymmetric equilibrium exists as long as it holds that 1α < . 
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Due to the asymmetry of our model, revenue for the two jurisdictions is 
composed differently. Revenue for the high tax jurisdiction is given by: 
 
(1 )A A AR t kα= −                      (6.9a) 
 
Revenue for the low tax jurisdiction is given by: 
 
B B B B AR t k t kα= +                  (6.9b) 
 
Differentiating equation (6.9a) with respect to At , the revenue-maximizing tax 
rate for jurisdiction A, for any tax rate chosen by jurisdiction B, is given by the 
following condition: 
 
( , ) (1 ) (1 ) 0A AA B A A A
A A
dk dF t t k k t
dt dt
αα α = − + − − =              (6.10a) 
 
When setting its tax rate, the high tax jurisdiction has to consider the following 
effects: first, tax revenue per unit of capital reported in A will change. Second, 
there will be an inflow (outflow) of capital to (from) jurisdiction B. Third, the 
tax rate determines α , which will partly replace real capital flows between A 
and B with flows that only exist on paper. An increase in At  will simultaneously 
decrease Ak  and increase α . As a result, there are two negative effects for the 
tax base.     
 
The revenue-maximizing value for the low tax jurisdictions tax rate, now 
depending on the tax rate chosen by jurisdiction A, can be obtained by the 
following condition that results from differentiating (6.9b) with respect to Bt :  
 
( , ) 0B B AA B B A A B
B B B
dk dk dF t t k k k t
dt dt dt
αα α = + + + + =    
 
From equation (6.6), we know that ( )/ /B Ad dt d dtα α= − . Since we know from 
equation (6.8a) and (6.8b) that ( )( )/ / /B B A A A Bdk dt dk dt s s=  and 
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( )/ /A B A Adk dt dk dt= − , we can rewrite the condition for the optimal value of Bt  
as: 
 
( , ) ( ) 0B A AA B B A A B
B A A
s dk dF t t k k k t
s dt dt
αα α = + + − − =              (6.10b) 
 
In contrast to the high tax jurisdiction, an increase in Bt  now has three different 
effects. First, there will be capital outflows that decrease Bk . However, since any 
decrease in Bk  results in an increase in Ak , from which a fraction α  comes back 
for taxation “on paper”, the overall effect for the tax base is weakened. Finally, 
an increase in Bt  will decrease misreporting activities which has an negative 
impact for the tax base. 
 
In the Nash equilibrium, both conditions (6.10a) and (6.10b) have to be 
fulfilled. We now want to determine the required condition for the existence of 
this Nash equilibrium. Since ( , ) 0A A BF t t =  and ( , ) 0B A BF t t =  in equilibrium, it 
must also hold that ( , ) ( , )A BA B A BF t t F t t= . Thus, the Nash equilibrium pair of 
tax rates must obey: 
 
2 ( ) ( ) 0A A AA B A B A A B B A A
A B A A
dk s dk dk k k t t t t t t k
dt s dt dt
αα α  − − + − + − + − =              (6.11) 
 
Any parameter combination that does not meet condition (6.11) can be ruled 
out as a possible equilibrium solution. Investigating condition (6.11), it is 
straightforward to see that the term 2 Akα−  is negative for any α  greater than 
zero, which is obviously the case for A Bt t> . Additionally, we know from 
equation (6.6) that ( )( / )B A A At t d dt kα−  is negative in this case. Originating from 
k  in both jurisdictions, in equilibrium, we have capital flows from the high tax 
jurisdiction A to the low tax jurisdiction B. Hence, the term A Bk k−  has also to 
be negative. On the other hand, given that A Bt t> , and bearing in mind 
equation (6.8a) the term ( ) ( / )B A A At t dk dtα−  is clearly positive. However, as 
shown in Appendix 6.A.1., this positive term is more than offset by the negative 
term A Bk k− . Finally, we have to investigate the sign of the last term:  
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A A
A B
B A
s dkt t
s dt
 −  
                    (6.12) 
 
As all other terms are negative, this term has to be positive to fulfil condition 
(6.11). In equilibrium, it therefore must hold that: 
 
0B A A Bs t s t− <                   (6.13) 
 
This condition can be fulfilled if, and only if, A Bs s> . This gives us: 
 
Proposition 6.2.: In an asymmetric equilibrium of tax competition with income 
shifting, the capital tax rate levied by a small jurisdiction will always be lower 
than that levied by a large jurisdiction.  
 
This is consistent with the results of Bucovetsky (1991), which state, that in the 
case of tax competition between two jurisdictions of different size, and without 
misreporting activities, the small jurisdiction will levy the lower tax rate. 
Introducing income shifting will therefore not alter the main result of the 
standard model. This is, of course, not a surprising result: The small 
jurisdictions lower tax rate stems from the fact that, as compared to the large 
jurisdiction, it faces a higher outflow of capital for a given change in its tax 
rate. As shown by equation (6.8a), although weakened by misreporting 
activities, this effect is still at work in our model.  
 
Up to this point of our analysis, we only know that Bt  will be lower than At  in 
equilibrium. However, therewith we have not made a statement on how the 
capital-labour ratio, tax rates, and tax revenue will change by introducing 
misreporting activities. This will be addressed in the next section.      
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6.3. Comparative statics 
 
6.3.1. Variation of the exogenous income shifting parameter   
To evaluate the effects of income shifting on the two jurisdictions we carry out 
a comparative static analysis. This is, we investigate how the variation of the 
exogenous concealment cost parameter β  influences the choice of the two tax 
rates in equilibrium. Following Dixit (1986) the direction of changes of the 
optimal tax rate of jurisdiction i  in response to a variation in β  is then 
determined by: 
 
. .j i
i
ji i
t const t const
j
dtdt dt dFsign sign
d d dt dβ β β= =
   = +       
  }{, ,i j A B∈ ; i j≠      (6.14) 
 
where the first term on the right hand side depicts the direct effect of a change 
in the parameter β , while the second term depicts the indirect effect. The 
direct effect determines how a change in the exogenous cost parameter affects 
the optimal choice of jurisdiction i  given that jurisdiction j  does not change its 
tax rate in response to a change in β . The indirect effect determines the 
response of it  to a change in jt  that is induced by the change in β .  To 
determine the sign of equation (6.14) we first have to take a closer look at both 
the direct and the indirect effects for each jurisdiction.    
 
 
6.3.2. Derivation of direct effects   
To determine the direct effect for the low tax jurisdiction B, we have to 
implicitly differentiate condition (6.10b) with respect to the exogenous cost 
parameter β . Using equation (6.8a) and (6.6) we get: 
 
( )
.
12 1
02(1 )( ) 2
A
A B B
B
t const
A B A
A
dk s t
f ddt
dd s s k
f dt
αα β
αβ α α=
 − + − ′′ = <
− − −′′
               (6.15) 
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with 0d
d
α
β <  from equation (6.5). 
 
We know that the denominator of equation (6.15), which is equal to the second 
order condition for the revenue maximising tax rate of jurisdiction B, will 
always be negative since ( )A Bs sα−  is always positive. Furthermore, since 
( )2 1α −Bs  is always lower than zero121, the numerator is positive. Therefore we 
can state that the sign of equation (6.15) is negative. This gives us: 
 
Proposition 6.3a.: For a given tax rate in the high tax jurisdiction, the tax rate 
of the low tax jurisdiction will decrease in β .  
 
Stated differently, a decrease in the concealment cost parameter β , which 
results in an increase in income shifting activities, will lead to higher tax rates 
for the small jurisdiction. At first sight, this result is counterintuitive since one 
may expect that income shifting will lead to a higher mobility of the tax base. 
Note first, however, that as shown by Proposition 6.2., the elasticity of real 
investment decreases since real capital flows are substituted by “paper” flows. 
Second, the tax base of jurisdiction B is increasing in α , since a higher fraction 
of the capital employed in A will be shifted towards jurisdiction B. Although an 
increase in the tax rate of jurisdiction B will diminish α , the net effect will 
always be positive. As a result, the elasticity of the tax base will decrease in α . 
If this is the case, and if misreporting costs decrease, then it is straightforward 
that the optimal reaction of jurisdiction B, assuming that jurisdiction A will not 
change its policy, is to increase its tax rate. This will result in higher tax 
revenues for the small jurisdiction.         
 
We now want to investigate how the variation in the concealment costs will 
change the tax rate for the high tax jurisdiction A, holding the tax rate for 
jurisdiction B constant. Analogous to the case of jurisdiction B, we implicitly 
differentiate equation (6.10a) and get: 
 
                                                 
121 This follows from equation (6.1), the equilibrium condition A Bs s>  and 1α < . 
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.
1(1 )(1 )
01(1 )(2 2 ) 2
B
A A B
A
t const
A B A
A A
dk t s
f ddt
d dd t s k
dt f dt
αα β
α αβ α α=
 − − + − − ′′ = >
− − − −′′
     (6.16) 
 
While the numerator is clearly negative, the sign of the denominator can not be 
determined that easy. The denominator is identical to the second order 
condition for the tax revenue maximizing tax rate in jurisdiction A. Hence, it 
has to be negative122. So, with the denominator being negative, the sign of 
equation (6.16) is positive. This positive sign implies: 
 
Proposition 6.3b.: For a given tax rate in the low tax jurisdiction, the tax rate of 
the high tax jurisdiction will increase in β .  
 
According to Proposition 6.3b., an exogenous decrease in the costs of income 
shifting leads to lower taxes in the large jurisdiction, if the tax rate of the small 
jurisdiction remains unchanged. Hence, the best response to an increase in the 
level of income shifting (stemming from a decrease in the exogenous cost 
parameter) for jurisdiction A is to decrease its tax rate. The effect of income 
shifting is thus the reverse from the case of the low tax jurisdiction. An 
exogenous decrease in β  that increases α  will make the domestic tax base 
more elastic. This is the case since the outflows of taxable income are higher 
than the inflows of real investments. For a given tax rate, this will reduce 
revenues for the high tax jurisdiction. By decreasing its tax rate, the high tax 
jurisdiction will diminish α  so that the negative effect of income shifting is 
reduced. Accordingly, for a given policy of the low tax jurisdiction, increasing 
                                                 
122 One can show that the second order condition is fulfilled: From equation (6.6) we know that 
/ 1/ ( , )Ad dt ααα θ α β= . To prevent income shifting ( 0α = ) in the case of different tax rates, 
( , )θ α β  and so ( , )ααθ α β  has to be infinite while it has to be zero to guarantee full income 
shifting ( 1α = ). Now, we can determine the sign of the denominator using (6.6): For α  close 
to zero, the first term converges to 2 /Bs f ′′ , which is obviously negative, while the second term 
converges to zero. For α  close to one, the first term of the denominator disappears while the 
second, negative, term increases to infinity.  
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income shifting will reduce tax revenues for the high tax jurisdiction. It thereby 
induces the jurisdiction to lower its tax rate.    
 
      
6.3.3. Comparative statics in equilibrium 
As can be seen from equation (6.15) and (6.16), the two direct effects have 
opposite signs. To determine the general equilibrium effects in equation (6.14), 
we next determine the indirect effects. This is relegated to section 6.A.2. of the 
appendix where we show that both reaction functions are upward sloping 
( / 0i jdF dt > ). Together with the condition for the stability of the Nash 
equilibrium we get: 
 
0 / 1i jdF dt< <                    (6.17) 
 
Hence, we have not only opposite signs for the direct effects in the two 
jurisdictions but we have also opposite signs for the direct and indirect effects in 
each jurisdiction. Given the complexity of equation (6.14), which depends on 
the combination of the endogenous parameters At , Bt  and α , for which our 
model can not be solved, we can not determine general equilibrium effects. 
According to (6.15) and (6.16) and illustrated by Figure 6.1., a decrease in the 
exogenous income shifting cost parameter β , which leads to an increase in 
income shifting activities, makes the reaction functions of the two tax rates 
steeper. We have to distinguish three possible outcomes of this change in 
reaction functions.  
 
Possibility 1 (Figure 6.1a.): The direct effect on the large jurisdiction A is 
rather high compared to that for the small jurisdiction B. The equilibrium 
moves from its initial point 0E  to the point 1E . In the new equilibrium both 
jurisdictions levy lower tax rates. In this case, the tax reduction in At  puts 
strong downward pressure on Bt , and thus overcompensates the direct effect in 
the small jurisdiction B. While the large jurisdiction unambiguously loses tax 
revenue from an increase in income shifting this is not clear for the small 
jurisdiction. On the one hand, the small jurisdiction still gains from the 
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misreporting of capital inputs. On the other hand, it suffers from increased tax 
competition and the resulting lower equilibrium tax rates.  
 
Figure 6.1.  
Equilibrium tax rate changes 
  
 
(a)      (b) 
     
   (c) 
 
Possibility 2 (Figure 6.1b.): The direct effect dominates for both jurisdictions 
(i.e. /i jdF dt  is small). The equilibrium moves from its initial point 0E  to the 
point 2E . In the new equilibrium the high tax jurisdiction decreases its tax rate 
At
( )B At t
( )A Bt t
0E
3E
Bt
At
( )B At t
( )A Bt t
0E
2E
Bt
At
Bt
( )B At t
( )A Bt t
0E
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while the low tax jurisdiction increases its tax rate. While the large jurisdiction 
unambiguously loses tax revenue, the small jurisdiction gains revenue from an 
increase in income shifting activities. 
 
Possibility 3 (Figure 6.1c.): The direct effect on the small jurisdiction B is 
rather high compared to that for the large jurisdiction A. The equilibrium 
moves from its initial point 0E  to the point 3E . In the new equilibrium both 
jurisdictions levy higher tax rates. In this case, the tax increase in Bt  allows 
jurisdiction A likewise to increase its tax rate. This effect is strong enough to 
overcompensate the direct effect in the large jurisdiction A. Since the small 
jurisdiction unambiguously gains from income shifting, there is the possibility 
that an increase in income shifting will be beneficial for both jurisdictions. Even 
though tax revenue of the large jurisdiction is still negatively affected by the 
misreporting of capital inputs, it gains from increased tax rates in equilibrium. 
 
As a result we can state that income shifting will not inevitably lead to 
increased pressure on tax rates, as first intuition would suggest. In fact it might 
also lead to a rise in both tax rates. An intermediate, and not implausible, 
scenario is to assume that the direct effect dominates for both jurisdictions. In 
this case, a decrease in the exogenous cost parameter will lead to convergence in 
capital tax rates. 
 
 
6.4. Discussion and possible extensions 
Even though income shifting is thought of as increasing the mobility of tax 
bases and thereby promoting competition between jurisdictions, we have shown 
that it will not inevitably result in a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates. 
Instead, income shifting may also lead to convergence in tax rates which 
counteracts the effects of differences in size or it may even lead to an 
uncoordinated increase in tax rates. Furthermore, not considering general 
equilibrium effects, the high tax jurisdiction will be worse off while the low tax 
jurisdiction gains from income shifting. This is what distinguishes this particular 
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study from other work that finds income shifting to spur competition (e.g. 
Gordon and McKie-Mason, 1995, Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000). What is 
crucial is the fact that in the symmetric case none of the jurisdictions will gain 
from income shifting since it will not take place in equilibrium. In our model, 
however, one country benefits from income shifting and may have incentives to 
increase its tax rate.  
 
This is also an important issue concerning the question whether both 
jurisdictions may agree to co-ordinate tax rates. As Wilson (1991) has shown, in 
the absence of income shifting, it may be possible that potential gains from 
competition are comparatively large for the small jurisdiction. Eggert and 
Haufler (1998) analyse the conditions for which this is the case. They show that 
potential gains are generally, and often strongly, reduced when real-world 
features such as imperfect mobility are considered. From their results, they 
conclude that only a few and very small jurisdictions can benefit from tax 
competition and that an agreement to co-ordinate tax rates may be possible. 
Our analysis in the previous section has shown that if income shifting is 
introduced into this model, the small jurisdiction has some extra gains which 
make it more likely that it can benefit from competition. Therefore, any 
attempt to co-ordinate capital taxes will be even more difficult than has been 
anticipated in the earlier literature.   
 
Our results may also be relevant in light of the current debate on a 
harmonisation of tax bases among the EU as it has been proposed by the 
Commission of the European Communities (2001). A switch from separate 
accounting to a consolidated tax base will, in any case, increase the costs of 
income shifting. For our model, this means to increase β  and thereby to 
decrease α . If direct effects dominate in general equilibrium, then the 
implementation of the Commission’s proposal will lead to more divergence in 
tax rates. If the indirect effect dominates for the large jurisdiction, then a 
switch away from separate accounting will even result in increased tax 
competition. A similar effect has been derived by Keen (2001) for the related 
problem of preferential taxation: Given that competition through income 
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shifting is restricted, jurisdictions revert to traditional tax competition, using 
their remaining instrument, the tax rate more aggressively.        
 
Furthermore, our model may explain the inconclusive results of a number of 
empirical studies measuring how globalisation influences national tax rates and 
revenues123. Given our results, if increased income shifting is the outcome of 
globalisation, then it will be hard to answer the question whether globalisation 
leads to more or less pressure on tax systems, simply by studying the relation 
between (an index for) globalisation and capital tax rates. Empirical work 
concentrating on the relation between globalisation and revenues may meet 
similar problems. Here, it is a crucial point that the existence of income shifting 
may generate extra revenue for low (and in some cases even for high) tax 
regions.  
 
The results obtained above rely on a number of simplifying assumptions. One 
important assumption was the independence of the firm’s investment and 
misreporting decisions (see equation (6.3)), which implies that increasing 
investment in one jurisdiction has no effect on the overall concealment costs. 
Instead, as we have argued in Chapter 5, misreporting may become less costly 
the more capital is employed in a jurisdiction since it is then easier to conceal 
this activity from tax authorities. A very simple way to incorporate this 
interdependence in our model would be to make the concealment costs 
dependent on Ak  or Bk
124. As briefly discussed in footnote 116, this would 
introduce another distortion into our model since any additional investment in 
jurisdiction A or B will then represent an investment in tax avoidance. 
However, this extension of the basic model will not change our qualitative 
                                                 
123  Garrett (1995) tries to estimated capital tax rates among OECD countries in the years from 
1967 to 1990 as a function of a capital mobility index. He finds no significant effects. Swank 
(2001) even finds a positive correlation between globalisation and tax revenues. 
124 If we use 2( , ) Akθ α β  as total costs for income shifting, we are in a situation in which the 
optimal level of income shifted depends negatively on Ak . An alternative, in which concealment 
costs decrease with the amount of capital employed in the low tax jurisdiction, is presented in 
Chapter 5. Note that this type of modelling corresponds to the implementation of a “thin-
capitalisation rule”.    
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results. For example, let us assume that concealment costs decrease with Ak
125. 
In this case, income shifting still has a negative effect on jurisdiction A 
(compared to a world where there is no income shifting at all) but the 
additional investment in tax avoidance reduces this negative effect. As a result, 
jurisdiction A will still reduce its tax rate in order to minimise income shifting, 
but the reduction will be smaller than in the basic model. For jurisdiction B, 
the positive effect of income shifting will be smaller than in the basic model 
since the additional investment in A implies lower investment in jurisdiction B. 
 
Another interesting point would be to consider the effect of income shifting on 
labour income (the fixed factor). As shown by Mintz and Smart (2004) and 
confirmed by our study, income shifting makes the allocation of real capital less 
responsive to tax rate differences. For a given tax differential, this implies that, 
whenever income shifting increases, the large jurisdiction will gain some capital 
at the expense of the small jurisdiction. This will also alter the return of the 
complementary factor, labour. Since governments simply maximize their capital 
tax revenue in our model, they do not consider these effects when setting tax 
rates126. In reality, however, we observe an increasing policy interest in 
attracting physical investment in order to fight unemployment. This aspect can 
be incorporated by extending the government’s revenue function such that 
revenue consists of two components, revenue from capital taxes and revenue 
from labour taxes. We then have two counteracting effects of income shifting, 
one affecting the capital tax base and an additional one affecting the labour tax 
base. Depending on the size of the additional effect, our results from above may 
be weakened or even turned around. For instance, one may think about a 
situation in which most revenue of the large jurisdiction stems from the 
taxation of labour income. An increase in income shifting activities will then 
                                                 
125 For the case where concealment costs decrease with investment in jurisdiction B, the 
argumentation is very similar.  
126 An interesting paper dealing with the effects of income shifting on real investment is Peralta, 
Wauthy and van Ypersele (2003). In their model, the location of a firm yields positive 
externalities for the host country. This is related to the potential positive effects on labour 
income described here. They show that the positive externality of real investment may 
overcompensate for the loss of capital tax revenue in the high tax jurisdiction.  
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reduce the capital tax base and enlarge the labour tax base. If the overall effect 
is revenue increasing, the large jurisdiction effectively gains from income shifting 
and hence has an incentive to raise its capital tax rate in order to further 
increase income shifting.  
 
     
6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have extended the literature on tax competition between 
countries of unequal size (Bucovetsky, 1991) by giving multinational enterprises 
the possibility to engage in costly cross-border income shifting activities. For 
revenue maximising governments that have only one tax instrument, we have 
shown that it is the smaller of two otherwise identical jurisdictions that levies 
the lower tax rate in equilibrium. 
 
We then studied how a change in income shifting costs affects equilibrium tax 
rates. The direct effect of a reduction in the costs for income shifting is to 
increase the tax rate chosen by the small jurisdiction and to decrease the tax 
rate chosen by the large jurisdiction. If indirect effects, caused by the response 
of each jurisdiction’s tax rate to the tax change in the competing jurisdiction, 
are not too large, then we get convergence in tax rates. In general, however, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that the indirect effect dominates the direct effect 
in either the small or the large jurisdiction. If this is the case, income shifting 
may either lead to a “race to the bottom” or to a “race to the top” with respect 
to the rates of capital taxation.   
 
This result has some important policy implications. If income shifting induces 
the small jurisdiction to increase and the large jurisdiction to decrease its tax 
rate, then any attempt to reduce income shifting will lead to more divergence in 
tax rates. In this case however, high tax countries will lose some further tax 
revenue. Contrary to what one might expect, preventing income shifting may 
even lead to increased tax competition, which may harm the high tax country 
more than income shifting by itself. The reason is that some investment in the 
  156
high tax country, which is profitable in the case of income shifting, becomes 
non-profitable when income shifting is not possible any more. Policymakers 
should be aware of this possibility when discussing the implementation of a 
consolidated tax base for the European Union.  
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6.A. Appendix to Chapter 6 
 
6.A.1. Determining the sign of selected terms in equation (6.11) 
Assuming a quadratic production function of the form 2( )i i if k ak bk= − . The first 
and second derivatives of the production function with respect to ik  are given 
by: 
 
( ) 2i if k a bk′ = −                 (6.A.1) 
 
and ( ) 2if k b′′ = −                 (6.A.2) 
 
Rearranging equation (6.7) yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( , )A B B Af k f k t t α θ α β′ ′− = − − +              (6.A.3) 
 
Substituting (6.A.1) and (6.A.2) in (6.A.3) we get: 
 
[ ] 1( )(1 ) ( , ) 0A B A Bk k t t fα θ α β− = − − − <′′              (6.A.4) 
 
This has to be compared with: 
 
2 1( ) ( )( )AB A A B B
A
dkt t t t s
dt f
α α α − = − − −  ′′              (6.A.5) 
 
Summing up (6.A.4) and (6.A.5), we get: 
 
2 1( )(1 ) ( , ) 0A B B Bt t s s f
α α α θ α β − − − + − <  ′′                  (6.A.6) 
 
which is negative for any α  below one and gets zero for 1α = . 
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6.A.2. Derivation of equation (6.17) 
Implicitly differentiating condition (6.10b) with respect to the tax rate of 
jurisdiction A, we get for the low tax jurisdiction: 
 
1(1 )( 1) (3 1)
02(1 )( ) 2
B B B B B AB
A A
A
A B A
A
d ds s s s t k
dt f dtdF
ddt s s k
f dt
α αα α α
αα α
  − − + − + − − +   ′′  = >
− − −′′
          (6.A.7) 
 
which is obviously positive, since both, the numerator as well as the 
denominator are negative. 
 
Implicitly differentiating condition (6.10a) with respect to the tax rate of 
jurisdiction B, we get for the high tax jurisdiction: 
 
1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
01(1 )(2 2 ) 2
A A A AA
A A
B
A B A
A A
d dt s s k
dt f dtdF
d ddt t s k
dt f dt
α αα α
α αα α
  − − − − − +   ′′  = >
− − − −′′
          (6.A.8) 
 
Again, the numerator is negative. Since we know from equation (6.16) that the 
denominator is also negative, equation (6.A.8) is positive. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
Increased economic integration and the implementation of the single market 
have enlarged the mobility of business within the European Union. Foreign 
direct investment between member states has increased and multinational 
enterprises have become more and more important for European economies. 
This led to the fear that multinationals may put competitive pressure on 
governments to reduce corporate taxation, resulting in a “race to the bottom” 
in which both tax rates and tax revenues collected from corporate taxation will 
be extremely low. 
 
However, mobility alone is not sufficient for harmful tax competition to take 
place. Additionally, multinational enterprises have to react to differences in 
taxation across potential host countries. The empirical literature so far has 
analysed the location decisions of multinational enterprises within the European 
Union and how they are determined by corporate tax rates. It is established 
that foreign direct investment is indeed deterred by high tax rates and studies 
conclude that there is scope for harmful tax competition to take place. 
Nevertheless, all these studies use data on aggregated FDI to estimate the 
reaction of multinationals to changes in tax policy. FDI is a very heterogeneous 
measure (see section 1.2.2.) and determinants may vary for different types of 
investment. While some investment is very sensitive to taxation, other 
investments may be insensitive to taxation. Estimation results of studies using 
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aggregated data may therefore be inaccurate and only of limited help when used 
by tax authorities. This was the starting point of the present work that aimed 
to analyse the determinants of FDI and in particular its sensitivity to corporate 
taxation in more detail by using disaggregated data on multinational activity. 
 
In a first step, Chapter 2 gave an overview on theories of the location decision 
of multinational firms. It was found that taxes are an integral part of the 
determinants of FDI and of the allocation of reported taxable income among the 
affiliates of the enterprise. We then proceeded with a discussion on how the tax 
burden imposed on an investment project can be measured. We concluded that 
the theoretical concept of effective average tax rates should be used in an 
econometric analysis since more simple measures such as implicit tax rates are 
associated with certain pitfalls. Moreover, we suggested that the statutory tax 
rate may be a better indicator for the incentives to shift income than for the 
decision where to locate real economic activity.  
 
In Chapter 3, we then presented a review of the empirical literature on the tax 
sensitivity of investment and taxable income. We identified several 
shortcomings of these studies. While some studies on US data have found first 
evidence that the distinction of different types of FDI matters, we found that 
studies concerned with the location decision of FDI in Europe almost exclusively 
rely on aggregated FDI data instead. A closer look at the empirical literature on 
income shifting then revealed a lack of evidence for the EU. Moreover, we 
emphasized that most of the literature in this field analysed the location 
decision of real activity separately from the decision to shift income. Given that 
these decisions interact in reality, we concluded that further research on this 
issue is needed.                      
 
To fill these empirical gaps, we made use of disaggregated data on multinational 
activities. In Chapter 4, we empirically tested if foreign direct investment flows 
in the three main economic sectors differ in their sensitivity to tax rates. Our 
results suggest that this is certainly the case. We found that investment in 
agriculture and mining is not driven by tax incentives. Taxes matter, however, 
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with respect to FDI flows into the manufacturing and the service sector. The 
tax elasticity in the service sector is between 20% and 40% above the elasticity 
we would obtain when using aggregated data on FDI. Given the important role 
of the service sector for economic development in the last years, aggregated tax 
elasticities underestimate the effect of taxes. Taking these results together, we 
concluded that the aggregated elasticities provided by the empirical literature so 
far are only of limited help for tax planning. Moreover, we found that other 
factors such as market size play in important role in determining FDI. 
Accordingly, high tax rates can be outweighed with other locational advantages 
so that a “race to the bottom” becomes less likely.  
 
In Chapter 5, we then analysed whether different types of FDI respond in 
different ways to alternative tax measures. We pursued this question with data 
on foreign activities of large German multinational enterprises. We developed a 
small theoretical model in which income shifting is a feasible strategy for some 
but not for all firms. Theoretical results suggested that the location decision of 
firms that have ample opportunities for income shifting will be affected by 
statutory tax rates while the decisions of firms that can not make use of income 
shifting strategies will be affected by effective tax rates. By dividing foreign 
activities of German multinationals into two broad categories, we confirmed this 
assumption empirically. We concluded from these results that income shifting is 
indeed a tax minimising strategy for some German firms. Moreover, as the 
location decision of shifting firms was independent from other real economic 
factors, we concluded that income shifting may result in a “race to the bottom”.        
 
After having found empirical evidence for income shifting, we turned to theory. 
In Chapter 6 we developed a theoretical model in which the tax rates set by two 
competing jurisdictions is endogenously determined by income shifting of 
multinational enterprises. For the case of asymmetric regions, we found that 
simultaneously allowing competition for physical capital and taxable income will 
not inevitably result in a “race to the bottom”. The presence of income shifting 
may reduce competitive pressure. We discussed this result in the context of 
several proposals that try to limit the possibilities of income shifting in the 
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European Union. In this respect, our theoretical results may be quite important 
since they imply that the limitation of income shifting may reinforce 
competition with other tax instruments.  
 
The results obtained here may be relevant for several policy purposes as well as 
for further research. Our empirical results suggest that future research should 
use more disaggregated data on foreign direct investments when evaluating the 
effect of taxation. Elasticities provided so far may under- or overestimate the 
effect of tax policy. Moreover, the study gives first evidence for income shifting 
activities among German multinationals. Tax authorities should take care of 
this result. Finally, we found that allowing for income shifting may decrease 
competitive pressure on tax rates. Tax authorities should be careful when 
enacting policies to prevent income shifting since this may make things even 
worse.          
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